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Changing Roles of Forests and Their Cross-Sectorial Linkages in 
the Course of Economic Development3 
 
Uma Lele, Alain Karsenty, Catherine Benson, Judicaël Fétiveau, Manmohan Agarwal 
and Sambuddha Goswami 
 
 
Findings, Conclusions and Implications for the Future 
 
Questions We Address  
 
In this paper we addressed several questions: 
 
1. What key factors underlie changes in forest cover as countries undergo structural 
transformation, i.e., shift from being predominantly forest and agricultural producers 
and exporters to manufacturing and service sectors, urbanize and move from low to 
high income countries? 
 
2. What can we learn from the experience of the past several decades about the 
relationship of forests to other sectors and particularly to the dynamic external 
environment? 
 
3. Is economic growth and prosperity possible without causing further damage to 
the forest cover and quality and the environment? 
 
4. What is the future of forests in a globalized world given dramatic changes in the 
global context? 
 
5. What are the implications for policies and investments for more pro-forest 
outcomes going forward?  
 
The United Nations Forum on Forests has rightly called for better mapping of the forest 
finance landscape to create a clearer understanding of the types and potential impacts of 
complementary public and private investment on future forests. Also a question arises: 
financing for what? To bridge the gap between the finance and substantive issues the 
UNFF commissioned three background papers including this one on the cross sectorial 
linkages of forests in the course of economic development. The principle message of this 
                                                          
3 United Nations Forum on Forests Open-ended Intergovernmental Ad Hoc Expert Group on Forest financing, Second Meeting 
(AHEG2). 
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paper is that forests are complexly woven with other sectors of the economy. Therefore 
focusing narrowly on forests has increasingly diminishing returns. Furthermore 
focusing on the environmental aspects of forests, without regard to hard core 
development issues have few returns in terms of sustainable forest management. 
 
The Continued Challenges of Reconciling Environment and Development 
and the Unequal Voice in International Deliberations 
 
As a background to the findings of our study and their implications for the future we 
first outline the complex substantive challenge of forest management in the course of 
economic development. This is then followed by a brief history of the response of the 
international community to that challenge. Our purpose in providing this background 
before presenting our findings is to establish that international interventions in forest 
management of developing countries have often lacked a holistic view of the land use 
and land use changes caused by the fundamental processes of development. They have 
often been focused on a single issue, and the external engagement has typically been 
fickle. Furthermore far too often the international focus has been driven by 
constituencies with the perspectives of developed countries. The interventions have only 
partially achieved their objectives but concurrently, and perhaps unwittingly ,diverted 
attention from the key challenges developing countries face in formulating and 
implementing holistic, farsighted, consistent and predictable inter-sectorial policies and 
practices needed to foster sustainable forest management concurrently with rapid, 
broad-based and sustainable overall economic growth. That is the central purpose of 
this paper 
 
Forests’ Multiple Values and the Analytical Challenges 
 
Forests’ multiple values and their nature have compounded the challenge of being able 
to view them holistically. They provide services ranging from their sheer existence value, 
to values of timber, biodiversity, ecosystem services of water, soil, carbon, cultural 
values, livelihood for forest dependent people, recreational, medicinal and human 
health benefits. But forests are also influenced by factors outside the forest sector, land 
conversion to agriculture and livestock, investments in transportation, power and 
urbanization needs. Forests have not simply been a source of subsistence, medicinal 
products and health but also sources of scourges of human diseases and conflict 
movements. They provide bundles of public, private and common pool goods and 
“bads”. Given their remoteness, they are often associated with poor governance, massive 
corruption, and poverty of forest dependent people, ambiguous property rights and 
contested claims. Forests have recently been at the forefront of climate change 
mitigation, whereas they are also severely affected by climate change. Some features are 
neither quantifiable, nor have market values. Others entail subsistence activities and 
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informal exchange. Many of these features of forests are multi-sectorial and interact in a 
complex way. Analytical tools and data are often woefully inadequate from the existing 
disciplinary armour to get a full handle over them. There is a growing consensus 
reinforced by this current UNFF process that the full contribution of forests is poorly 
understood, grossly undervalued, inadequately measured and neglected at best4.As a 
result forests have not been recognized to have contributed their full potential to 
sustainable development. To correct this situation a renewed effort is needed to look at 
the forest sector for what it offers. 
 
The urgency is great. As developing countries grow rapidly, much as they have in the last 
few decades, their growth will continue to exert enormous and growing pressure on 
natural resources of land, water and forests, driving land use changes, with profound 
implications for forest outcomes, and their contribution to economic growth, equity and 
environmental sustainability. This paper is meant to shed light on some of these issues 
from a review of the changing roles and not insignificantly, changing views of forests. 
 
Today’s Debates in the Context of the Post-World War II International 
Cooperation on Forests 
 
Following the unceremonious abandonment of the Tropical Forestry Action Program 
(TFAP), for its alleged top down nature, FAO’s estimates of the dramatic increase in the 
loss of tropical forests in the 1980s attracted much attention, especially in the run up to 
the UNCED conference in Rio de Janeiro in 1991.5 TFAP was established by FAO in 1985 
with the active support of the World Bank, UNDP and the World Resources Institute. 
The international concern about forest loss which ensued in the late 1980s has many 
parallels with today’s REDD+. In place of the focus on climate change now, then the 
concern was rather exclusively focused on conserving biodiversity in the primary 
tropical moist forests, although other forests with substantial biodiversity and other 
uses, such as fuel wood and fodder were also disappearing at an alarming rate. Indeed 
some were on the verge of extinction, e.g. forests in Mata Atlántica in Brazil and the 
Western Ghats of India and the dry forests of Africa, e.g. in Tanzania, Zambia and 
Sudan. Apart from their rich biodiversity, many of these forests were and still remain 
home to the poorest forest dependent peoples. Fortunately, the Convention on 
Biodiversity was established to support conservation of all types of forest biodiversity, 
leading to the establishment of the Global Environmental Facility in 1992. But the 
funding was too small and too focused on biodiversity conservation without 
                                                          
4 A concurrent paper by Arun Agrawal et al estimates that the non-cash contributions of forests in the form of food, fuel wood, fibre, 
building material, timber, medicinal products is two to four times the cash values. 
 
5 1935 million ha, of which 1200 million ha were closed forests and 735 million ha were open tree formations. In addition, fallow 
forest land amounted to 410 million ha. The potential sustained yield capacity of the closed tropical forests was estimated at 5000 
million m3 of wood per year, assuming a growth of approximately 4 m3/yr./ha. Although this estimate may be on the high side. 
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understanding the full complexity of interactions between biodiversity, poverty and 
particularly the pressures on protected areas outside forests, except in the remotest 
areas of the world, a weakness the GEF is now attempting to correct by promoting a 
landscape approach. The issue of the fragmented support through the various 
conventions of biodiversity, international waters, climate and land degradation however 
continues. In the current fragmented international environmental architecture there is 
also no link between the carbon funds and the conventions as the UNFF study on forest 
financing makes clear (Lele et al 2011a). Private finance is currently the most significant 
source of investment for forestry. Estimated to total around us$ 15 billion per year in 
developing countries and countries in transition, private-sector investment in the 
forestry sector far outstrips the combined investments of governments and development 
agencies (Asen, Savenije and Schmidt 2012). Although broad sectorial investment 
parameters are generally well understood, the knowledge of the exact shape and weight 
of domestic and international flows is still work in progress with divergent estimates of 
private sector finance.  
 
With the influence of international NGOS, the World Bank established its forest strategy 
in1991 and became the largest single financial supporter of the forest sector. While 
acting as the implementer of GEF projects, it also provided direct lending and policy 
advisory support to the forest sectors of developing countries. The World Bank 
established ten environmental, social and cultural safeguards which became the 
standard for other international financial institutions. In a recent evaluation by the 
World Bank’s IEG Bank safeguards were said to have become out of date. Other 
international organizations including the UN agencies, the regional development banks 
and the IFC, living less in a fish bowl, and hence less subject to external scrutiny, were 
able to be more agile and have followed more flexible safeguards (IEG 2010). The 
implementation of the World Bank’s 1991 forest strategy had been limited in the forest 
rich countries in the 1990s. An interface between forestry and agricultural land 
conversion was lacking in the Bank’s forest strategy but active on the ground in the 
forest rich countries. An IEG (then OED) evaluation of the Bank’s 1991 forest strategy in 
2000 concluded that the strategy’s almost exclusive focus on conservation of the tropical 
moist forests, including the “logging ban” had a chilling effect on the demand for World 
Bank engagement particularly in the forest rich countries (World Bank 2002). 
Notwithstanding the conservation focus of the 1991 forest strategy the World Bank’s 
operational approach was rightly more pragmatic and more eclectic, but it had mixed 
results. It succeeded in helping to contain forest fires and expanding forest plantations 
in China, supporting joint forest management in India but tended to be caught in the 
controversy surrounding the issues of sustainable forest management in forest rich 
countries, which typically shunned the Bank’s presence. They wished to exploit their 
substantial forest resources for economic growth, while their forest sectors were often 
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also mired in corruption. The World Bank persevered to improve forest concessions in 
countries such as Cameroon.  
The revised World Bank forest strategy formed in 2002in light of the implementation 
experience reviewed in the OED evaluation, and based on world- wide consultations was 
an attempt to better reconcile development objectives of developing countries and yet 
maintain a conservation focus. It was accompanied by the revision of the operational 
policy towards sustainable forest management which softened the approach to forest 
management away from the blunt instrument of the logging ban after experience 
demonstrated that the World Bank staying away from financing logging did not stop 
logging, but undermined the Bank developing an understanding of the factors causing it. 
Providing a more balanced approach, the 2002 strategy’s three pillars, were an 
acknowledgement of the roles of forests in achieving social equity and environmental 
sustainability as well as economic growth. This means improving forest governance and 
trade as well as improving management of industrial logging using instruments such as 
reform of the forest concessions policy and implementation, forest certification and 
FLEGT, (Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade), while concurrently 
supporting the expansion of protected areas and participatory forest management 
involving forest dependent communities. Agriculture forestry links and how to foster 
them were still perhaps a weak link in the 2002 forest strategy although Bank 
operations in agriculture increasingly incorporated support for trees in agricultural 
projects. 
 
The 2013 IEG evaluation of the World Bank’s 2002 forest strategy, played out since the 
UNFF meeting in Vienna in January 2013, rightly pushes for more evidence of impacts 
of Bank interventions in the forest sector. But it has also reopened the Pandora’s Box 
about whether the World Bank should be involved in forest concession management, as 
if keeping the World Bank out of being engaged in improving concession management 
will get developing countries to abandon forest concessions as a tool of forest 
management or profit.6 The Committee on Development Effectiveness, (CODE) of the 
World Bank’s Executive Board which represents all member governments, rightly 
expressed strong and unambiguous support for continued World Bank Group (WBG) 
engagement in the Forest Sector, recognizing a unique role of the Bank group in 
supporting effective sustainable forest management in client countries, including 
supporting timber concession reforms. It rejected IEG’s recommendation urging a 
review of the Bank support to industrial logging regarding timber concession reform in 
                                                          
6 IEG Recommendation #3, “ Undertake and disclose a comprehensive review of the economic, environmental and social outcomes 
associated with World Bank support for industrial timber concession reforms in tropical moist forest countries with weak 
governance, including an analysis of the outcomes that could be achieved under alternative land-use schemes. Based on the 
evidence, determine whether and how the World Bank Group can realistically support effective sustainable forest management in 
tropical moist forest countries.”  IEG Evaluation, P 102.Managing Forest Resources for Sustainable Development an Evaluation of 
World Bank Group Experience, February 5, 2013. 
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tropical moist forest countries including an analysis of the outcomes that could be 
achieved under alternative land-use schemes to determine whether and how the World 
Bank Group can realistically support effective sustainable forest management in tropical 
moist forest countries”. It agreed with Bank management that the evaluation was 
swayed by particular interests and did not take into account the full evidence of the 
Bank effort. The controversy surrounding the desirability or otherwise of the World 
Bank’s presence in managing industrial concessions may have unwittingly high-jacked 
the international debate, yet once again, from the important underlying factors affecting 
the future of forests and missed an important opportunity.  
 
Arguments Behind REDD and REDD+ 
 
Failing to learn lessons from the implementation of the 1991 forest strategy as well, the 
international community moved on towards a single carbon centric, focus in the context 
of climate change negotiations, while effectively side-lining concerns about biodiversity 
conservation, poverty reduction among others, leading to a large number of forest 
carbon funds where international forest financing is now concentrated (Lele, Zazueta, 
Singer 2011c). REDD (Reducing Deforestation and Degradation, eventually leading to 
REDD+ ― the + denoting loss of other forest values and functions beyond carbon, was 
launched at the COP 15 meeting in Bali as a mitigation strategy to combat climate 
change, thus in reality with a continued focus on carbon. Developing countries have 
demanded adaptation funds to address the adverse impacts of climate change on their 
economies. These have been slow to take off on the argument that adaptation is difficult 
to distinguish from normal development activities and the capacity of countries most 
adversely affected by climate change has been limited to prepare “bankable” projects. 
 
The justification for REDD+ has been as follows: 
 
 Forest carbon emissions are significant. (They were estimated to contribute an 
estimated 17 percent of GHG emissions at the time of COP 15, but are now estimated to 
be between 10 and 15 percent partly due to a slow decline in forest emissions and partly 
due to unabated increase in fossil fuel related emissions). 
 
 Almost all forest related emissions come from developing countries. 
 
 Due to the supposedly lower opportunity costs in developing countries, it would 
be cheaper to compensate forest owners and users in developing countries to achieve 
carbon sequestration through avoided deforestation compared to the cost of mitigation 
in industrial countries, and, 
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 It is in the interest of industrial countries to compensate developing countries for 
avoided deforestation based on independently verified and certified emissions given that 
historically industrial countries have contributed the most to climate change. While 
economists have presented this as an economically rational argument (WDR 2010), 
others have considered it an “environmental debt”, and a moral duty of industrialized 
countries to organize transfers of money, know-how and technology for abating climate 
change which is likely to adversely affect developing countries in Asia and Africa 
containing the greatest incidence of poverty. In addition, if a global agreement is to 
emerge in 2015 with quantified targets for all the countries, it is in the interest of 
industrialized countries to provide such transfers starting immediately. But the 
likelihood of a binding global agreement is increasingly viewed with great scepticism.7 
 
The Current State of REDD+, Cap and Trade and Carbon Tax Debate 
 
After five years of slow progress on an agreement relating to the post-Kyoto regime, and 
many obstacles in finalizing the operational design and implementing REDD+ the Doha 
round of COP generated lukewarm headlines at best: 
 
• "The honeymoon for REDD+ is over": consensus not yet reached in Doha on 
MRV, finance”. 
 
• “A delay in key decisions at Doha could see REDD+ lose its climate change 
focus”. 
 
• “Doha: Future climate agreement may merge agriculture, land use change and 
forestry”. 
 
• “UN Carbon market has collapsed”. 
 
Given the belief in the importance of a market approach it would be technically easy to 
raise carbon prices by withdrawing the dubious credits and the HFC-related credits, 
tighten eligibility to the CDM, etc., as EU senior officials have noted, but it is politically 
impossible to reach a consensus on this issue. As reported in an earlier paper private 
entrepreneurs in the US have indicated there is small return to private investment in 
reducing emissions unless carbon prices reach at least $25 to $30. Some have argued 
that the current cap and trade agreement is so watered down that it is unlikely to bring a 
significant reduction in carbon emissions and have been urging imposition of carbon 
                                                          
7 In the US although President Obama has strongly affirmed his commitment to addressing issues of climate  change and the US 
government including the US military has taken a variety steps using executive powers, the chances of a legislative action are 
considered to be dim. 
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taxes as a fiscally and environmentally win-win solution (Lele Keynote; Vienna, 14-18 
January). Other weaknesses of REDD+ are discussed in the body of this report. 
 
An important and strong continuing difference has been between Brazil and Norway on 
the principle of independent verification on grounds of sovereignty. It in turn raises a 
variety of geopolitical and technical issues of their own, including the drivers of 
deforestation and the extent of incentives developing countries have to conserve forests, 
in view of the opportunity cost of land and forest resources and relatedly the extent of 
political will, institutional capacity and credibility of developing countries, particularly 
those with the most forest to lose or protect. In this regard, the growing differentiation 
among developing countries in terms of policy capacity itself poses challenges as well as 
opportunities, in dealing with a variety of technical questions which have been debated 
about REDD+. These include the reference level, verification, and the types of 
programs—whether national or project based, and funding, whether, market based or 
publicly funded. 
 
Climate Change to Exceed 2 °C? 
 
In the meantime, a 2012 World Bank Report “Turn down the heat” postulates that under 
the current business as usual scenario temperatures could rise by 4 degrees Celsius by 
the end of the century with more catastrophic events than envisaged under a more 
moderate temperature rise of 2 degrees Celsius (World Bank 2012).  If the events of the 
past decade have not been convincing that an adaptation strategy is needed in 
developing countries most affected by climate change, including in support of their food 
security objectives, the “turn down the heat” should be a wake-up call.  
 
The Duel Challenge of Managing Over and Under-Consumption 
 
A further caveat is called for as background to the findings of this study. This paper does 
not tackle the elephant in the room, namely, the issue of global consumerism and 
overconsumption. Admittedly it is compounded by the changes in food and other 
consumption patterns in emerging countries (including the growing consumption of 
resource intensive foods such as animal products) which are contributing to climate 
change. The large inequalities between and within nations are clear from the differences 
in the consumption levels presented in this paper in many respects—ranging from food 
to energy use and its implications for arduous labour of the poor. It presents a moral 
dilemma. How can one ask developing countries’ deprived populations to curtail their 
consumption, often from their already low levels, without simultaneously asking for 
actions in developed countries, and from the rich of the developing nations, to change 
their consumption levels? There has been relatively little progress on this latter front. 
On the contrary the gap within emerging countries’ consumption styles has increased 
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where the middle-upper classes have adopted the (worst) food consumption patterns of 
the West (fats, sodas, sugar) with disastrous health impacts on the way in terms of 
increased incidence of heart disease and a menacing epidemic of diabetes concurrently 
with many public health diseases of the poor, such as diarrheal. The very fact that 
REDD+ has been the only game in town on climate change is an abundant testimonial to 
this reality. 
 
Vested Interests in Current Modes of Thinking 
 
There is a further risk that so wedded may be the various interest groups to continue 
business as usual including on REDD+ that they might be unwilling or unable to 
consider a radical rethink of the kind which looks at the future of forests through the 
glass of an enabling environment in developing countries, rather than conditioned aid. 
The latter is based on measuring narrowly focused and impossible to measure outcomes 
that are unlikely to materialize, unless and until countries develop. The concept of 
“output-based aid” or (for REDD+ “performance-based payments”) will remain illusory 
without investing massively and sustainably in rebuilding the institutions not just in 
fragile States but even in seemingly strong emerging countries where institutional 
dysfunction in the public sector is pervasive. Furthermore, the “performance-based 
payments” principle (if performance is narrowly defined as emission reductions from 
forests) is tricky when deforestation drivers are more and more globalized and beyond 
the reach of governments. 
 
Findings of this Study 
 
The Good News is that:  
 
 According to FAO’s latest data, forest cover loss in 2000-2010 has slowed in 35 
developing countries and with one notable exception of a developed country Australia. 
The most notable slowdown has been in Brazil and Indonesia, the two largest emitters of 
forest carbon. Together the 35 countries constitute well over 90 percent of the loss (FAO 
2010). 
 
 Several middle income developing countries (most notably China, but also India 
and Viet Nam) have increased their forest cover. 
 
 Protected areas have also increased. 
 
 Tree cover outside the forest sector has increased.8 
                                                          
8 While we know the characteristics of the new integrated farming systems, we know less about what is causing them to occur and 
policy implications, e.g., the extent to which they are policy induced, a Boserup type intensification from increased population 
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 Reduced forest loss and increased gain have occurred despite accelerated rates of 
global economic growth. Indeed since 1990, unlike in the past, economic growth has 
occurred in all developing regions including Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa 
where growth had lagged in the 1980s due to a debt burden. 
 
 Share of forest emissions in total global carbon emissions has declined since the 
2005 estimates. 
 
 These achievements are the result of the efforts of developing countries themselves 
with relatively insignificant external financing.  
 
 As the UNFF study on external financing documents, much of the increase in 
forest financing has been in support of REDD+. Given the focus of REDD+ on 
mitigation, most of the forest financing has gone to forest rich middle income countries, 
most notably Brazil and Indonesia. Even then most of this financing is provided for the 
early stage of “REDD readiness”. Little has actually been disbursed for the 
implementation of the payments for certified emission reductions at the national level. 
Therefore it is safe to conclude that most of the reduction in the forest cover loss among 
the largest emitters of forest carbon has been the result of the developments in 
international agriculturalmarkets and prices and domestic exchange rates, or due to 
strengthened enforcement of existing laws, as in Brazil as discussed in the body of the 
report. 
 
Forests and Watershed Protection 
 
The growing forest and tree cover, in some parts of the world, has been accompanied by 
substantial growth in the payment for environmental services programs, particularly in 
middle income developing countries, the largest among them being in China. Mexico 
and other Latin American countries also have been engaged in major PES programs. 
These are typically countries which have reached a tipping point in forest loss but also 
have the domestic capacity to plan and implement national PES programs. The PES 
programs have more often been either rewards to forest owners (e.g. in Costa Rica) or 
socially-oriented schemes (e.g. in Mexico), or have been prompted by concerns about 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
densities with de facto growth of land rights, as distinct from being a result of spontaneous innovation aided by NGO and research 
activity. According to Garritty “Each involves the integration of tree species into food crop farming in ways that increase and sustain 
grain production, and diversify and increase household income. The trees sustain a green cover on the land resulting in higher 
biomass production that contributes to enhanced soil fertility and increased fodder production. And they have enabled practical 
ways of reducing soil tillage to improve rainwater-use efficiency, increase soil carbon accumulation, and improve soil health. In each 
national case there is evidence that the practices increased household and national food security, and that they have reached a level 
of adoption that may be sustainable in the long term with adequate farm advisory support. Further, there is evidence in all four cases 
that governments are deepening their support for the expansion of these Evergreen Agriculture systems throughout their 
territories”. Clearly reform of rights to land, trees and water helps. 
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floods and droughts and water requirements of the urban sector, with growing middle 
class populations in need of water services, rather than as triggers for forest recovery. It 
is easy to charge consumers for assured water supply and increased water quality So far 
there is limited evidence that PES implementation is the cause of forest cover recovery. 
Most of the PES programs are funded by resources of developing countries themselves 
to protect ecosystem functions, e.g., biodiversity, soil and water protection, social and 
cultural values. Impacts of PES on outcomes are difficult to establish independently and 
unequivocally because their monitoring and evaluation is limited, and yet they have 
been growing in popularity. 
 
Other Factors explaining reduced Rate of Forest Loss and Increased Forest 
Gain in Selected Forest Rich and Forest Poor Countries 
 
Critics argue that viewing achievements of individual forest rich and forest poor 
countries masks the impact of growing global agricultural and forest trade on 
displacement of land uses. The forest rich countries continued to “import” deforestation, 
from the growing demand for forest and agricultural products from the large emerging 
forest poor countries. The forest poor countries, on their part, while intensifying their 
agriculture to meet domestic food demand and discouraging deforestation at home, also 
increased their imports of food and forest products from countries such as Brazil and 
Indonesia. The results are reflected in accelerated global trade in food, agriculture and 
forestry. Europe maintained its dominant share in the growing agricultural and forest 
product trade, but in imports, the share of the East Asia Region grew particularly rapidly 
and within East Asia, China’s share in food and forest product imports grew even more 
rapidly. These changes are part of a structural transformation of economies developing 
countries are going through whereby the shares of agriculture and forestry in GDP and 
employment are declining, rural-urban migration is taking place together with the 
growth of the services and the manufacturing sectors and a demographic transition is 
leading to a reduction in the population growth rates. With more intensive agriculture 
and economic development more land is becoming available for forest regeneration 
under a mosaic of land uses. Yet the substitution of old growth natural forests with the 
fast growing plantation forests entails considerable losses of ecosystem services 
including the loss of biodiversity and soil carbon which takes years to replenish. Besides 
the structural transformation process including demographic transition is at different 
stages in different parts of the world. Latin America is highly urbanized with low 
population growth rates, much of Asia is transitioning and Sub-Saharan Africa is at a 
less advanced stage of transformation (WDR 2008). In this context, China’s forest 
product exports are noteworthy. Their increase reflects the increased value added 
through manufacturing to meet the increased global demand for forest product 
consumption. Indeed, since the start of the recession in 2007, and the onset of the food 
crisis, the value of the global food and forest trade grew more rapidly than the overall 
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merchandize trade, compared to the years preceding. These developments reflect the 
growing integration of food, energy and financial markets together with the impacts of 
extreme weather on food production with implications for the future of forests discussed 
below. 
 
Now the bad news is: 
 
There are still nearly a billion poor and hungry in the world, two thirds in Asia and a 
third in Africa. The net global gain in forest cover is less impressive than appears on the 
surface because some, mainly fast growing countries, have “exported” their 
deforestation, despite intensifying their agriculture. Others are still practicing low 
productivity extensive agriculture. 
 
Is Governance the Key? 
 
As a general tendency across a large number of countries factors that most explain the 
forest loss are the initial size of the forest cover and the level of per capita income. Per 
capita income in turn is closely related to the quality of governance. In a cross country 
regression, together they explain most of the rates of forest cover loss. The higher the 
initial size of the forest cover, the greater the net loss. All else being equal, better the 
quality of governance, less the forest cover loss. This result also makes sense from a 
structural transformation perspective as the share of agriculture and forestry in the total 
economy declines with growth of the urban –manufacturing sectors. Among the nearly 
200 countries for which governance indicators are available for well over a decade, the 
various components of the governance indicators tend to be highly correlated with each 
other and with per capita income. Yet the causality between governance and per capita 
income is unclear. Does improved governance lead to increased per capita income or the 
other way around? Clearly the relationship is complex and interactive. Besides 
determinants of forest cover loss or gain are very country and period specific. They 
relate to the issues of clarity of land tenure, enforcement of rule of law, but to 
international and domestic markets and prices. The relative roles of these factors are 
difficult to disentangle in the cases of Brazil, Indonesia and Congo Basin (Box1). 
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Box 1: Deforestation in Brazil, Indonesia and Congo Basin 
 
At least half of the reduction in the forest cover loss in Brazil in the new millennium 
compared to the previous decade is explained by conservation policies and decisions 
made by the government in 2004 and 2008. They increased command and control in 
the enforcement of forest laws, reduced credit subsidies and increased the cost of 
expansion of agriculture on forested lands. Reduction in soybean prices until 2007 
and strengthening of the Brazilian Real vis-à-vis the US$, also reduced the incentive 
to open up new lands. Several factors have played a part including Brazil’s capacity 
through satellite imagery to monitor changes in the forest cover on a real time basis, 
its strong political will to withstand pressure from powerful state governments and 
enforce existing legislation because Brazil sees itself as a responsible global 
environmental steward. Besides the already deforested land is now available to use 
for production expansion. Not the least important, changes in commodity prices and 
economics of agricultural production, all have played a role. Clearly these various 
factors are reversible with internationally more attractive alternatives, changes in 
governments, and domestic political and economic pressures to deforest. But Brazil’s 
assets in this regard are considerable which other countries lack, including the 
internal capacity to develop real time data and information on forest cover changes, 
ability to form and enforce forest protection laws and regulations effectively and at 
least so far, sustained political commitment. 
 
Causes for reduction in deforestation in Indonesia in the second decade are complex 
too, although changes in the sources of deforestation from one period to another are 
clear, e.g. reduced role of logging to feeding the timber processing industry and the 
increased role of palm oil plantations in Sumatra and Kalimantan using direct forest 
investment by Malayans companies. Some possible causes include the decreasing 
forest stock that can be profitably converted. The “go east” trend (logging and oil 
palm moving to Papua) is continuing, but is limited by high costs. 
 
Indonesia has shown less decisive leadership in addressing issues of forest 
governance. It has experienced one of the most rapid expansions of plantation 
agriculture in the world (more than half of palm oil plantations are in Indonesia and 
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Centrality of Agricultural Productivity Growth 
 
Rapid technical change in the agricultural sector has frequently been ascribed the role in 
accelerating deforestation. Yet growth in agricultural factor productivity is critical to 
achieve structural transformation of countries, keep urban wage growth under control 
in a period of economic growth, and keeping food prices low, particularly for the poor, 
who spend a disproportionate share of their income on food. These arguments are often 
obscured in the literature on deforestation from the exclusive perspective of land use 
changes. Agricultural productivity growth has played quite a different role in land short 
and land surplus countries. Productivity growth was most rapid in the state of 
MatoGrosso, which experienced considerable deforestation in the 90s from the 
increased returns to agricultural production. The growth of oil palm in Indonesia is 
similarly a result of new technology for oil palm production imported from Malaysia 
together with increased foreign investment. An important policy question in Indonesia 
 
Malaysia). As the world’s largest producer and exporter of palm oil India and China are 
the main importers. Oil palm plantations are established on forest land because 
companies are looking for the timber value, and not because of a problem of scarcity of 
degraded lands.  
 
In its REDD + effort, backed by $ 1 billion commitment by  Norway, it is only in May 
2011 that the Indonesian government ordered a two-year suspension on new concession 
permits on primary forests and peat lands. Yet provinces continue to exert pressure not 
to extend the moratorium much as do the states in Brazil. Although Indonesia has 
pledged to move agricultural development from forests to degraded lands, 
implementation has been slow because of loopholes and breaches.  
 
The rate of deforestation in the Congo Basin has been limited to coastal areas and along 
navigable rivers with high population densities. Unlike Latin America and, to a lesser 
extent, South-East Asia, where large-scale commercial agriculture and ranching are the 
main drivers of deforestation,, deforestation in Africa is still largely driven by small-
scale activities, both for subsistence and commercial agriculture, with outlets on local or 
sub-regional markets but also exports on the international markets to Europe and 
South-East Asia. Charcoal and logging are important drivers of degradation, and are 
triggers that can facilitate eventual deforestation. 
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is whether it could have achieved increased oil palm production on degraded or logged 
over forests without deforesting new lands. Evidence seems to suggest that deforestation 
was in part to provide rents to investors from logging forests, while profitability would 
be lower for plantations on degraded land, due to transaction costs of establishing 
property rights, and due to lower soil fertility. 
 
The continued bad news from the perspective of deforestation is that despite some 
slowing in the accelerated speed of globalization following the great recession in 2008 -- 
globalization will continue-- accompanied by increased, savings and  foreign direct 
investment, integration of global commodity, financial , land and foreign exchange 
markets. The speed of integration may well accelerate over the long haul with 
demographic pressures, urbanization, and income growth expanding markets for food, 
agriculture, and minerals. Thus whereas the share of forest emissions in total emissions 
has declined, this is only in part because deforestation has slowed, but also because with 
structural transformation emissions in other sectors have increased. 
 
Furthermore percentage increase in demand for energy with increased income tends to 
be far higher than demand for food with damaging effects of increased emissions in 
other sectors on forests and agriculture, unless energy efficiency increases and energy 
policies result in climate friendly energy investments, rather than continuing reliance on 
oil and coal that currently dominate energy use in many countries. In this context 
biofuels policies and subsidies of developed countries are the wild card. They exert 
pressure on forests through land use changes. Since 2007 they have reduced supply of 
cereals traded on the global markets leading to increased food prices. 
 
Forests and Food (In) Security 
 
Globally three areas of food and forest interactions seem to be critical. 
 
 The importance of productivity growth in agriculture to meet demand for food. 
 
 The growing synergy between food and energy prices and their incentives for 
biofuel production. 
 
 Traditional fuel wood as a source of energy and policy implications for 
reforestation including particularly integration of trees in the farming systems. Agro-
forestry outside forests. 
 
Long term demand for food and agriculture will increase with economic growth, 
urbanization and changes in tastes and preferences to more land and water intensive 
crops in all developing regions. With increased food and energy price volatility risks of 
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high food prices particularly to the poor who spend a high share of their income on food 
has also increased.  
The high food prices in the 1970s triggered a major global response in the form of 
increased investments in food and agricultural R and D whereas aid to food and 
agriculture has increased. Increase in the official development assistance is nowhere 
near the peak of investments it had reached in the mid -1980s, nor have government 
investments in developing countries—barring a few notable exceptions of Brazil and 
China- increased anywhere near needed to increase agricultural productivity on a 
sustained basis. 
 
Forests and the “degraded lands” are battlegrounds in the food and energy insecurity 
nexus going forward. As energy prices have risen and moved closer together with food 
prices, incentives to deforest to produce biofuels have strengthened. Experts have 
considered the damaging impacts of the diversion of land and grains/oilseeds on the 
food consumption of the world’s poor greater than any foreign aid program could 
compensate, stressing the importance of avoiding diverting food crops and land used for 
them, away from food to energy production. EU has imposed a ceiling of 5% in the use 
of food crops in the first generation of biofuels. Such policies are not evident in the US. 
 
Most of Asia has already reached the limits of land and water use in the agricultural 
sector. While increasing its own efficiency of land and water resources, the Asian 
continent has already turned to and would continue to turn to global markets for food 
and forest products. North America and Europe hold the dominant shares of world 
trade in food, agriculture and forestry. Latin America and Africa, where “surplus” land 
currently exists are beginning to play a growing role, Latin America in food and 
agricultural exports, and Africa, which is still at an early stage of development, in the so-
called “ land grab”. Or direct foreign investment in land, both prompted by high prices 
of food and energy. What the future holds is unclear. Some (WDR 2009) have suggested 
that Latin America has perhaps better prospects of meeting the growing world food 
demand due to its more developed infrastructure, institutions and market integration 
than SSA. In any case, investing in agricultural research and development, which 
continues to be a neglected area by government policy is of highest priority for all 
governments, if reliance on international food trade is not to increase, due to domestic 
food production failures. Climate change has increased the already high market risks to 
food and agriculture, calling for redoubling of effort to invest in agricultural research 
and development, to improve domestic agricultural policies and institutions including 
particularly introducing clarity in land, water and tree tenure rights as an important way 
of improving governance. 
 
Forests, Fuel wood, Biofuels and Energy Demand 
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Even though energy consumption has been growing rapidly in developing countries as 
incomes grow, there continues to remain a huge gap in per capita energy consumption 
between developed and developing countries and within countries among the rich and 
the poor. All developing countries have experienced increased energy efficiency. Yet, 
energy consumption in developing countries is likely to continue to increase rapidly as 
an essential element of development. Therefore, increasing energy efficiency further and 
shifting to cleaner sources of energy is of high priority. 
 
Fuel wood is a major source of degradation and eventual deforestation in the areas of 
poverty as charcoal becomes a thriving industry in forest areas including those with, but 
not confined to, easy access to urban centres. Some 3 billion people are dependent on 
fuel wood and there is clear evidence that regions with the greatest incidence of poverty, 
most notably Sub-Saharan Africa and low income households in Asia, are the most 
dependent on fuel wood. Fuel wood uses have multiple downsides—not only of forest 
degradation and deforestation but of use of long hours by women in fetching fuel wood, 
respiratory diseases from smoke inhalation among women and children and GHG 
emissions. At the same time agro-forestry has multiple benefits of improving soils, 
providing fodder and other by-products and stabilizing and enhancing the quality of 
natural resources. 
 
The implication is an urgent need to promote agro forestry and alternative sources of 
clean energy—such as hydropower, or solar energy-cook stoves, or individual and 
community forest plantations that provide an assured supply of wood and coal for clean 
stoves. 
 
Despite known solutions and many boutique examples of successful use of solar or 
alternative energy, particularly in Asia, there appears to have been very little scaled up 
spread of alternative energy in rural areas (with perhaps the possible exception of 
China) as a way to reduce forest degradation and deforestation. In rural Africa, there 
seem to be fewer options outside of the forest sector for energy. The world energy 
consumption is still dominated by fossil fuels and coal, two major sources of GHG 
emissions, thanks to subsidies and access, even though alternative forms of energy are 
making headway, albeit from a small initial base. Total energy consumption increased 
most rapidly in Asia, particularly in China, although energy efficiency measured in 
terms of energy use with respect per capita income has also increased in many parts of 
the world. The substantial progress made on alternative sources of energy, e.g. in solar 
and wind energy, in Europe and the US and China, has brought down energy prices. 
Such clean energy development in advanced countries will benefit developing countries 
in due course although currently its expansion is constrained by initial capital costs.  
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Yet innovation in clean energy sector received a major setback as a result of the fiscal 
challenges in OECD countries following the global economic recession. Technological 
changes in gas exploration is bringing down energy prices in the US and may eventually 
do the same in the rest of the world but the technology remains controversial and its 
potential impacts are as yet speculative.  These new opportunities must be considered in 
the context of the “black-swans”, in the energy sector, (the Tsunami and the earthquake 
in Japan, the Arab Spring and the technological innovation in gas fracking which is 
changing the political and economic dynamics of nuclear, oil and gas technologies). 
They make predicting the prospects for the use of cleaner alternative energy sources on 
a large scale in developing countries difficult. And yet the potential to reduce pressure 
on forests is enormous. 
 
Forests and Mining 
 
Mining is a growing industry and will likely remain so. Many minerals are found in 
forest rich areas with substantial indigenous populations. Impacts of small scale 
artisanal mining on forest are believed to be limited and location specific. Those of large 
scale mining raise questions of benefit sharing among affected population and long term 
environmental impacts; appropriateness of legislation that ensures transparency and 
accountability including adequate compensation to those affected needs to be in place. 
International agencies  such as the World Bank have concluded that they have a role to 
play in assisting developing countries in the exploitation of minerals and coal (e.g. in 
South Africa) while minimizing the adverse impacts the environment and affected 
populations. 
 
Forests and Health 
 
Three types of interactions between forests and health are evident. 
 
Forest biodiversity—both in the form of plants, birds and animals is a major source of 
food security and medicines as well as of poaching and crime, not just for the 
populations directly dependent on forests, but in the urban areas of developed and 
developing countries, many of which depend on the medicinal/pharmaceutical values 
on a large scale. 
 
Close access to forests is also a source of spread of zoonotic diseases. There is 
considerable evidence that increased interactions between human populations and 
forests including forest fragments are leading to the spread of disease. Urbanization and 
reduced access to forests seems to reduce this risk. Areas needing future work include 
information and knowledge about forests and health, and in benefit sharing of the 
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intellectual property with regard to the values of biodiversity found in rich tropical 
forests. 
 
 
Forests and Transport 
 
Impacts of transportation routes on deforestation are well documented, particularly of 
roads. Development of roads needs to take these impacts into account in planning their 
placement as well perhaps of shifting from heavy reliance of roads relative to railroads, 
not to mention the indirect impacts of road traffic expansion on fossil fuel consumption. 
 
Forest Tenure 
 
The trend toward forest privatization and tenure devolution to communities and local 
councils has been significant in the last 20 years, especially in Latin America. However, 
the trend seems to be slowing down in the last years. The new interest for lands, 
following the 2008’s food crisis, the high price of minerals and the new technologies 
allowing extracting oil and gases in difficult places and profitable conditions, have 
prompted  governments to keep the control over forest lands, in order to foster  
economic development though agribusiness and extractive industries. Community 
forestry, the institutional innovation of the 90’s, has achieved mixed results. They are 
quite positive in Latin America, even for joint management of protected areas, but 
contrast with poor results in Africa. In Asia, the environmental outcomes of community 
forestry are heterogeneous, and in South East Asia, many community forests have been 
abandoned in favour of integration with oil palm plantations schemes (sometimes in 
nucleus estate schemes). In Central Africa, the few experiments in community forests 
have been very deceptive, with their being embedded in illegal exploitation networks 
and their capture by the elites. 
 
One lesson  derived from such mixed results, is that the institutional instrument or the 
tenure category are not a panacea, and the interaction with the prevailing culture, 
historical pathways, demographic structures and governance can create heterogeneous 
situations. Large scale forest concessions, a legacy of the colonial era, are under pressure 
from agriculture and small-scale enterprises in areas with fast population-growth they 
tend to be downsized or to be removed. On the other hand, in many areas of low 
population densities, the forest concessions are structuring the territories, and 
providing some services which national or local governments are unable to supply. 
Small-scale enterprises are generally unviable in such low-density areas with high costs 
for accessing the markets, and large concessions still have a future there –unless they 
are encroached by mines or extensive crop plantations estates. All things being equal the 
FLEGT initiatives will tend to back, the concessions regimes – notably in Africa - since 
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these large companies could more easily comply with the legal verification 
requirements. 
 
It seems difficult to provide incentives to local populations to maintain forests without 
recognising their tenure rights on the lands they use. Paying for environmental services 
under REDD+ schemes entails a contractual responsibility over an area, which, in turn, 
calls for recognition of rights (at least, exclusive rights). Another REDD+ strategy could 
be the expansion of protected areas. But in the contexts of growing rural populations, it 
is unlikely that such protected areas can be sustainable, unless they are based on some 
recognition of the communities’ tenure rights (at the exclusion or full ownership), joint 
management and some kind of incentives to accept the restriction of land use rights 
associated with the protection status. Recognitions of tenure rights and associated 
economic benefits can be one dimension of these incentives. In addition, identifying, 
mapping and registering collective forest land tenure will help in preventing large-scale 
land acquisitions, compared to a situation when the State is, legally or presumably, the 
only land owner. 
 
Devolving rights does not mean less government in the forest. Community-based 
management is increasingly thwarted by the heterogeneity of forest users, consequences 
of people’s voluntary and involuntary migrations, more accepted or undergone by the 
native communities. Given growing scarcity of land conflicts are unavoidable, and they 
may result in external interventions. 
 
REDD+: the New “Silver Bullet”? 
 
Will REDD+ be the “silver bullet” the international community was eagerly looking for 
to stop the deforestation process on a global scale? REDD+ has been developed as a 
“positive incentive” to compensate countries for reducing emissions from deforestation 
and forest degradation, with an assumption that this will lead to development pathways 
towards sustainable land use.  REDD+ is a positive incentive instrument by design, and 
not a cap-and-trade instrument, due to its voluntary nature (meaning developing 
countries choose to participate in it) and the “no-liability” design, meaning that there 
are no sanctions for participating countries that do not reduce, or even increase, 
emissions. 
 
Not being bound to a cap-and-trade type system the question of REDD+ architecture is 
remains open, and should be determined by the most cost-effective method of reaching 
the objectives of REDD+. REDD+ is praised for its “performance-based” dimension 
(payments are conditioned upon verified results in emissions reduction from 
deforestation and degradation and proportioned to them), and are opposed to more 
traditional approaches where financial transfers were associated with the design of 
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nationals plans (typically the National Forest Action Plans) without regard to the 
results. The second feature making REDD+ attractive is the non-intervention principle 
that respects sovereignty: REDD+ countries are free to decide which means they will use 
for achieving their targets. It represents a shift from approaches based on 
“conditionality”, in which disbursements were released only if certain public policy 
actions and legal measures were taken. Such an approach, often associated with the 
“structural adjustment” periods under the auspices of the IMF and the World Bank, is 
seen as preventing the ownership of reforms – adopted under “external pressure” –  
and, therefore, with limited effectiveness. 
 
REDD+’s Huge Implementation Challenges 
 
However, such attractive features are facing huge implementation challenges and the 
ambition exhibited at the inception of REDD+ in 2005 is clouded by the mounting 
doubts about the workability of the mechanism. The design of the mechanism raises 
concerns about its capacity to deliver effective and permanent emission reductions, due 
notably to the potential arbitrary choice of  the “reference”, i.e. the level of emissions 
against which the reduction will be calculated. As for the CDM, the REDD+ mechanism 
rests on the creation of “business-as-usual “scenarios, which by definition are 
impossible to verify (if the programme is implemented,  then  the  reference  scenario  
cannot  be  checked  for  validity),  and  thus  subject  to manipulation. Therefore, the  
risk of massive  “hot air” creation, weakening carbon prices already laminated is real 
and is a major  source of concern for the EU, which has decided not to accept any forest 
carbon credits (from CDM or REDD+) at least until 2020. REDD+ is questioned from 
the perspective of environmental integrity but also for it potential impact on local 
communities and indigenous people who might lose some critical access rights if 
governments decide to create new protected area that deprives resources users of most 
of their rights in the name of “reducing emissions”. 
  
In the international negotiations the difficulty to move, from principles agreed upon by 
countries to an operational mechanism with precise rules, highlights the gap between 
simple ideas based on the economic theories of “rational choices” and “incentives” on 
which REDD+ has been based, and the complexity of dealing with national decision 
processes and the effects of globalization that increase land demand and foster 
displacements of land uses. The principle of basing payments on measurable 
“performance” in reducing emissions from deforestation (i.e. quantified reductions on a 
given period of time against an agreed reference level), is not really workable when 
countries face severe institutional dysfunctions of a variety of kind which limit the 
effectiveness of the government and the reach of public interventions. 
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A growing amount of evidence shows that before performance-based payments become 
practicable, there is a need to invest over a long period and work along with 
governments to create the necessary conditions for tackling the drivers of deforestation, 
and sometimes it is about rebuilding national institutions which have deteriorated over 
time– not a swift and cheap action. The ambition,  once exhibited, to shift from an “old” 
to a “new” principle of international cooperation is stumbling on the issue of local 
governance, “fragile states” and the limited reach of national public policies including  
external factors linked to liberalized and globalized markets. There is currently a 
growing awareness of such limitations, and, without abandoning the principle of 
designing a “performance-based” payments mechanism, reflections are developing on 
the possibility to widen the scope of acknowledging  “performance”, linking them with a 
process (with milestones and “proxies”) and not only to a measurable output in term of 
emission reductions. In sum, the “REDD+ community” is following the same pathway 
the aid community has taken two decades ago about the concept of conditioning aid to 
performances, under the so-called “output-based aid”. In the ODA (Official 
Development Assistance) case, the concept of “performance-based aid” has remained 
more an ambition than a reality, even though it has been helpful for better 
understanding the obstacles on development and designing more effective aid policies. 
 
No “Quick-and-Cheap” Solution 
 
Whatever the architecture finally decided, it seems more and more clear that REDD+ 
will not be a “quick and cheap” mean for curbing global greenhouse gases emissions. 
The “performance-based” remuneration principle, the expected comparative advantage 
of this incentive instrument, will prove to be hardly workable in the majority of potential 
REDD+ countries, characterized by ill-functioning institutions, poor governance quality 
and limited reach of the public action. Perhaps the only country where payments for 
performance would prove workable, would be Brazil, where national policies has been 
effective for curbing deforestation (even though not all the “performance” is attributable 
to the intentional action of the government, making the decrease of deforestation at 
least partially reversible). But Brazil’s case has also shown that financial incentives have 
not been decisive for adopting policies tackling deforestation: the balance of social 
forces has been moved in favor of forests’ protectors (especially for the indigenous 
populations and national ambition of Brazil to be recognized as a global power called for 
building up an environmental credibility vis-à-vis the rest of the world. 
 
If political will to tackle deforestation is related to the need to build up credibility (at 
both national and international level), incentives can be useful for helping committed 
politicians to justify their decisions in favor of forest protection and to circumvent 
vested interests; but conceived as such, it seems clear such incentives should not be 
necessarily in financial terms (joint and sustained investments for “greening” the 
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economy and tackling the drivers of deforestation would certainly be more useful) for 
“performance” in emission reductions which does not depend entirely of the 
governments’ action. 
 
Implications of Forest’s Cross-Sectorial Linkages Going Forward 
 
REDD+ as currently conceived and implemented is narrow in its focus, has been facing 
huge implementation challenges and is not workable when countries lack “just in time” 
information and face severe institutional dysfunction. Performance based aid is more an 
ambition than a reality  in most developing countries barring  exceptions of a few middle 
income countries such as  Brazil, China, Turkey, India or Vietnam.  In the least 
developed countries finances are less a problem than political will and institutional 
capacity although external finance has not been forthcoming to do the right things, i.e., 
for building internal capacity. In the more advanced countries the finances are not large 
enough to compensate countries for the opportunity cost of land. There are more useful 
and likely effective ways to proceed if the purpose is to improve outcomes in the forest 
sector over a long haul. 
 
This calls for a wider rural development strategy including: 
 
1. An urgent need to improve global data sets on land use changes on a routine “just 
in time” basis. Brazil’s example shows that the developing world has the capacity to 
extend this know-how to international organizations and other developing countries but 
this potential is currently not sufficiently exploited.9 
 
2. Strategy and implementation of agricultural intensification and broad based 
economic development since it gets people out of poverty and extensive agriculture. To 
avoid the “rebound effect” of increased agricultural profitability on deforestation, 
countries should simultaneously introduce policies to contain forest conversion, such as 
the use of PES in the forest frontier areas. Yet at the global level, net deforestation/land 
use changes may be unavoidable since global food supply will equate with food demand, 
the precise extent of deforestation depending on the nature, extent and location of 
technical change in agriculture. 
 
3. The twin objectives of food security and avoided deforestation need to  go hand in 
hand. Without achieving food security for all any efforts at avoided deforestation would 
be ineffective. Agriculture and deforestation agendas should not only be interconnected 
but merged through a landscape approach. This will require a very different approach to 
                                                          
9 An example may be the FAO -INPE/FUNCATE support to DRC National Forest Monitoring system to be linked with the INPE 
platform Terra Congo named after Terra Amazon. 
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planning and implementation of natural resources than the current sector based 
approaches which operate in silos. 
 
4. An effective energy policy needs to promote agro-forestry to increase fuel wood 
supply while also adopting strategies that will get the poor out of poverty and reduce 
their fuel wood consumption in favor of clean energy including hydropower, solar and 
wind power. Options in Africa may be limited to wood plantations, SFM, improved 
charcoal making. Elsewhere widespread use of electricity, solar power or LNG will also 
help promote education of children. 
 
5. Secure land tenure will likely have ambiguous effects on deforestation. Yet any 
incentive policy for tackling deforestation, such as PES, would have to rest on tenure 
security, a condition for liability, including strengthening of administrative and judicial 
institutions. New protected areas should be accompanied by recognition of customary 
land rights, as a basis for joint management and benefits sharing of the conservation 
and the sustainable use of the forest resources. 
 
6. A transportation strategy should help shift from road to rail transport, stricter 
emission standards, reduced subsidies to dirty fuels and more active incentives for 
innovation which will shift energy consumption to clean energy. 
 
7. A population and health strategy should focus on information and knowledge 
about the interactions between forests and health and benefit sharing of biodiversity 
among those most dependent on forest products. Investing in health care of pregnant 
women and newborn children would help diminish infant mortality while also 
contributing to incentives to reduce birth rates. 
 
8. An education strategy focusing particularly on girl’s education will increase the 
opportunity cost of women’s labor in fuel wood gathering, spur reduction in population 
growth rates and promote demographic transitions. 
 
9. The rapid growth of private investment, calls for a global  strategy towards the 
corporate sector which ensures consumer and civil society involvement such that private 
investments are undertaken in a transparent and accountable manner  and  social and 
environmental outcomes become an integral part of  routine corporate social 
accountability.  Instruments such as (certifications, Round Table, labeling) have become 
popular and are hopefully leading to improved forest management on a significant scale. 
 
10. A global policy environment which eliminates subsidies for biofuels in OECD 
countries eliminates subsidies for oil generally and introduces transparency and 
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accountability among all nations to ensure growth outcomes are socially equitable and 
environmentally sustainable on a global scale. 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
When countries develop they undergo substantial changes associated with structural 
transformation of economies with several characteristics: (1) declining share of GDP 
originating in agriculture and forestry, (2) declining share of employment in agriculture 
and forestry, (3) rural-urban migration, (4) growth of the services and the 
manufacturing sectors and (5) a demographic transition with reduction in the 
population growth rates. Differences in labor productivity between the 
agricultural/forestry/rural sector and non -agricultural sectors narrow as countries 
develop whereas at early stages of development, there is often a huge and even a 
widening gap in productivities between sectors. The difference between the typically 
large share of employment in traditional agriculture and forestry and their much smaller 
share in GDP at early stages reflects the magnitude of rural poverty. The rural –urban 
divide begins to narrow as rural poverty is eliminated over time (Lele et al 2011b). 
Drawing on the works of several analysts, Hertel describes the changes in land use, from 
predominantly natural ecosystems with hunting and gathering as the primary sources of 
food and fuel to subsistence farming followed by intensive agriculture and urbanization 
of most of the population (Hertel 2011 & 2012). The mosaic of land uses include a 
combination of agriculture, natural and planted forests, forest areas set aside for 
biodiversity protection and ecosystem functions (such as watershed protection), and 
recreational uses. They include public and private forests established for timber 
production, community forests, including but not confined to the uses by indigenous 
peoples, and increased uses of land for agriculture to meet the growing food demand of 
the urban population. But as agriculture and forestry eventually decline in importance 
some of the agricultural land goes back to secondary forests with loss of some 
biodiversity. Payments for environmental services (PES) to protect ecosystem functions 
become an important part of this nexus as urban consumer demand for water, food and 
environmental quality increases with increased incomes and governments have the 
resources to invest in PES programs. 
 
During the course of transformation developing countries also invest in energy, 
transportation and communications needed for the growth of the service and 
manufacturing sectors. The massive expansion in agricultural production, energy, 
transport, and urban systems leads to new sources of deforestation and but also offers 
opportunities for reforestation. Each produces associated environmental and human 
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impacts that are both positive and negative. The two way impacts of deforestation and 
reforestation associated with structural transformation are numerous, and many are 
quite site and country specific although some general outcomes are discernible. For 
example, using one measure, the share of developing countries in global emission has 
increased with economic development in recent years and their total emissions are now 
larger than the emissions of OECD countries although their energy efficiency (when 
measured in terms of energy used per ’000 $) has also been increasing.10 Growth in 
global CO2 emissions from energy use continued in 2011, but at a slower rate than in 
2010. 
 
Beyond these changes within countries, external factors have become more important. 
The accelerated speed of globalization and the recent food and energy price rises, 
volatility and the financial crisis have added to land use changes; for example, growth in 
global trade in food and forestry products has increased since 2007-2008 together with 
concerns about food and energy security and their impacts and implications for the 
future land use changes (including lands under forests, pastures) as well as for food 
insecurity of the poor and climate change. Among these, biofuels are clearly a wild card. 
With technological possibilities and policies in the energy sector they could affect 
croplands, grasslands, permanent crops and forests in a profound way (Hertel 2011 & 
2012). Furthermore, “food-competing biofuels can do more harm to the welfare of the 
poor and landless, globally, than the greatest conceivable aid efforts or productivity 
increases could compensate” (Wright 2012). Yet their potential long term impacts must 
be seen in the context of the kinds of “black swans” which change long term structural 
changes in energy outlook, e.g. the tumultuous events of the ‘Arab Spring’ which 
disrupted oil supplies, the earthquake and tsunami in Japan which changed public 
opinion towards nuclear power, and the revolution in shale gas production in the US, 
which resulted in record discounts in US oil prices after hitting an all-time record high. 
Climate change and its impacts on agriculture and forests is an added dimension. 
 
The key question then is not just how to how to pursue growth and prosperity without 
causing further damage to the environment including to and from forests. Forest carbon 
was estimated to contribute 17 percent of the share of GHG emissions and agriculture 
was 14 percent in 2005. Forest carbon is now estimated to have declined to 9 percent 
(reported by Global Carbon Budget 2012) for good and bad reasons: in part due to 
slowing forest emissions and in part due to growing emissions from fossil fuels, which 
signifies that global action on fossil fuel emissions is not making sufficient progress 
(Figure 1.1a and 1.2). All the forest related GHG emissions from developing countries 
come from land use changes. In low income countries GHG emissions (at an average of 
                                                          
10 All of the net growth in energy in 2011 took place in emerging economies, with China alone accounting for 71 percent of global 
energy consumption growth. OECD consumption declined, led by a sharp decline in Japan – in volumetric terms, the world’s largest 
decline. 
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2 tons CO2 equivalent) are nearly a third of the emissions of middle income countries (6 
tons per capita GHG emissions). Fifty percent from land-use change and forestry and 20 
percent from agriculture of emissions in low income countries come from land use 
changes and 37 percent in middle income countries. In contrast, in high income 
countries land use change related to GHG emissions are negligible (Figure 1.1b, c and d). 
These climate related differences have been at the center stage in the Post Kyoto 
negotiations. The argument for promoting REDD+ has been that the opportunity cost to 
those converting and using forests of reducing emissions is lesser than in developed 
countries. Historically industrial countries have been the major contributors to GHG 
emissions and therefore it is in the interest of industrial countries to reduce emissions in 
developing countries by compensating them for the opportunity cost of emission 
reductions particularly if a global agreement of collective emission reductions with 
agreed targets is to be reached by 2015. The cool economically rational argument (e.g. 
Stern 2007; and WDR 2010) is also combined by a moral argument by some that 
climate change is affecting tropical countries in Asia and Africa with the greatest 
concentration of poverty and hunger. They will need to help out not just in mitigating 
climate change but to adapt to its already visible effects in the forms of floods and 
droughts (e.g., in South Asia) in situations of limited resources with which to cope with 
adaptation. To this has recently been added the Green Economy Agenda. With the 
global recession, the “fiscal cliff”, denial of climate change and aversion to global 
collective action in some key member countries the extent to which green growth will be 
pursued through global agreements remains to be seen.  These arguments represent 
only a tip of the iceberg even in the narrower area of REDD+ where the focus in reality 
has been on carbon, notwithstanding the “+” denoting concerns which go beyond 
carbon. Progress in international negotiations has been slow and carbon prices have 
collapsed. 
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Key Questions and Outline of the Paper 
 
This paper addresses several overarching questions: 
 
Figure 1.1 a, b, c and d: Greenhouse Gas Emissions by Sector: World and High, 
Middle, and Low Income Countries and Figure 1.2: Global Emissions from Fossil 
Fuels & Cement and Land-use Change (1960-2011) 
 
 
1.2: Global Emissions from Fossil Fuels & Cement and 
Land-use Change (1960-2011) 
 
 
Land-use 
change black 
line: 
Includes 
management
-climate 
interactions 
 
Source: WDR team, based on data from Barker and others 2007 (figure 1.1a) and WRI 2008 (figures 1.1b, c, and d) -- taken 
from WDR 2010and for Figure 1.2 Le Quéré et al. 2012; and Global Carbon Project 2012. 
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1. What do we know about the causes underlying changes in forest cover loss and 
gain in the last two decades including particularly their relationship to other sectors and 
external factors? 
 
2. How to pursue growth and prosperity without causing further damage to the 
environment including to and from forests? 
3. How would forests fare in the course of economic development in the future 
given the dramatic changes in the global context in the last two decades? 
 
4. What are the implications of what we know (and do not know) for policies and 
investments for more pro-forest outcomes going forward? 
 
The paper presents a picture of changes in forest cover and its many and varied linkages 
with other sectors of the economy at different stages of development at multiple levels 
ranging from the global to local. It offers no silver bullets but rather a way of looking at 
the role of forests with their multiple and changing functions. Using quite diverse sets of 
data, evidence and analytical methods and drawing on evidence from a number of 
studies, its purpose is to illustrate the diversity and richness of insights that can be 
derived from an eclectic approach for policy making and institutional choices going 
forward at many levels. The paper is organized as follows: 
 
Section 1 reviews the global record of forest cover changes over the 1990-2010 periods, 
particularly the good news of the deceleration in the rate of forest loss from higher rates 
in the preceding decade. It naturally raises questions of the causes underlying these 
changes and their lessons. Section 2 reviews unprecedented economic growth 
performance of developing countries over the same period in the context of which this 
deceleration has occurred. Section 3 explores at the global level the various 
hypotheses/drivers of forest cover loss in 32 countries,11 using an econometric approach 
to examine the role of factors such as the initial size of the forest, the level of economic 
development, and changes in total agricultural factor productivity growth, among 
others. Section 4 sets out the radically changed global context, reflected in20 global 
trends in the last two decades. Section 5 further explores the large share of the variation 
explained by size of the initial forest cover and the level of economic development as 
reflected in per capita income, first at the general level based on the evidence on the 
drivers of deforestation and then by discussing case studies of Brazil, Indonesia and the 
                                                          
11 Those 35 countries explained 92 percent of the forest area loss globally in 1990-2010--Angola, Argentina, Australia, Bolivia 
(Plurinational State of), Botswana, Brazil, Cambodia, Cameroon, Chad, Colombia, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ecuador, Ethiopia, Ghana, Honduras, Indonesia, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Malaysia, 
Mali, Mexico, Mongolia, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nigeria, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda, United 
Republic of Tanzania, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Zambia and Zimbabwe. Here, for our econometric analysis we have taken 
32 countries excluding Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Myanmar and Somalia because of data unavailability. 
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Congo Basin, each of which have experienced the most loss and which offer new 
evidence on the drivers of deforestation as well as on the role of governance. The 
evidence suggests that factors driving deforestation are not just country specific but 
period specific. The paper then explores interactions between deforestation and 
reforestation between water, energy, transport, mining, and health. New Instruments 
for financing forests are discussed next in light of this evidence, including the concepts 
underlying Payments for Environmental Services, Land Tenure and Deforestation and 
Market Based Institutions. The paper ends with a discussion of opportunities and 
challenges including Expectations and Realities of Incentives, Externalities, 
Governance, Rule of Law, Financial, Human and Institutional Resources and 
Conclusions and Recommendations. 
 
A Record of Forest Cover Loss Gain and Changes in Other Forest Values 
Over the 1990-2010 Periods 
 
At the global level forest cover loss slowed in the decade of the 2000 and more forest 
and tree cover was gained compared to the previous decade. According to FAO, forest 
loss without taking into account the additional information on afforestation and on 
natural expansion of forest declined from 12.4 million hectares per year in the decade of 
the 1990s to 10.2 million per year in the first decade of the new millennium.12 A total of 
35 countries explained 92 percent of the loss in each decade.  Whereas the number of 
countries contributing to the loss remained mostly the same as the previous period13 the 
loss was smaller, most notably in the two large countries, Brazil and Indonesia, which 
together had lost 48 million hectares and contributed 39 percent of the total loss in the 
1990s. In the 2000s they had lost 31 million hectares and contributed 31 percent of total 
loss. Whereas all those losing forest in the 1990s were developing countries, a notable 
exception in the post 2000 period was Australia, a developed country, which ranked 
                                                          
12 We have estimated those values from FRA 2010 datasheet by taking the Forest area data for different years (1990, 2000 and 2010) 
for 233 countries and then calculated the change in area of forest for each country and got the values of total forest loss and gain 
globally by summing up the set of countries which have lost and gained their forested area respectively. But according to FRA 2010 
Report-- At the global level, it decreased from an estimated 16 million hectares per year in the 1990s to around 13 million hectares 
per year in the last decade; where earlier only 13 million hectares/year was reported for 1990-2000 (FRA Report 2005). The 3 
million hectares/year ex-post expansion was explained as follows—Previous figures underestimated the global deforestation rate for 
the 1990s-- FRA 2010, like FRA 2005, did not directly compile data on deforestation rates because few countries have this 
information. In FRA 2005 the global deforestation rate was estimated from net changes in forest area Additional information on 
afforestation and on natural expansion of forest for the past 20 years has now made it possible to also take into account 
deforestation within those countries that have had an overall net gain in forest area. As a result, the revised estimate of the global 
rate of deforestation and loss from natural causes for 1990–2000 (close to 16 million hectares per year) is higher, but more accurate, 
than was estimated in FRA 2005 (13 million hectares per year) (FRA 2010 Report, page 22). 
 
13 33 countries are the same in both periods (those are –Angola, Argentina, Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Botswana, Brazil, 
Cambodia, Cameroon, Chad, Colombia, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ecuador, 
Ethiopia, Ghana, Honduras, Indonesia, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Malaysia, Mali, Mexico, Mongolia, Mozambique, 
Myanmar, Nigeria, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Somalia, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania, Venezuela (Bolivarian 
Republic of), Zambia and Zimbabwe) apart from Nepal and Sudan in 1990-2000 and Australia and Namibia in 2000-2010. 
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second among those losing forest cover. The reduced rate of loss or the gain in others 
reported below does not take into account the extent of forest degradation or fully 
reliable estimates of the continued large dependence on fuel wood as a source of energy 
in developing countries, most notably in Sub-Saharan Africa and Asia where poverty 
dominates, or watersheds are lost or threatened, excessive groundwater exploitation 
exists, and increased salinity occurs. These issues are discussed in the later sections. Yet 
a question remains: what may explain the forest cover changes? 
 
Eighteen countries14 gained forest cover, together explaining over 90 percent of the total 
gain. The biggest gain in forest cover in the 1990s was in China, which gained nearly 20 
million hectares, nearly half of the global gains in forest cover. Whereas developed 
countries showed significant forest gain, the notable feature was that a number of large 
middle and lower middle income developing countries were among the gainers-- 
Vietnam, India and the Philippines in Asia. Several, such as Chile and Cuba in the 
American hemisphere, which gained forest cover in the 1990s, maintained or improved 
their position in the post 2000 period. Turkey joined the ranks of gainers.  
 
However, most forest loss continued to take place in countries and areas in the tropical 
regions, while most of the gain took place in the temperate and boreal zones and in 
some emerging economies. Beyond forest cover, there is evidence that tree cover outside 
forests also increased (Garrity et al 2010). Tree cover is now greater than 10 percent on 
over half of the world’s farmland. In some regions, tree cover is 30 percent. The term 
“evergreen” coined by Swaminathan and others has been defined by ICRAF to mean that 
a green cover is maintained throughout the year. “Evergreen agriculture” is one of 
several types of agroforestry. 
 
The growing forest and tree cover has been accompanied by substantial growth in 
payment for environmental services, particularly in middle income developing 
countries, again, the largest among them being in China, discussed in the section on 
Payments for Environmental Services. Most of these are funded by resources of 
developing countries themselves to protect ecosystem functions, e.g., biodiversity, soil 
and water protection, social and cultural values. 
 
Unprecedented Record of Economic Growth in Developing Countries as a 
Group 
 
The smaller net forest loss in the decade of the new millennium must be seen in the 
context global economic growth, which is being driven by developing countries. 
                                                          
14 13 countries are the same in both periods (those are-- Belarus, Chile, China, Cuba, France, India, Italy, Philippines, Spain, Turkey, 
United States of America, Uruguay and Viet Nam) apart from Australia, Finland, Germany, New Zealand and Russian Federation in 
1990-2000 and Bulgaria, Greece, Norway, Poland and Sweden in 2000-2010. 
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Developing countries are expected to continue to drive global growth and will affect 
developments in the forest sector. Overall economic growth in developing countries had 
picked up starting the early 1990s and accelerated further in the post 2000 period 
(Figure 2a), with a buoyant demand for commodities ranging from minerals, oils and 
raw materials to agricultural and forest products, and growing international trade 
volumes in agriculture and forest products (Figure 6, 7, 8 and 9).Indeed developing 
countries in all regions of the world grew more rapidly until 2007-2008 as agricultural 
and energy prices began to rise in tandem. The United States and Europe were by far the 
biggest players in agricultural and forestry trade but developing countries had begun to 
increase their shares (Figure 6, 7, 8 and 9).World economic growth stalled starting 2008 
with the global recession (Figure 2b) and a huge drop in merchandise trade volumes as 
share of GDP (Figure 3), but developing countries continued to grow more rapidly than 
high income countries (Figure 2a and 2b). Whereas the global economic crisis slowed 
the high and rising gross domestic capital formation in developing countries, East Asia, 
led by China, continued to show rising gross domestic capital formation even after the 
crisis (Figure 4). The volume of trade and foreign direct investment had grown 
substantially too but slowed after the great recession (Figure 5). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2a: GDP Growths by Region (constant 2000 US$)(1970-2011) (Base 
Year 1970=100) 
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Figure 2b: GDP Growths by Region (constant 2000 US$) (2000-2011) base Year 
2000=100 
 
 
Figure 3: Merchandise Trade (% of GDP) by Region (1990-2011) 
 
34 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Gross Fixed Capital Formation (% of GDP) by Region 
(1990-2011) 
 
Figure 5:  Total Foreign Direct Investment (Inward + Outward) by Region (% 
of GDP) (1991-2011) 
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Total merchandise trade as share of GDP had been increasing until the global economic 
crisis but plummeted after the crisis and yet agricultural trade volumes continued to 
grow, particularly sharply since 2000 and even after the global economic crisis. Europe 
was the major importer of agricultural products but the role of Asia, particularly East 
Asia, also grew (Figure 6). Europe and North America maintained their premier position 
in agricultural exports, but export values from Latin America were approaching those of 
North America in the post 2000 period (Figure 7) (Table 1). 
 
Europe and North America dominated in forest exports and imports but Asia’s share in 
forest imports had increased (Figure 8 and 9). 
 
Again, China led in forestry imports and Indonesia and Brazil in forest related exports 
(Figure 10 and 11) and as in the case of agricultural trade, the share of forestry trade 
remained strong after 2000. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Total Agricultural Products Imports by Region (Import Value in 
Million$) (Real=Nominal/MUV) (MUV Index 2000=100) (1970-2011) 
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Figure 7: Total Agricultural Products Exports by Region (Export Value in 
Million$) (Real=Nominal/MUV) (MUV Index 2000=100) (1970-2011) 
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Region Item 
1970-
2010 
1970-
2002 
2003-
2007 
2008-
2010 
Import Growth Rate ( percent) 
AFRICA Total Merchandise Imports 3.48 1.80 15.92 0.58 
AFRICA Total Agricultural Products Imports 2.91 1.83 13.42 2.64 
AFRICA Total Forest Products Imports 2.55 1.70 9.81 8.28 
EAST ASIA Total Merchandise Imports 7.74 7.38 12.76 5.71 
EAST ASIA Total Agricultural Products Imports 3.66 3.28 6.61 6.45 
EAST ASIA Total Forest Products Imports 3.90 4.36 4.22 7.57 
EUROPE Total Merchandise Imports 4.84 4.13 11.80 -6.28 
EUROPE Total Agricultural Products Imports 2.45 1.51 8.53 -2.30 
EUROPE Total Forest Products Imports 2.99 2.77 6.94 -5.93 
LATIN AMERICA AND 
CARIBBEAN 
Total Merchandise Imports 5.27 4.14 19.23 0.24 
LATIN AMERICA AND 
CARIBBEAN 
Total Agricultural Products Imports 4.30 3.58 10.85 -1.67 
LATIN AMERICA AND 
CARIBBEAN 
Total Forest Products Imports 3.97 3.24 9.62 -0.13 
NORTH AMERICA Total Merchandise Imports 6.01 6.01 8.87 -2.58 
NORTH AMERICA Total Agricultural Products Imports 3.17 2.24 7.49 3.24 
NORTH AMERICA Total Forest Products Imports 3.12 3.63 -0.06 -7.85 
OCEANIA Total Merchandise Imports 5.17 4.23 11.97 1.24 
OCEANIA Total Agricultural Products Imports 4.34 3.22 12.11 4.93 
OCEANIA Total Forest Products Imports 2.76 2.79 4.77 1.63 
REST OF ASIA Total Merchandise Imports 6.47 5.43 17.93 -2.22 
REST OF ASIA Total Agricultural Products Imports 4.82 4.30 12.33 3.83 
REST OF ASIA Total Forest Products Imports 5.60 4.54 19.25 1.33 
SOUTH ASIA Total Merchandise Imports 6.06 4.14 18.88 5.86 
SOUTH ASIA Total Agricultural Products Imports 3.16 1.73 13.02 6.98 
SOUTH ASIA Total Forest Products Imports 4.26 2.21 10.72 5.50 
SOUTH-EAST ASIA Total Merchandise Imports 8.08 8.15 13.64 2.52 
SOUTH-EAST ASIA Total Agricultural Products Imports 4.85 4.17 11.90 8.99 
SOUTH-EAST ASIA Total Forest Products Imports 5.80 6.45 9.88 5.67 
Export Growth Rate (percent) 
AFRICA Total Merchandise Exports 3.49 1.46 19.26 -3.26 
AFRICA Total Agricultural Products Exports 0.20 -1.49 5.26 8.42 
Table 1: Growth Rates (%) of Total Merchandise, Agricultural Products and 
Forest Products Imports and Exports by Region for different Period (1970-
2010) 
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AFRICA Total Forest Products Exports 2.83 2.03 8.22 -4.66 
EAST ASIA Total Merchandise Exports 8.05 7.93 13.65 5.19 
EAST ASIA Total Agricultural Products Exports 4.27 4.31 8.05 11.20 
EAST ASIA Total Forest Products Exports 4.87 3.95 13.95 5.01 
EUROPE Total Merchandise Exports 5.12 4.53 10.47 -5.27 
EUROPE Total Agricultural Products Exports 3.86 3.23 8.54 -0.91 
EUROPE Total Forest Products Exports 3.92 3.58 8.13 -4.38 
LATIN AMERICA AND 
CARIBBEAN 
Total Merchandise Exports 5.27 3.90 19.90 0.81 
LATIN AMERICA AND 
CARIBBEAN 
Total Agricultural Products Exports 2.86 1.36 12.38 4.43 
LATIN AMERICA AND 
CARIBBEAN 
Total Forest Products Exports 7.00 6.82 11.09 2.59 
NORTH AMERICA Total Merchandise Exports 4.93 4.94 8.81 -0.48 
NORTH AMERICA Total Agricultural Products Exports 2.12 1.50 7.06 1.23 
NORTH AMERICA Total Forest Products Exports 2.59 3.23 2.38 0.12 
OCEANIA Total Merchandise Exports 4.81 3.91 12.41 7.21 
OCEANIA Total Agricultural Products Exports 2.24 1.57 5.67 7.70 
OCEANIA Total Forest Products Exports 5.97 6.25 5.40 8.71 
REST OF ASIA Total Merchandise Exports 5.49 3.62 19.06 -5.11 
REST OF ASIA Total Agricultural Products Exports 4.38 3.71 9.62 4.06 
REST OF ASIA Total Forest Products Exports 7.02 4.94 14.37 2.45 
SOUTH ASIA Total Merchandise Exports 5.08 2.96 18.26 4.07 
SOUTH ASIA Total Agricultural Products Exports 2.85 1.06 17.82 12.37 
SOUTH ASIA Total Forest Products Exports 3.71 -0.96 13.69 16.42 
SOUTH-EAST ASIA Total Merchandise Exports 8.63 8.68 12.96 4.85 
SOUTH-EAST ASIA Total Agricultural Products Exports 4.30 3.17 13.45 6.22 
SOUTH-EAST ASIA Total Forest Products Exports 3.41 3.83 7.16 4.86 
Source: FAOSTAT 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8: Total Forest Products Exports by Region (Export Value in Million$) 
(Real=Nominal/MUV) (MUV Index 2000=100) (1970-2011) 
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Figure 9: Total Forest Products Imports by Region (Import Value in Million$) 
(Real=Nominal/MUV) (MUV Index 2000=100) 
(1970-2011) 
 
 
Figure 10: Total Forest Products Imports (Import Value in Million$) 
(Real=Nominal/MUV) (MUV Index 2000=100) (Brazil, India, Indonesia and 
China) 
(1970-2011) 
(BIIC) 
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There is every expectation that developing countries as a group will maintain higher 
economic growth rates in the foreseeable future than developed countries and will drive 
global demand, particularly countries in Asia (BP Statistical Review of World Energy 
2012). 
 
What Explains Rapid Economic Growth Performance and decline in Forest 
Cover Loss? 
 
To answer this question we ran the following econometric model: 
 
Forest Cover loss (1990-2010) as a function of Initial forest cover (1990), GDP per 
capita  (constant 2000 US$) (1990), per capita GDP growth (1990-2010), rate of growth 
Figure 11: Total Forest Products Exports (Export Value in Million$) 
(Real=Nominal/MUV) (MUV Index 2000=100) (Brazil, India, Indonesia and 
China) 
(1970-2011)  
(BIIC) 
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in TFP in agriculture (1990-2009)15, agricultural value added as a share of GDP (1990) 
and governance indicators (voice and accountability).1617 
 
The results show a good fit as follows: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Two variables essentially explain most of the extent of deforestation in part because of 
multi-collinearity among several variables. The greater the initial forest cover, the 
greater the loss. The higher the per capita income, the lesser the loss. Both these factors 
make logical sense. Brazil and Indonesia’s smaller forest loss in the second period for 
example was in part because they had less easily accessible forest left to lose, 
particularly in the case of Indonesia. Yet factors explaining the reduced rate of loss are 
far more complex than captured in an aggregate equation. We explore these 
developments first by outlining the radical changes in the overarching context in the 
“external environment” in which global economic growth and forest cover changes have 
occurred. 
 
At least 20 such trends in the global context are noteworthy since the early 1990s: 
 
                                                          
15 Data is not available for the year 2010. 
 
16 Average of 11 years—2000, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009, 2010 and 2011—data is not available for the year 
2001. 
 
17 The other five governance indicators are-- Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism, Government Effectiveness, 
Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law and Control of Corruption. 
 
Table 2: Regression Result of the Economic Model 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      32 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  6,    25) =   33.33 
       Model |  2.6789e+09     6   446476481           Prob> F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |   334871820    25  13394872.8           R-squared     =  0.8889 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.8622 
       Total |  3.0137e+09    31  97217119.6           Root MSE      =  3659.9 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
forestcove~a |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
initialfor~a |  -.0948775   .0072431   -13.10   0.000    -.1097949     -.07996 
gdppercapi.. |   .7148208    .261723     2.73   0.011     .1757923    1.253849 
gdp~19902010 |  -302.6025   444.4848    -0.68   0.502    -1218.036    612.8311 
tfp~19902009 |  -6146.356   60366.38    -0.10   0.920    -130473.2    118180.5 
agricultur~p |   -15.4289   50.54096    -0.31   0.763      -119.52    88.66216 
voiceandac~y |  -1209.095   1160.163    -1.04   0.307    -3598.497    1180.306 
_cons |  -1183.603   1928.041    -0.61   0.545    -5154.479    2787.272 
 
Note: Detailed regression results are available from authors on request. 
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1. Developing countries have pursued relatively liberal macro-economic and trade 
regimes following protracted debt crises in the 1980s in Latin America and Sub-Saharan 
Africa, the two regions that experienced the worst economic performance in a decade of 
structural adjustment. They learnt from their own economic management mistakes to 
be more prudent and risk averse. They increased savings and investments expanded 
their outward orientation and gave major boosts to agricultural and forestry exports in 
countries like Brazil and Indonesia. 
 
2. Deregulation of global financial markets, the rise of foreign direct investment and 
enterprise, combined with domestic policies of developing countries, spurred economic 
growth and international trade. 
 
3. Private capital flows and remittances dwarfed official development assistance, 
which has implications for REDD+ (Figure 12). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4. With the rise in food prices, private equity has encouraged land acquisition, the 
phenomenon of the so-called “land grab” has acquired most attention in Africa, but land 
purchases in forested areas of Japan by China too are noted, evidently prompted by the 
desire to secure assured supply of clean water (The Washington Post; Nov 6, 2012). 
Figure 12: DAC Members’ Total Net Resource Flows to Developing Countries 
(1970-2010) 
(Constant 2009 USD billion) 
 
 
Note:  Net OOF flows were negative in 2000-01, 2003-04 and 2006-07 & 08. 
Source: http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=CRSNEW 
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5. Risks and uncertainty in the international markets has increased greatly as 
capital, commodity and land markets have become increasingly intertwined. As a recent 
IMF working paper noted, “Rising cross-border trade and finance have underpinned 
strong and sustained growth in many parts of the world and delivered well-known 
economic benefits, such as access to new markets, cheaper funding, and more efficient 
allocation of capital. But the global crisis has brought home with devastating force the 
potential risks of interconnectedness, including that shocks in one part of the system—
sometimes seemingly small in proportion to the whole—can be transmitted widely and 
quickly. With fragility and limited policy buffers expected to persist in the advanced 
economy core of the global financial system, the potential for systemic volatility remains 
high. The Fund’s recent Triennial Surveillance Review (IMF 2011b) called for enhancing 
our understanding of interconnectedness and incorporating this understanding into the 
analysis of risks and policies. In a significant deviation of its standard polity, the IMF 
also acknowledged the need for restrictions on capital account at the insistence of 
emerging countries. 
 
6. Major droughts and forest fires in major exporting countries (e.g., Russia in 
2010, Australia and the US in 2012), which scientists (and even the skeptics among 
them) have begun to attribute to climate change, make it difficult to project the future 
based on the past performance. 
 
7. Half the world population already lived in urban areas in 2012. By 2050, 70 
percent of the population is expected to be urban (UN population projections). This 
shifting demographic trend is changing demand for environmental management (Figure 
13). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 13: Urban Population by Major Geographical Area (in per cent of total 
population) 
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8. Urbanization and income growth have been associated with increased food 
demand and changing consumption patterns, typically increasing caloric consumption 
and shifting to higher value, often to more water consuming crops and products, 
including livestock, fisheries, fruits and vegetables. This shift spurs forest conversion to 
pastures for livestock and cropping but also results in protection of watersheds for 
environmental services. 
 
9. Demand for packaging, processing, refrigeration and shipping is also increasing 
(summarizes in the Table 3)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
10. Population growth rates have slowed throughout the world although they remain 
high in SSA followed by South Asia. Together the two regions are projected to contribute 
90 percent of the global population growth until 2050 when the world population would 
reach or slightly exceed 9 billion. 
 
11. Asia and Africa now contain two thirds and one third of all global poverty and 
food insecurity with a number of interrelated vulnerabilities, i.e., greater dependence on 
fuel wood for energy, absence of reliable clean water and sanitation for a large share of 
the poor, disease, child malnutrition, stunting and other insecurities (Figure 14 and 15). 
Poverty related forest degradation from fuel wood is expected to continue in these 
regions. The rest of the developing world has made remarkable strides in meeting the 
Millennium Development Goals. 
Source: United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division: World Urbanization Prospects, the 
2011 Revision. New York, 2012. 
 
Table 3: Long Term Global Food Challenge 
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Figure 14: Number of Poor (Millions) by Region ($1.25 a day) (1981-2005) 
 
Source: All outputs from PovcalNet should cite the source as "PovcalNet: the on-line tool for poverty measurement 
developed by the Development Research Group of the World Bank" and provide the web link to PovcalNet. Available at: 
http://iresearch.worldbank.org/PovcalNet/index.htm?3 
 
 
Figure 15: Number of Undernourished by Region, 1990-92 and 2010-12 
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12. Having reached the limits of extensive land margin, most of Asia, (barring a few 
exceptions such as Indonesia and Cambodia), with high population densities and 
dynamic economic growth, has been driving global demand for food and energy. 
 
13. Latin America, with its abundant land and other natural resources and the 
advantage of developed transportation and communications, has become (and will likely 
be) the major source of food supply to Asia. Brazil was also able to export corn and 
soybeans to the US during the severe drought in 2012. 
 
14. Even though Africa is more open in terms of the share of trade in GDP than other 
regions and there is much debate about the likely impact of land grab in Central Africa, 
the WDR 2009 notes that, relative to other regions, Sub-Saharan Africa today suffers 
from the triple disadvantages of low population density, long distance, and deep division 
of language and national borders defined by a colonial history that put the continent at a 
developmental disadvantage. These spatial dimensions reduce proximity between 
economic agents within Sub-Saharan Africa, and between Africa and the rest of the 
world. “Cumulative causation” between these forces catches many countries in Sub-
Saharan Africa in a “proximity trap” leading to weak agglomeration forces, high 
transportation costs, and reduced factor mobility. Africa will remain more constrained 
in its regional and global integration through industrialization, trade in comparison with 
other regions, most notably Latin America and Asia where populations are concentrated 
in the coastal areas. Small land locked countries, limited physical infrastructure,  high 
transportation costs and divisions by language and history (WDR 2009) make economic 
exploitation of natural resources such as water, energy, forests and food more 
challenging(Figure 16). Collier and Venables (2012) make a similar argument. But not 
everyone accepts this line of argument. They point to the considerable variability in 
population densities in Africa and the fact that African countries are more open in terms 
of share of trade in GDP than many Asian countries. But they too acknowledge that 
unless accompanied by substantial investment in physical infrastructure to open up 
lands for resource exploitation, (as witnessed by China’s recent investments in Africa), 
and better maintenance of existing infrastructure land conversion of forests to 
agriculture and other uses will likely be limited in Africa than Latin America and South 
East Asia. 
 
Data Source: The State of Food Insecurity in the World 2012. 
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15. Increased investments in biofuels in response to rising energy prices post 2000 
are already making additional demands on land and agricultural and forest products as 
a substitute for traditional forms of energy and they will remain a wild card in countries 
such as Brazil and Indonesia with access to international and domestic capital and 
technology for the expansion of the first and second generation bio-fuels. The impact of 
biofuels could be limited by lack of infrastructure in Africa and the new gas discoveries 
in the US which are changing the energy dynamics and could well make biofuels less 
necessary or competitive. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
16.   A global movement towards democratization has been followed by decentralization. 
These developments pose new and very different challenges in natural resource 
management with competing interests vested with stakeholders possessing different 
political power at different levels in the countries, each vying for limited resources, a 
sharp contrast to the centralized power exercised by the top down autocratic regimes of 
the past, e.g., in Indonesia or DRC Congo described in OED’s review of the World Bank’s 
1991 forest strategy (The World Bank 2000). 
 
17.  The information age has given growing voice to civil society and media, with 
growing demand for the rule of law. Institutional pluralism and partnerships have led to 
increased demand for transparency and accountability of governments and stakeholders 
Figure 16: Areas of Physical and Economic Water Scarcity 
 
Source: International Water Management Institute (2007) analysis done for the Comprehensive Assessment of Water 
Management in Agriculture using the Watersim model, chapter 2. 
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in general. However, the impact of the information age on the likely exploitation of 
natural resources is still relatively unknown. 
 
18.  Environmental and social movements have been mainstreamed in development 
thinking, with increased debates about the role of the MDGs in the post-2015 
development agenda and the development of Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), as 
recommended in theRio+20 Outcome Document, which give equal weight to the 
economic, environmental, and social dimensions of sustainable development. The 
steady progress in mainstreaming environmental concerns is evident in the variety of 
safeguards in place in international organizations and governments of developing 
countries to protect biodiversity human rights and traditional cultures. 
 
19.   Multilateral development assistance has changed fundamentally in character and is 
increasingly and directly tied to demonstrated performance (Table 4). Aid levels to 
agriculture and forestry declined steadily until the food crisis of 2007. Even though aid 
to agriculture (which included forestry) has increased since then, it has not reached the 
aid levels reached in the mid- 1980s (Figure 17, 18 and 19). Barring a few exceptions, 
namely, China and Brazil, until food prices began to increase there was a prolonged 
neglect of investment in food and agriculture by donors and developing countries alike 
(Figure 20). Most aid is now concentrated in Africa. With increased bilateralization and 
fragmentation of multilateral aid since the mid-1990s, accompanied by a proliferation of 
global partnerships transaction costs to developing countries in accessing external 
resources are huge (Lele et al 2011a; and Lele 2012). Carbon funds (including forest 
carbon) have proliferated too while assistance to the forestry sector has stagnated. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4: Total ODA from All Donors 1967-2010 
Donors 
Current Prices (USD 
millions) 
Constant Prices 
(2010 USD 
millions) 
DAC Countries, Total 23 countries 1,22,146.22 209, 278.5 
Non-DAC Countries, Total—only 2 
reported 
90.62 97.15 
Bilateral, Total 1,22,236.84 2,09,375.70 
Multilateral, Total (14 organizations) 78,509.14 1,36,106.50 
Total ODA 2,00,745.98 3,45,482.20 
 
Source: OECD.Stat 
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Figure 17: Declining Share of ODA Compounded by OECD Economic Woes 
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Figure 18: Share of Agricultural Commitments by World Bank and ODA 
(FY1960-FY2011) 
sa 
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Note: Other DAC Countries are—Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Korea, Luxembourg, New 
Zealand, Portugal, Sweden and Switzerland. 
Other Multilateral Donors are—AFESD, GEF, IDB Sp. Fund, Isl. Dev Bank, Nordic Dev. Fund, OFID, UNDP, UNECE and 
UNPBF. 
Non-DAC Countries are—Kuwait and United Arab Emirates. 
 
Figure 19: Bilaterals and Multilaterals ODA to Agriculture + Forestry + 
Fishing by Major Donors (Total Commitments) (2010 USD Millions) 
(Constant Prices) (1995-2010) 
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20.      The growth of private capital combined with environmental and social concerns 
pose new challenges for sustainable and equitable development. Because they are driven 
by these global trends and yet are location specific they call for domestic capacity to 
address the new norm of growing complexity outlined in the rest of this paper. 
 
Cross Sectorial Linkages between Forests and Other Sectors in Depth 
 
Agriculture and Forestry 
    
In this section we explore how structural transformation of countries can be reconciled 
with the growing debate about the merit of increasing agricultural productivity through 
intensification and its impacts on land use changes in the course of development.  
Economists have considered agricultural productivity growth as being crucial to the 
economic transformation process outlined in the introduction to this paper. 
Technological change increases food supply and brings down food prices, which plays a 
major role in consumer budgets, particularly those of the poor. Low food prices are 
essential to contain demand for increased wages from urban workers in the course of 
 
Source: Josef Schmidhuber, IPC 2010 
Figure 20: Food Price Index vs Share of Agricultural ODA 
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industrialization. High wage bill puts pressure on savings and can be a disincentive to 
employ more labor in the non-agricultural sector, an essential feature of structural 
transformation. As the food supply curve shifts to the right under factor neutral 
technical change, low elasticity of demand for food leads to fall in prices and so will the 
value of land, particularly on marginal land where lower returns result in a profit 
squeeze and abandonment of land for agriculture. 
 
In a land short Asia with millions of hungry mouths to feed, increasing food productivity 
has also been important on welfare grounds. Nobel Peace Prize winning Norman 
Borlaug, the father of the Green Revolution, often argued that without productivity 
growth millions of more hectares of land would have been needed to feed today’s hungry 
and the growing population.18 The CGIAR was founded to generate technologies for 
agricultural intensification on the basis of this argument. But of course lands are 
increasingly used for economic transformation, substitution of forms of energy among 
others, as discussed later in this paper. Some forest economists on the other hand have 
argued that technological change has a “rebound effect” of increasing deforestation by 
increasing returns to land and providing incentive for further land clearing (Fearnside 
1997; pp. 537-570).19 Others have stressed the ambiguous effects of technological change 
on forests (WDR 2008; and Angelson & Kaimowitz 1999). These various outcomes are 
possible depending on land constrained or land surplus situations, which were well 
identified in the World Bank’s evaluation of the 1991 forest strategy as well as the 
neglect of cross sectoral linkages which drive deforestation (World Bank 2000). In cases 
where additional land is available and there are either no constraints to land expansion 
and marginal cost of accessing new land is low, or government actively promotes 
agricultural expansion through credit or other forms of subsidies as the OED evaluation 
then noted in the case of Brazil and Indonesia, productivity growth would in all 
likelihood lead to expansion of area under cultivation. This same phenomenon is 
discussed below albeit in a changed more globalized context. The tension between those 
concerned with the environment and others concerned with development is evident 
from these arguments since trade-offs often exist, over time and across space and their 
overt discussion tends to be unpopular with the search for a vague “win-win-win” 
particularly with a focus on developing countries. 
 
Relative to the effects of technological change in food production, which is needed for 
human survival, effects of biofuel expansion in industrial countries are of course less 
                                                          
18 “If the global cereal yields of 1950still prevailed in 2000, we would have needed nearly 1.2 billion more hectares of the same 
quality, instead of the 660 million hectares used, to achieve 2000'sglobal harvest. Moreover, had environmentally fragile land been 
brought into agricultural production […] loss of forests […] would have been disastrous”(Borlaug 2007). 
 
19 Crops (Pirard & Belna 2012). 
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benign. Technological change or policies that promote biofuels divert food or edible oils 
tend to reduce food supplies in the market increasing food prices as Wright notes in the 
case of the US -“food-competing biofuels can do more harm to the welfare of the poor 
and landless, globally, than the greatest conceivable aid efforts or productivity increases 
could compensate” (Wright 2011). Furthermore income elasticity of demand for food 
declines with increased incomes—Engel’s law applies-- it is likely therefore that even in 
the face of population and income growth, with substantial investment in agricultural 
research, food supply will continue to grow with steady decline in food prices as 
occurred after the first Green Revolution starting 1973 until 2007 (Figure 21). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Income elasticity of demand for energy on the other hand tends to be much higher than 
for food and demand may well be price inelastic as discussed later in the section on 
energy. Furthermore biofuels constitute a small share of the total energy mix. Therefore, 
there is huge scope for substitution of biofuels for other forms of fuel, if either 
technological change or subsidies and mandates of governments, such as those which 
currently prevail in OECD countries, result in incentives to produce biofuels.  As global 
incomes and demand for energy increase biofuels may turn out to have far more adverse 
impacts on the poor particularly if the latter are not preceded by technological change in 
Figure 21: Food Price Index vs. Food Supply (1970-2011) 
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food and agriculture. The complexity and country specificity of these issues is discussed 
below. 
 
 
Drivers of Deforestation: Exploring Regional Differences and New Patterns 
 
A recent consensus has emerged on the increasing role of urban and export demand in 
driving deforestation in a globalized economy, such as in studies on the drivers of 
deforestation using new sources of satellite data following the UNFCCC COP meeting in 
Cancun (Rudel et al 2009; and DeFries et al 2010). This new consensus should 
complement the conventional wisdom about the role of subsistence farming and 
firewood collection as the causes of deforestation where poverty exists (Boucher et al 
2011).20 Agricultural expansion was the key driver of deforestation in the tropics since 
the 1960s (Gibbs et al 2010). Drivers also vary regionally and indeed within countries as 
shown in the case of Brazil and Indonesia and change over time. Most such analysis is 
largely based on local or regional case studies (Geist and Lambin 2002) or on coarse 
assessments on the continental and global scales, with less focus on the national level. 
Moreover, discrepancies in estimates of forest losses, for instance, between FAO Forest 
Resource Assessment 2010 and the remote sensing based estimates of Hansen et al 
2010, suggest that knowledge of context-specific drivers is needed but tends often to be 
lacking, highlighting the current knowledge and data gaps. Only 12 of 100 (sub)tropical 
non-Annex I countries were able to provide quantitative data (Hosonuma et al 2012) to 
the review of driver data collection engaged at the national level as part of UNFCCC 
REDD+ readiness activities, including setting of the required reference level. 
 
These suggest that in Africa and Asia subsistence and commercial agriculture contribute 
roughly equally while commercial agriculture is the main driver in Latin America. 
Mining plays a minor direct role. The degradation patterns are more similar in Latin 
America and Asia with the predominance of logging. Fuelwood and small-scale 
agriculture are the main drivers of deforestation in Africa (Hosonuma et al 2012; and 
also see below in the case of Central Africa). Although the predominance of agriculture 
and logging as drivers of deforestation is confirmed, there are relatively few systematic 
studies of agricultural and forestry interactions except in frontier expansion, as 
discussed below in the case of Brazil. As the real time availability of deforestation data 
has increased, so has the quality of analysis and knowledge on the sources of 
deforestation. Globally, however, the task is constrained by the fact that data on 
agriculture and forestry sectors are maintained by separate ministries and therefore by 
FAO, rather than on land use changes per se. With the notable exception of Brazil, real 
time data on deforestation has been difficult to come by. The vast literature on total 
                                                          
20 Uma Lele’s field visits in the state of Gujarat and Maharashtra during November and December 2012 illustrated that firewood 
collection remains extensive among the rural poor in India. 
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factor productivity growth (TFP) in agriculture does not take into account the 
environmental consequences of productivity growth whether on forest land conversion, 
or with regard to water and soils. Studies on Brazil and Indonesia which address forest 
conversion are reported below. 
Among developing countries detailed time series estimates of TFP growth are now 
available. Among the largest developing countries, China has experienced some of the 
fastest growth in agricultural TFP, followed by Brazil and Indonesia (Figure 22) (Map 1). 
More detailed country by country decade by decade rates of productivity growth, which 
vary, are in Annex 1 (Table 1 and Table 2). India shows slower rate of total factor 
productivity growth in agriculture than either China or Indonesia and the incidence of 
poverty is also greater in India (Figure 23). But the performance of these three countries 
on forest cover loss/gain has been quite different. Indonesia has had a rich forest in 
outer islands to lose and technical progress and international demand to convert forests 
into oil palm have been attractive much as in the case of soybean and pastures in Brazil 
in the earlier period. Indeed the opportunity cost of producing oil palm with gross 
margin of US$ 2000 to US$ 3000 even compared to the $1 billion from Norway is not 
self –evident since the donor money goes to the treasury and it is unclear how much and 
how it reaches the producers does not compare favorably. Measures of agricultural TFP 
growth do not take into account changes in natural resource stocks (soil loss, water 
depletion, changes in biodiversity), or other environmental externalities resulting from 
land use changes, like carbon emissions, etc. What TFP growth implies for 
environmental resources on the whole is ambiguous. In some cases we are 
undercounting resource changes and in other cases over counting them. For example, to 
the extent that productivity growth reduces conversion of forests to cropland, there are 
environmental benefits not counted in TFP. In the US, large reductions have been noted 
in greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions per unit of meat and milk production due to 
productivity growth in livestock. On the other hand, growth in large feedlot operations 
(which have contributed to measured growth in TFP) also pose larger risks to water 
pollution from livestock wastes (Personal Communication with Keith Fuglie; Dec 11, 
2012). 
 
In Indonesia’s case, when new land is brought into production, it adds to the resources 
used in production. If resources (land etc.) in oil palm doubles and oil palm output 
doubles, there is no growth in TFP. If output more than doubles, then that excess is 
attributed to improvements in TFP. But these calculations do not account for the loss of 
environmental services from previously forested areas (Personal Communication with 
Keith Fuglie; Dec 11, 2012). Clearly better accounting of environmental impacts of 
agricultural TFP growth is overdue in the context of climate change discussions. 
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Figure 22: Agricultural TFP Indexes Growths (Brazil, India, Indonesia and 
China) (1961-2009) 
 
Figure 23: Population living below $1.25 a day (1981, 1990 and 2005) 
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in 1981 
South Asia 44% and SS Africa 28% of 
Global Poverty In 2005
 
Note: The survey years for all the regions except India are 1981, 1990 and 2005 but for India the survey years are 1977.5, 
1987.5 and 2004.5.Data Source: http://iresearch.worldbank.org/PovcalNet/index.htm?0,5. (PovcalNet). 
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 China’s gain of forest cover is controversial. Countries such as China and Vietnam 
are noted for having exported deforestation elsewhere through increased imports 
(Figure 10 and 11) (Meyfroidt, Rudel and Lambina 2010). China’s forest product exports 
which add value to imported timber have increased too, many of which go to OECD 
countries -- so that net forest product imports are smaller than gross imports. 
 
 Elsewhere Lele et al (2011b) in a study of structural transformation of 109 
countries demonstrated the role of agricultural productivity growth in China’s reduced 
share in GDP and employment, rural-urban migration, which by many accounts is larger 
than that reported in FAO’s data on Chinese labor in agriculture and the growth of non-
farm employment, urban water needs among others. Indeed in this regard China and 
Indonesia are well ahead of India (Figure 24). 
Map 1: Agricultural TFP growth in China 
 
 
The top ten provinces in TFP growth 
for the 1985-2007 period 
(* Six of them are on the east coast) 
 
Jiangxi 8.17% 
Guangdong* 8.11% 
Hebei* 7.95% 
Fujian* 7.89% 
Shandong* 7.37% 
Hubei 7.34% 
Inner 
Mongolia 
7.26% 
Zhejiang* 7.19% 
Sichuan 7.18% 
Liaoning* 6.83% 
 
 
 
Province Annual growth rate 
Qinghai 4.0% 
Ningxia 3.8% 
Zhejiang* 3.8% 
Hebei* 3.5% 
Guangdong* 3.5% 
Guangxi* 3.3% 
Fujian* 3.3% 
Sichuan 3.0% 
Shaanxi 2.9% 
Yunnan 2.8% 
 
 Annual TFP Growth of the 
Top Ten Provinces  
(* Five of them are on the 
east coast) 
Source: Wang, Tuan, Gale, Somwaru and Hansen (Forthcoming). 
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 Evidence on the role of PES schemes in China on reforestation remains a debated 
issue. Some have attributed China’s increase in forest cover to forest tenure reforms as 
early as in the 1980s (Hyde et al 2003). Yet some of these same authors (Xu et al 2010) 
have noted the stalled forest tenure reforms until the first decade of the new millennium 
and attributed some of the reforestation to its PES schemes programs prompted by the 
floods and droughts in the late 1990s, first leading to a logging ban in the upper reaches 
of the Yellow and Yangze rivers, where returns to agriculture on the steep mountain 
lands are marginal, followed by one of the most ambitious programs of payments for 
environmental services (Xu et al 2010). China is now driving some of the largest public 
PES schemes in the world. Starting in 1999,the government began the Conversion of 
Cropland to Forest and Grassland Program (also known as “Grain for Green”), which 
has spent more than CNY130 billion ($19 billion) to date on payments and incentives for 
farmers to retire and afforest or plant grass on more than 9 million hectares (ha) of 
sloping or marginal cropland. The program now stretches to all corners of the country. 
Since 2001, the government has spent more than CNY13.34 billion ($2 billion) on the 
Forest Ecosystem Compensation Fund, a program that pays households, communities, 
 
Figure 24: Difference between the Share of Value 
Added and Share of Employment in Agriculture 
(Brazil, India, Indonesia and China) (1980-2009) 
 
 
Data Source: WDI and Global Development Finance, World Bank and FAOSTAT and 
Lele et al 2011b. 
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and local governments to protect about 44.53 million ha of key forest areas across 30 
provinces. The variety of payment schemes for watershed services have increased in 
popularity in recent years, from eight in 1999 to more than 47 in 2008, with an 
estimated transacted value of $7.8 billion and covering about 290 million ha. Others 
(including Karsenty) question the role the PES is playing in China’s or indeed in 
countries such as Costa Rica and Mexico where it has been in vogue in increasing forest 
cover (see section below on PES). 
 
Notwithstanding the ongoing design, implementation, and funding challenges, these 
programs have generated significant momentum for the development of future 
ecosystem services markets in China and elsewhere although as discussed in the next 
section and later in the section on PES benefits of watershed protection, are not always 
easy to measure, Chinese experts suggest protecting watersheds in the yellow river and 
Yangtze river have stabilized water flows and improved water quality (Lele’s discussion 
with Zyani Gao, President of International Irrigation and Drainage Commission; 
November 30, 2012). Demand for ecosystem services seems to increase with increases 
in per capita income as does the consumer willingness to pay, or at least the ability of 
governments to charge urban populations water rates. Although the precise benefits of 
these services are not known, “In 2007,it is estimated that annual payments under all 
payment schemes and markets for ecosystem services totaled around $77 billion 
worldwide, and these total payments are expected to increase to approximately $300 
billion by 2020 (Carroll and Jenkins 2008).” 
 
Environmental management raises important issues of an appropriate balance between 
centralization and decentralization in contexts where there are huge spillovers, 
externalities, tradeoffs between the long and short term, and huge measurement 
challenges both in costs and benefits. Yet these issues are also imbedded in the polities, 
bureaucracies and histories of each country where there are few generalizations, 
transferable lessons or silver bullets possible. China’s seemingly relatively more 
successful environmental management in the last two decades, using a landscape 
approach, is made possible by the fact that constitutionally all natural resources in 
China are state owned, the Chinese central authorities have demonstrated strong 
commitment to environmental management, have substantial state capability to pilot 
and learn from experiments and take a long term view of planning and implementation 
of scaled up large scale and long term development program including its adverse 
consequences (e.g. resettlement). Some have expressed a concern that REDD+ is 
leading to an unnecessary or unwarranted centralization of forest management and have 
advocated decentralized solutions (Phelps et al 2010). In recent papers on water 
management Lele et al on the other hand have demonstrated the challenges in water 
management in a decentralized democracy such as India with often weak central, state 
and local governments (Lele Oct 18, 2012; Lele et al forthcoming; and Lele 2012). 
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Successful action has taken place at the state level, e.g. forest management in the state of 
West Bengal, where an enabling environment has been created by forest tenure rights, 
or in water management in the state of Gujarat, where the states have shown leadership 
and an ability to undertake strong and consistent policy decisions, and ensured their 
successful implementation. State level is where the action is increasingly centered in 
India but responsible state action is often an exception than a reality in natural resource 
management. 
 
International markets for carbon involving developing countries are unlikely to emerge 
without state capacity in developing countries combined with an overarching agreement 
that clarifies rules of the game and establishes standards and norms for carbon credits. 
Such a market will call for breaking the current impasse between developed and 
developing countries on the need for independent verification of certifiable carbon 
credits. 
 
The higher incidence of poverty in India relative to China or Indonesia on the other 
hand should be expected to result in the greater use of fuel wood. Indeed, data cited for 
fuelwood use in China and the rest of Asia in the section on forests and energy in 
following sections lends support to this hypothesis. 
 
In Indonesia, not only is the growth in total factor productivity in agriculture and 
structural transformation more advanced higher than in India as shown in Figure 22, 
but it is explained in part by the TFP growth in the outer islands. Figures 10 and 11 show 
Indonesia’s thriving forest exports and imports—In the case of oil palm the TFP growth 
was accompanied by forest conversion using new agricultural technologies from 
Malaysia (Fuglie et al 2012). Growing demand from India and China for palm oil from 
Indonesia has led to export growth (Lele et al 2011b) (Figure 25). Demand for oil for 
cooking is more income elastic than demand for food crops, explaining Indonesia’s palm 
oil exports to India and China. So far there is no evidence that oil palm is leading to the 
increased production of biofuels; however, it does offer Indonesia the flexibility to use 
oil palm production for biofuels than as edible oil exports. 
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Ceteris Paribus, higher income elasticity of demand for energy and livestock products 
relative to cereals should be expected to result in the conversion of forests into pastures 
as occurred in the Amazon with growing demand from China, unless forest law 
enforcement changes the dynamics of land use. 
 
Productivity growth, e.g., in the soybean sector in Brazil, has the effect of reducing the 
cost of production of livestock in China, leading to reduced prices and increased demand 
for meat with increased derived demand for soybean imports in China from Brazil. How 
these patterns of agricultural productivity growth have affected deforestation in Brazil 
and Indonesia and reforestation in China follows. 
 
Effects of Urbanization on Agriculture 
 
Urbanization is associated with changes in consumption patterns (DeFries et al 2010). 
Rural populations moving to the cities tend to have higher incomes and consume more 
processed foods and animal products than rural dwellers. This trend encourages 
commercial, large-scale agricultural production in rural areas, and there is evidence of 
increased farm operations including in the piggeries in China and expansion into 
 
Figure 25: Palm Oil Import by India & China and Export by Indonesia 
(tonnes) (1961-2010) 
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forests, in this case seemingly in Brazil. Traditional clearing of forests for small-scale 
subsistence farming and local market production is thus no longer the only prime 
reason for deforestation in many regions, particularly in countries that are growing 
rapidly and have reached middle income urbanized state such as China or Brazil. In 
Africa, the rates of urbanization are lower; urbanization is not causing such a large shift 
in consumption patterns. However, with urban migration, if less labor is available in 
villages for clearing forests in an already labor constrained agriculture that still uses 
very low level of technology; increased food imports may follow (Fuglie et al 2011). In 
addition, in oil or mining countries, urbanization is often associated with Dutch Disease 
syndrome (and food imports), which tends to reduce pressure on forests, but also create 
less domestic linkages between agricultural and non-agricultural growth. The 
governments of course can give large tracts of forest land to oil palm developers but then 
the employment implications of large scale farming on domestic economies remain a 
relatively less researched area in Africa, unlike in Latin America where new literature on 
farm size and efficiency suggests that with modern computer based technologies many 
management costs of employing large scale labor can be reduced with relatively little 
labor or management. A U shaped curve with respect to farm size is notable, i.e., small 
farms are more efficient than large farms until a certain size is reached and then farm 
efficiency increases with scale due to an altogether different level of technology which 
employs much less labor (Deininger and Byerlee 2011; and Helfand and Levine 2004). 
 
To summarize, with liberalized global food markets, production will take place where it 
is most economic and this will likely mean where forests exist and there is scope for land 
conversion, unless the cost of such conversion is increases through policy design. These 
options are evident in the case of Brazil with its technologically advanced agriculture. 
The 109 country study reported earlier showed that Brazil has been shedding substantial 
labor from agriculture than the general trend for all 109 countries, explaining the 
growing contribution of its large farms to agricultural TFP growth compared to the 
average trends. Brazil’s agriculture is becoming more capital intensive and its farm size 
is increasing whereas poverty remains isolated in the north-east. Productivity studies 
also show that agricultural factor productivity has been faster in the states of 
MatoGrosso and Para adjacent to the Amazon where deforestation has taken place on a 
large scale (MAP 2) than in the rest of the country (Lele et al 2011b). 
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In view of the growing importance of large scale farming some have argued that efforts 
need to focus on reducing deforestation for industrial-scale, export-oriented agricultural 
production, concomitant with efforts to increase yields in non-forested lands to satisfy 
demands for agricultural products (DeFries et al 2010). Rudel et al (2009) propose to 
focus on promoting environmental stewardship in areas conducive to industrial 
agriculture. While noting the greater capacity of large farms to destroy forests, they 
argue that the shift from poverty-driven to industry-driven deforestation may offer new 
opportunities for rainforest conservation in that it is easier for pressure groups to target 
corporations and enterprises rather than millions of poor farmers engaged in 
subsistence activities. This is provided public opinion keeps up the pressure on large 
corporations, effects of displacement of land-use are limited, and evidence of declining 
footprints are not accompanied by corrupt corporate practices that have now begun to 
be extensively documented. For example, in the case of Wal-Mart, its environmental 
footprint is reportedly declining but its cash flow is increasing rapidly, so its total 
Map 2: Brazil--State Level Variation in TFP Growth 
Rate (Average % per Year over Period) 
 
Source: Authors’ own creation based on the data from Gasquez et al 2011. “Productivity 
and Structural Transformation in Brazilian Agriculture: Analysis of Agricultural Census”.  
Ch. 7 in Productivity Growth in Agriculture: An International Perspective, ed. Keith O. 
Fuglie, Sun Ling Wang and V. Eldon Ball. CAB International. 
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footprint is expanding. Further, in Mexico it is alleged to have broken both Mexican and 
US laws. 
Urban consumers could be targeted as well in the strategy to curb deforestation. The 
success of the 2006 soybean moratorium in Brazil (Rudorff et al 2011) and its 
duplication for the beef cattle industry in 2009 lend support to the proposal. In both 
cases, after Greenpeace issued a report, officials called for a crackdown and cut of 
financial incentives. The industry responded with a moratorium on buying products 
from previously forested areas and a promise to implement improved supply-chain 
tracking mechanisms (Butler & Laurence2008; and Boucher et al 2011). Yet, reflecting 
overconsumption trends throughout the world, per capita caloric consumption in Latin 
America, including from animal products, now is close to US levels and disparities 
among developing regions in caloric consumption are staggeringly high South Asia 
being at the bottom (Figure 26). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 26: Total Food Supply by Region (Crops Primary Equivalent + 
Livestock and Fish Primary Equivalent) (kcal/capita/day) (1961-2007) 
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Eco-certification schemes like the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO) initiated 
by the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) in 2002  (first companies certified in 2008) of 
“partnered governance” emerged in a context where globalization and specialization 
created a vacuum in control of the inputs of the value chain, as a way to prevent further 
state regulation.  Some have noted that RSPO has been more successful than FSC in 
promoting the sustainable management of forests (Nikoloyuk et al 2010) but the two are 
complementary, FSC about exploited forests and RSPO about avoided deforestation, as 
the FLEGT and the Lacey Act intend to do for wood products imported in the European 
or American market. Such private or public regulation has a limited impact if non-
certified production can be sold without much difficulty. Moreover, the relative success 
of the moratorium in Brazil has been possible because of its national capacities (near-
real time monitoring of deforestation) and a favorable governance context more 
conducive to compliance, even when, (or because?) a large influential player such as 
Cargil was involved and had a reputation to protect. Similar cases are not noticeable in 
Indonesia, for instance, illustrating how strong governments of developing countries 
have to be to withstand multinational pressures. 
 
Even if the profitability of Amazon cattle ranching and soy farming soar in the future, 
some believe with Norway’s $1 billion commitment, the marketplace transition within 
the beef and soy industries could take place to exclude Amazon deforesters from their 
supply chains, and pasture intensification as ways to achieve the end of deforestation in 
Amazon. Legal compliance could be facilitated through land-use zoning plans and 
compensation for the opportunity costs incurred in maintaining private forests beyond 
what the law requires (Nepstad et al 2009). However, promises of intensification should 
be examined carefully against the environmental capacity to support it (i.e., in water 
constrained areas) or the political economy context. This may explain the lack of 
correlation between soil quality and forest clearing, the land tenure issues, land 
speculation and money-laundering (Fearnside 2005). 
 
Setting Aside Degraded Marginal Lands for Reforestation 
 
A number of developing countries have expanded national forest areas over the recent 
decades (Lambin & Meyfroidt 2011) because of a combination of increase in agricultural 
productivity, in the more productive areas of the country, greater reliance on 
international trade in agriculture and setting aside the marginal areas for reforestation, 
most notably China, which explains the large areas brought under forests by a single 
country.  India and Vietnam have undertaken similar efforts in forest regeneration, 
using mixtures of agricultural intensification, land use zoning, forest protection, 
increased reliance on imported food and wood products, the creation of off-farm jobs, 
foreign capital investments, and remittances (Lambin & Meyfroidt 2011; and Xu et al 
2010). 
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Case Studies of Forested Countries 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Box 2: Deforestation in Brazil 
 
Having the world’s largest tropical forest a small percentage change in forest loss in 
Brazil can mean a big change in the share of global forest loss. Therefore decadal 
changes in forest loss and factors underlying it are important in understanding 
global changes in forest cover.  
 
From 1988 (when annual record keeping began) until 2004, annual deforestation in 
the Brazilian Amazon ranged between 1.1 million (1991) and 2.5-3 million hectares 
(1995, 2003-2004). Since 2004, the annual rate has fallen by 80 percent, down to 
642,000 hectares in 2011. Among the nine states of the Legal Amazon, MatoGrosso 
and Pará account for approximately one-third each of cumulated deforestation, but 
the latter constitutes nearly half of clearings since 2007 (INPE 2011). 
 
According to preliminary results of the Terra Class mapping exercise on the land use 
of Amazon deforested areas as of 2008, 62 percent are currently used as pasture, 5 
percent for agricultural activities, 21 percent are in a process of forest regeneration, 
the remaining 12 percent are not yet covered or include mining, settlements and 
urban areas, zones flooded by dams and other development. If MatoGrosso had the 
largest percentage of forest land converted for large-scale agriculture (15 percent), 
the survey covers only the areas previously forested and does not include the credo 
(savannah) regions expected to account for a higher proportion of agricultural 
operations where loss of biodiversity is also a concern (INPE/EMBRAPA 2011). 
 
Clearing for pasture (cattle ranching) has been the leading proximate cause of 
deforestation in the Brazilian Amazon since the 1970s, but the “hamburger 
connection” described by Myers (1981) – that is the rapid growth of beef exports 
from Central America to fast food chains in the US – only applied from the late 
1990s. If national beef consumption quadrupled between 1972 and 1997 due to 
growing urban incomes, it is only by 1991 that the Amazon started producing a 
surplus for the national market (Kaimowitz et al 2004). 
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Through roads cut and colonization programs in the 1970s and 1980s, federal 
policies promoting the development of cattle pasture were the main driver of 
forestation in the Brazilian Amazon. Despite the low profitability of cattle production 
and the reduction of government fiscal incentives in the 1990s, ranching continued 
to expand, partly because of its utility to investors and land speculators in helping 
them claim title to land as creation of pastures was the cheapest way of achieving the 
demonstration of “productive use” required to get land titling (Fearnside 2005; and 
Nepstad et al 2006). 
 
From 1997, the rise in Brazilian beef export was driven by the massive devaluation of 
the national currency that doubled the price of beef locally while making it 
competitive on international markets, progress in eradicating foot and mouth 
disease (FMD) in the Brazilian Amazon opening access to these markets, and 
outbreaks of Mad Cow disease and Avian flu encouraging a switch to Brazilian beef 
source. Improvements in the health, productivity, and “traceability” of Amazon cattle 
herd and the trend toward trade liberalization helped Brazil to become by 2004 the 
world’s leading beef exporter (Nepstad et al 2006) a place now left to India (USDA 
2012). 
 
Soy expansion in the Amazon began in the late 1990s as new varieties were 
developed that tolerated the climate and as a worldwide shortage of animal-feed 
protein boosted soy prices (China’s growth combined with the 2001 EU ban on 
animal-protein-based feeding of livestock). After 2005, the increase in soy 
production in MatoGrosso was due mainly to expansion onto previously cleared land 
compared to the first half of the decade. Such decoupling may provide the evidence 
that it is possible to achieve the dual objectives of conservation and agricultural 
production if there is incentive for a productive use of already cleared land instead of 
expansion into forests (Macedo et al 2012). Although not a major proximate drive of 
deforestation, soy expansion could be an underlying driver (displacement 
deforestation) through land prices increase allowing cattle ranchers to sell valuable 
holding to purchase new land further north in forested Pará (Nepstad et al 2006; 
Barona et al 2010; and MacDonald & Simon 2010). Moreover, soybean industry 
carries the political weight necessary to induce infrastructure improvement such as 
paved roads which in turn stimulate further deforestation (Fearnside 2005). 
 
There are two complementary rather than competitive explanations of the dramatic 
decline in deforestation since 2004. On the one hand, conservation policies 
introduced in 2004 and 2008 (strengthening of command and control strategies 
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based on near-real time monitoring of deforestation, extensive expansion of 
protected areas, and adoption of conditional credit policies) may have contributed as 
these turning points coincide with sharp decrease in deforestation. Actually, a recent 
study showed that half of avoided deforestation between 2005 and 2009 could be 
attributed to conservation policies. On the other hand, falling agriculture prices 
between 2003 to 2007 before the global economic crisis may have inhibited the 
clearing of forest areas for the expansion of farmland. The study shows that the 
relationship between deforestation and agriculture differs for crops and cattle 
products, it being more heterogeneous for the latter (Assunção et al 2012). Not only 
the international price of beef and soya fell from 2003 to 2007 but over that period, 
the Brazilian currency almost doubled relative to US dollar, cutting profits of 
commodity exporters (Fearnside 2011). 
 
International demand, currency valuation, domestic policies in agriculture, all 
factors outside the forest sector, have a big impact on outcomes in Brazil but policies 
towards the forest sector have also played a critical part–in both positive and 
negative way for deforestation—e.g. policies to promote land clearing vs. increased 
forest law enforcement particularly in the second half of the last decade, based on 
near-real time monitoring of deforestation to check compliance with the legal 
reserve provision in the legal Amazon (80/20 in most cases). One very effective way 
has been conditioning the access of banking credits to the verification of compliance 
with the provisions of the legal reserve. 
 
 
Box 3:  Deforestation in Indonesia 
 
A Rapid Decline but Uncertain Figures 
 
From 162 M ha in 1950, Indonesia has lost 40 percent of its forest cover in 50 years 
(FWI/GFW, 2002), a rapid decline confirmed over the period 1990-2010, in spite of 
discrepancies between estimates (FAO FRA 2005 and 2010; Hansen et al 2009; 
Ekadinata 2011; and Saatchi 2011). According to the ALLREDDI project, forests 
covered 68 percent of the country’s area in 1990 (128 Mha) but 53 percent (99.7 
Mha) in 2005. In the meantime, undisturbed forests declined from 105 m ha to 58 
M. ha while over-logged forests increased from 22 Mha to 39 Mha (40 percent of 
remaining cover), and timber plantation doubled over the period(above 3 Mha). 
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The detailed analysis of land-cover change shows that unsustainable logging and 
forest fires were the main causes of deforestation in the 1990s period while meeting 
demands for agricultural products and export commodities were primary causes of 
the latter deforestation (Ekadinata 2011). The first attempt to provide annual map of 
forest cover loss covers the 2000-2008 period in Sumatra and Kalimantan 
accounting for a minimum of 40 percent to a maximum of 55 percent of total 
deforestation when peaking above 900,000 hectares in 2005. It revealed high 
fluctuations in spatio-temporal trends of forest-cover loss which are in part due to 
the harvesting of tree plantations and to variations in governance form on district to 
another (Broichet al 2011). 
 
A Changing Pattern of Deforestation over Time to Feed the Wood 
Industry 
 
Historically, transmigration, to relieve the demographic pressure on Java, from the 
1960s up to the late 1990s, moved millions of people from Java to the outer, forested, 
islands. The magnitude of its impact on deforestation is debated (imprecise and 
conflicting definitions of deforestation and shifting cultivation led to overstatement 
of shifting cultivation and understatement of logging) but has been significant, about 
20 percent (FWI/GFW 2002). According to estimates endorsed by the World Bank 
in early 1990s, 67 percent of deforestation was imputable to government sponsored 
programs (Sunderlin et al 1996). 
 
During Asia’s economic crisis, the fall of the Suharto’s regime (1988) made the room 
for “big bang” decentralization, particularly dramatic in the forestry sector. Deprived 
by force of their customary rights from 1970 by the central government which started 
granting large-scale permits, forest-dependent communities recovered the exercise 
of their rights to negotiate directly with logging companies. Not only the forestry law 
passed in 1999 formalized these community use rights, which were then sold by 
communities to firms (Palmer & Engel, 2007), but it also transferred authority to 
local governments, and allowed resource-rich regions to retain a larger share of the 
fiscal revenues generated within their jurisdictions, fueling illegal logging through an 
ongoing struggle over the economic rents associated with timber production 
(proliferation of permits, license granting to sale illegally logged timber) (Barr et al 
2006; and Arnold 2008). 
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Under Suharto, cronyism in the forestry sector left timber companies free to operate 
out of any regulation while overcapacities in the timber processing industry raised 
pressure on the natural forests (FWI/GFW 2002, OED case study on Indonesia). 
Unregulated logging, with high intensity of timber removal (over 100-120 m3 per 
hectare in some rich-primary forests) have a direct impact on forests, especially 
when fires run through the logged-over forest. 
 
Intensive and unregulated logging reduced dramatically the potential profitability of 
a second harvest, thus raising pressures for converting over-logged forests in cash 
crop fields or in pulpwood plantations. Under-investment in tree plantations by the 
pulp and paper industry has entailed a high reliance of this industry on natural 
forests for fiber supply. This industry has taken advantage of a legislation which 
stated that any natural forest with a standing stock below 20 m3 per ha could be 
clear-cut and turned into plantation (Pirard 2008). In the meantime, the expansion 
of plantations, sometimes non-productive, appeared as a tool of laundering illegally 
logged wood (Nellemann 2012). 
 
The Rise of the Oil Palm Industry, New Main Driver of Deforestation 
 
Since 1990, Indonesia experienced one of the most rapid plantation expansions 
worldwide (more than a half of palm oil plans are in Indonesia and Malaysia) and 
became the world’s largest producer and exporter of palm oil, of which India is the 
main outlet (USDA/FAS 2012).The Agricultural Ministry’s records indicate that from 
1990 to2010, oil palm area increased 600 percent to 7.8 Mha. Over 90 percent of this 
development occurred in Sumatra and Kalimantan (Carlson 2012). During the 
period 1990–2005, at least 56 percent of oil palm plantation in Indonesia occurred 
at the expenses of forests (Koh & Wilcove 2008). With price which quadrupled since 
2000 and gross margin of up to 2,000 – 3,000 US$ and more per ha on industrial 
complexes, make oil palm a highly profitable enterprise, even for small-holders. By 
2006, about 12 percent of plantations were owed by the government, 35 percent by 
the small-holders, and the remaining 53 percent by companies (Indonesian Palm Oil 
Board 2007). This private sector is highly concentrated and partly belongs to the 
same conglomerate that control the logging, wood processing, and pulp and paper 
industry (FWI/GFW 2002). Oil palm plantations are made on forest land because 
companies are looking for the timber value and not because of a problem of land 
scarcity.  
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In its REDD effort, backed with $1 billion commitment of Norway, in May 2011 the 
Indonesian government ordered a two-year suspension on new concession permits 
on primary forests and peat land which suffered from loopholes and breaches. In 
addition, Indonesia has pledged to move agricultural development from forests to 
already degraded lands (Murdiyarso et al 2011; Austin et al 2012; and Greenpeace 
2012). A great deal will depend on how under a more decentralized regime than 
Suharto’s provincial governors view forest exploitation. 
 
An Emerging Threat: Mining 
 
Indonesian coal production has increased in recent years, driven by regional 
demand. Although not ranking among the world's top ten in coal reserves, Indonesia 
is currently is the world's largest exporter of steam coal (IEO Report 2011, EIA). 
Most of Indonesia’s coal reserves are situated in Sumatra and Kalimantan. The 
activity is contributing to an economic boom in rural/forested areas and has visible 
impacts on forests. The moratorium allowing underground resource extraction in 
protected forests (zoned to maintain watersheds and ecosystem function, not for 
logging or conservation) could be a boon to miners that have exhausted surface 
deposits. 
 
 
 
Box 4: Drivers of Deforestation and Degradation in the Congo Basin 
 
With a net deforestation rate of dense forests of 0.35 percent (+/- 0.16) according to 
the OFAC (Observatory of Forests of Central Africa), Congo basin is still at an early 
stage of the forest transition curve. The rate of deforestation has been limited so far, 
and has been concentrated mostly in coastal areas and in some places along 
navigable rivers with high population densities too. Unlike Latin America and, to a 
lesser extent, South-East Asia, where large-scale commercial agriculture and 
ranching are the main drivers of deforestation, currently, deforestation in Africa is 
still largely driven by small-scale activities (DeFries et al 2010; and Fisher 2010), 
both for subsistence and commercial agriculture, with outlets on local or sub-
regional markets but also exports on the international markets. Charcoal and logging 
are important drivers of degradation, and are triggers that can facilitate eventual 
deforestation, when there is population pressure for land and opportunities of 
market access for agriculture production.  
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In DRC, where the deforestation rate is the highest in the sub-region, Defourny et al 
(2011) found strong positive correlations between rural population densities and 
deforestation. Spatially-modeled analysis undertaken in the study found that one of 
the main drivers of deforestation is traditional smallholders’ agriculture activities, 
which are dominated by roots crops (cassava, yams and cocoyam), and bananas and 
plantains. These have low productivity, are based on shifting cultivation and use 
minimal to no external inputs. Population increase in rural areas, forest 
fragmentation and roads are compounding factors, but Defourny et al (2011) found 
no significant association between deforestation and protected areas – a quite 
expected result – but also forest concessions – which is a less obvious result. 
 
One of the big issues is what will be the future of the degradation and the 
deforestation in the Congo Basin, and especially in the DRC. Zhang et al (2002) 
predicted a rate of annual deforestation of 1.2 percent in 2030 due to the interlinked 
dynamics of population growth and shifting cultivation. This hypothesis is contested 
by Tollens (2010), a leading agricultural researcher on DRC’s agriculture, who sees 
the state of agriculture as “a declining and neglected smallholder agricultural sector, 
rapidly increasing food imports, and existing plantations trying to maintain only their 
productive capacity with replanting”. The potential of large-scale agriculture is huge 
in the Congo Basin, especially for oil palm and rubber wood, but also for many other 
food and biofuel crops. Many observers anticipate a large increase of large-scale 
commercial agriculture in the Congo Basin as influence of commercial globalized 
agriculture are expected to increase, as these countries move to the next phase of the 
forest transition. Around 1.2 million ha could be developed for oil palm in Cameroon 
(planified activities and negotiated contracts) in the coming years, mostly on 
degraded forest areas but also on dense forests. This country seems to be the most 
favored by agribusiness international investments so far and tend to have 
comparative advantages in the sub-region. In Gabon and Congo Brazzaville, 
multinational companies plan also to develop important plantations of oil palm and 
rubber wood, but investors face the problem of the cost and the limited availability of 
the local workforce. For DRC, Tollens considers that “The investment climate and 
business conditions do not attract newcomers entering the sector. The lack of public 
support for the agricultural sector, the lack of adequate infrastructure and support 
services and Dutch disease type problems result in a lack of international 
competitiveness compared to similar forest areas in particularly South East Asia”. 
Those diverging views on the dynamics of land-use are a big  challenge  for  the  
setting  of  a  REDD+  “reference  scenario”,  which  is  meant  to  anticipate 
deforestation rates. 
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These findings lead to five overarching conclusions about deforestation: 
 
First: In a strong, non-fragile state, with good governance, public policies can make a 
difference, even in a globalized and liberalized world. 
 
Second: In a globalized and liberalized world with instable prices and technological 
changes (that modify comparative advantage), the achievements on reducing forest loss 
can be fragile and can be reversed quickly. The forest transition theory is useful but is 
not a guarantee for the state of the future. Transitions toward a green economy with new 
consumption and production paradigms are the only chance for consolidating these 
 
Mining is the emerging driver of deforestation in Central Africa. The escalating prices 
of minerals has triggered new explorations and further exploitation of iron, cobalt, 
copper and other metals in both non forested and forested areas. Terrestrial oil and 
gas resources are also considered for extraction in the forested areas. Oil resources 
are suspected in the close basin of the Congo River in the DRC. Oil exploration is 
expected to start soon in one of the oldest national park in Africa, in the Virunga 
(close to Rwanda). Mining and oil/gas extraction will probably not destroy very large 
areas of forests, but will contribute to the fragmentation of the dense forest, with 
many adverse ecological effects and risks of further degradation and deforestation, 
due to unlocked access to the forests. 
 
In spite of the active involvement of the Congo Basin’s governments in the REDD+ 
negotiation process, it seems this is not likely to modify anyway the intention of the 
governments to utilize as soon as possible the mining and oil extraction potential, and 
it does not seems to prevent these same governments to court the agribusiness 
investors for developing oil palm and rubber wood plantations in their countries. This 
is particularly the case of Cameroon, with impressive development of oil palm 
plantations, but also in Gabon and Congo-Brazzaville. In the DRC, the government is 
to go ahead with the oil exploration in the Virunga National Park. 
 
Overall, even if the governments were sincerely committed towards designing future 
land use planning in order to reduce deforestation, the reach of the public authorities 
is very limited in countries that remain “fragile States”, where corruption is still 
omnipresent and the judiciary system is down (Karsenty and Ongolo 2012). 
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results. Neither the developed nor the developing world is following this pathway if per 
capita caloric consumption and its sources are considered.  
 
Third: International financial incentives, such as those through REDD+ have not been 
the determining factor for Brazil, Indonesia, or the Congo Basin countries to curb the 
internal policies of indiscriminate provision of credit without law enforcement on land 
set asides or small scale farming. Rather in the case of Brazil gaining international 
stature and credibility that correspond to the status of new global power has certainly 
been the most important incentive. This is good news for the “common but 
differentiated responsibilities”, but the bad news is that financial incentives are not 
enough if there are not (heavily) complemented by the political will to become credible. 
Indonesia has not reached this stage yet and neither has Congo. 
 
Additionally, some of the deforestation which was previously taking place in the Amazon 
has moved to the cerrados (biodiversity-rich savannah partially wooded, with high 
quantities of carbon into soils) and with the growing importance of biofuels beyond 
sugarcane based ethanol in which Brazil dominates the future of the savannahs remain 
in the balance. 
 
Fourth: Without completing accounting of natural capital gain and loss and its 
externalities and valuation at an appropriate level, individual countries and the global 
community will continue to rely on partial incomplete measures to save the 
environment. This means estimations of factor productivity growth too will have to be 
modified from the perspective of the long term sustainability of the natural systems and 
their local and global impacts. 
 
Fifth: Notwithstanding the terminology of market based ecosystem services explored 
further in section---, governments remain the key actors in achieving results. 70 percent 
of all ecosystem programs in the world are funded by governments. 
 
Forestry and Water       
 
 Forested catchments supply three quarters of freshwater (Fischlin et al 2007) 
used for domestic, agricultural and industrial needs. The availability and quality and 
water in many regions are threatened by widely documented overuse, misuse or 
pollution (Lele et al Forthcoming), whereas it is now widely recognized that both are 
strongly influenced by forests and thus depend on proper forest management there is 
less agreement on the impacts of forest protection on watersheds. Climate change is 
altering forest’s role in regulating water flows and influencing the availability of water 
resource. The amount of water used by forests is also an issue of concern, particularly as 
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the world increasingly looks to planted forests for carbon fixation, renewable energy, 
wood supply alternative to natural forests and landscape rehabilitation. 
 
 As forested catchments supply competing needs, a key challenge faced by land, 
forest and water managers is to maximize the wide range of multispectral forest benefits 
without detriment to water resources and ecosystem function. Indeed the trade-offs 
between the many forest service’s stakeholders derive at different spatial and temporal 
scales are only now begun to be understood. In line with the WSSD (2003), and the 
Shiga Declaration prior to the third World Water Summit (2003), many countries have 
begun to develop integrated water resource management(IWRM) – i.e. multispectral, 
including forestry and foresters – plans at the watershed or the river-basin level as 
fostered by the Global Water Partnership (GWP). 
 
 Since regulatory frameworks have often proved ineffective or unable to reconcile 
conflicting needs, payments for watershed services (PWS) schemes, a subset of 
payments for environmental services (PES) based on conditionality, has gained 
popularity as the way to improve the efficiency of watershed management in several 
middle income countries, most notably Costa Rica, Mexico and increasingly China. 
Providing an incentive to upstream land users to adopt practices that ensure to 
downstream user the supply of environmental services, many PWS include forest 
conservation, regeneration or plantation. It difficult, if not impossible, to unequivocally 
link all causes and effects including the ability to demonstrate both the threats to 
existing services and the effectiveness of the practices ensuring the service provision, in 
view of the complexity and natural variability of watershed processes. 
 
 It is in maintaining high water quality that forests contribute the most 
significantly to the hydrological characteristics of watershed ecosystems. Maintaining or 
restoring forest cover 1) minimizes soil erosion in sloping lands and prevent landslide; 
2) reduces the run-off impact on sediment losses of soils and sediment concentration in 
water bodies; 3) filters water pollutants (organic matter and agricultural or industrial 
chemicals) on run off pathways or in riparian zone (i.e. along streams). However, trees 
exposed to high levels of air pollution capture sculpture and nitrogen and can increase 
water acidification. 
 
 One of the most poorly understood (though by no means under-researched) 
forest-water interactions is the impact of forests on water yield. The enduring debate on 
the outcome of extension or reduction of the forest cover is less a matter of gap between 
public perception and scientific knowledge (Calder 2002) than a sharp division in the 
scientific community between a ‘demand-side school’ working at very local micro-
perspective (<1km2to 10 km2) and a ‘supply-side school’ modeling at larger spatial scales 
(Ellison et al 2012). Against the ‘conventional wisdom’ that ‘the more trees the more 
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water’, the demand-side school has opposed the assertion (based on empirical evidence) 
that ‘trees use water’ (evapotranspiration) and that deforestation leads to a period of 
increased water availability while afforestation reduces runoff. 
 From such a demand-side perspective, the forest-water debate implies some 
important trade-off, especially in areas where climate change threatens water resource, 
like in semi-arid areas. Large-scale forest planting for climate change mitigation 
purpose or fast-growing and water-demanding forest crops (fuelwood) have potential to 
accentuate water shortages. As natural upstream forests reduce dry-season flows as 
much as or more than they reduce water yield, a forest removal policy has sometimes 
been suggested as a mean of mitigating drought in water-constrained areas. Such a 
practice has to be weighed against the consequent loss of other forest services and goods 
and should definitely be avoided in fragile ecosystems like in saline-prone areas, and in 
mountain cloud forest. 
 
 The importance of upstream forest cover in regulating hydrological flows 
(maintaining water flow during the dry season and reducing flood risk during the rainy 
season) seems to have been overestimated. Impacts of forest cover removal are evident 
only at the micro-level: forests can mitigate small and local floods but do not appear to 
influence either extreme floods or those at the large catchment scale. Even if scientific 
evidence refutes the ‘myth’ that deforestation in the Himalayas causes big floods in the 
lowlands of the Ganges and Brahmaputra (Hofer and Messerli 2006) – and that 
reforestation can prevent it – the controversy has not ended so far (Bradshaw et al vs. 
Bruijnzeel et al 2007). Rather than discarding the need for proper management and 
conservation of upland forests, it points out the need of integrated approaches in river-
basin management beyond simplistic forest-based “solutions” (FAO & CIFOR 2005). 
 
 Hydrologists have focused on ‘blue water’ (how freshwater in rivers and aquifers 
is made available for human use in irrigation systems), ‘grey water’ (conditions under 
which ‘used’ water can return to the cycle without ecological damage), ‘green water’ 
(how a substantial part of rainfall recycled to the atmosphere forest and any other 
vegetation is lost for human use). Emerging ‘rainbow water’ focus tackles the origin of 
rainfall that waste missing part of the water cycle studies. In this perspective, the new 
concept of “precipitation shed”– as an atmospheric watershed –helps to understand the 
impact of land change cover on rainfall-dependant areas (Keys et al 2012) while 
advocating for increased attention to the role of ecosystems as water producers rather 
than consumers (Ellison et al 2012). 
 
 Seeing trees and forests as consumers of available water and competitors for 
other (human) downstream water uses – as the demand-side proponents do – misses 
the beneficial side of this consumption. The same evapotranspiration that consumes 
water at one scale supplies water to the atmosphere, such a precipitation recycling 
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through cloud formation. It not only raises the likelihood of local precipitation, it also 
favors the cross-continental transport of moisture vapor and thus increases at regional 
and global scales. For the proponents of the supply-side, large forest expanses should be 
seen as ‘biotic pumps’ renewing and intensifying the water cycle. Reviews of many 
studies find support for the connection between deforestation and declining 
precipitations (Ellison et al 2012). 
 
 As exposed in a SBSTA 36 side-event organized by ICRAF (Bonn, May 2012), 
although forests are mobilized against global warming to boost carbon sequestration, 
fossil fuel substitution and biodiversity protection, little attention is paid to the ‘tangible’ 
influence of forests on the local and regional patterns of rainfall. For example, existing 
climate data exclude microclimatic effects of trees while predicting crop growth under 
climate change scenarios does not include the option of modifying local climate by 
increasing tree cover in strategic location. Moreover, if water transpired in the Congo 
Basin would feed rainfall over the water-constrained Sahel, understanding regional 
climate drivers can give impetus to climate negotiations and cooperation at a more 
regional level. However, further work will be necessary to quantify how specific land 
cover change (e.g. from forest to savannah) affect the water cycle. 
 
Opportunities & Challenges 
 
 A subset of the payments for environmental services (PES), payments for 
watershed services (PWS), appear to have potential to improve resource management as 
a conditional (result-based payments) watershed management tool where existing 
regulatory framework often proved unable to reconcile competing needs and traditional 
tools such as integrated watershed management plan in which rewards and investments 
were not contingent to contract compliance. Payments dot not necessarily involve 
money, often taking form of development services a community has been lacking. 
 
 According to Wunder’s definition (2005), PES transactions are: (1) voluntary (2) 
between at least one service buyer (3) and at least one seller (4), focused on a well-
defined service (or a land use likely to provide that service), and (5) conditional upon 
contract compliance. In practice, two generic PWS types are being implemented. Small-
to-medium sized, the user-financed schemes are emerging from the negotiation process 
between buyers and sellers (often through intermediaries) like the Vittel watershed 
scheme in France and municipal programs in Latin America. In government-financed 
PWS schemes, the state acts on behalf of service users, using tax revenues or obligatory 
user fees for payments and targeting poverty alleviation and regional development co-
benefits (far from the archetypal nature of PES deals). Some are nominally focused on 
watershed protection, such as the Chinese Sloping Land Conversion Program (7.2 
million ha land retired; 4.9 million ha planted with trees), or Mexico’s national 
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watershed protection program (126,000 ha). Others have a broader scope, such as the 
Costa Rica’s PES scheme (600,000 ha), and the United States Conservation Reserve 
Program (about 14.5 million ha). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Linkages between Forests and Energy 
 
The relationships between GDP growth, population growth and growth in energy 
consumption have become issues of growing interest in the context of climate change. It 
is a vast subject and this section is confined to a more modest objective, namely of 
addressing it in only two ways: 
 
1. The direct contribution of forests and agricultural lands to energy, e.g. through 
the use of fuel wood, largely associated with poverty and underdevelopment,  and bio-
energy (the modern form of energy being developed in middle and high income 
countries in the form of the first and second generation biofuels) and  
 
2. Indirect relationships/impacts on forests and forest related emissions and forest 
dependent people of energy development in other energy sub-sectors, (e.g. hydropower, 
wind and solar, oil and gas). The widespread availability of these substitute sources of 
energy in domestic use, agriculture and rural industries, create alternative sources of 
employment, increasing opportunity cost of labor in collecting fuelwood, reduce 
demand for traditional forest based fuels in household use, e.g. substitution of gas or 
electricity for wood fuel in household use, as well as, on human health, and indirectly 
through land use changes in the establishment of alternative forms of energy such as 
hydropower and wind power. 
 
Box 5: Challenges in Assessing impacts of Watershed PES Schemes 
 
The criterion of the well-defined service is particularly critical for watershed services, 
because the biophysical linkages between land use change and service outcomes can 
be complex. Case studies reviews (Hamilton 2008) indicate that almost none of the 
existing PSE schemes are bases on both good science (proper scientific measurement 
of the impact of projects) and good economics (reliable valuation of the benefits of 
theses impacts). There is a general absence of scientific data to support the 
evaluation of trade-offs: most of initiatives were based on conventional wisdom, 
secondary sources of information, and selective reference to forest hydrology 
literature. For example, payments are based on the opportunity costs of returning 
cleared land to forest cover, with no attempt to model relationships between land use 
and hydrology (Asquith and Wunder 2008). 
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Key Points 
 
1. Food and energy prices have begun to move together to a far greater extent than 
in the past (Figure 27). Therefore what happens to the energy prices is more likely to 
affect food prices and land use changes directly and indirectly. Directly energy costs 
enter into agriculture in the form of fertilizers, power and transport. Indirectly as 
agriculture modernizes, high energy prices increase the incentives to convert land into 
the production of energy. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2. World Consumption of commercially traded energy has nearly tripled from 1970 
to 2011. Whereas energy consumption has grown in all parts of the world the fastest 
growth has occurred in the Asia and Pacific Region (Figure 28). The underlying causes 
of the particularly steep growth in energy use in the new millennium in the Asia and the 
Pacific region needs to be better understood. Part of the increase is explained by 
increase domestic consumption. Yet at least a significant part of it is a result of Asia, and 
particularly China, becoming the world’s biggest factory and producing consumer goods 
exported to all parts of the developed and developing world where consumption is 
increasing. 
 
Figure 27: Food and Energy Real Price Indices (1960-2011) 
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3. The good news is that energy efficiency (measured over the 1980 to 2009 period 
as energy use in kgs of oil equivalent per $1,000 GDP) has declined sharply in the Asia 
Pacific Region and in other developing regions where energy consumption has been 
growing (Figure 29). But energy use per $1000 increased in the Middle East and North 
Africa. In SSA where it increased first but has returned to the 1980 levels, and in Latin 
America where is has not changed. Data on energy consumption are perhaps less 
reliable for the African region so there is need for caution in interpreting them. But it is 
unclear why the energy use was so high in East Asia in the 1980s (Figure 29). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 28: Total Primary Energy Consumption by Region 
(Million tonnes oil equivalent) 
(1970-2011) 
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4. Clearly the efficiency gain has not been fast enough to slow down the rate of 
temperature change. The range in the levels of energy efficiency use per $1,000 is also 
very large from the lowest level of 140 kgs of oil equivalent in LAC region to over 260 
kgs in Asia in 2009 to well over 300 kgs in SSA, and when compared to high income 
countries suggesting that there is still considerable scope for increasing energy 
efficiency. 
 
5. Energy consumption is rising more steeply in developing countries relative to 
energy use in middle income countries (Figure 30). And yet relative to developed 
countries there remains a huge gap in per capita energy consumption between 
developed and developing countries (Figure 31). The implicit higher income elasticity of 
energy use with respect to per capita income at low levels of income seems consistent 
 
Figure 29: Energy use per $1,000 GDP (constant 2005 PPP) by Region 
(Kg of oil equivalent)(1980-2009) 
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with previous studies which suggest that elasticity of demand in energy with respect to 
income to be nearly twice as high in Non-OECD countries as that for OECD Countries. 
These same studies suggest that demand responds faster to income changes than to 
price changes. Some have noted that short run elasticities are nearly half in magnitude 
to long run elasticities.  Residential uses tend to be less elastic with respect to prices and 
income than industrial uses. In India income and price elasticities are inelastic for 
electricity among urban households. Whether countries are in tropical or temperate 
zones, the rate of technological change, fuel use efficiency in automobiles and aviation, 
all influences both energy use as well as demand for modes of transport and we need far 
more analysis/evidence on these issues than currently exists. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 30: Energy Use (kg of oil equivalent per capita) vs. GNI per capita by 
Developing Region Only (1971-2009)  
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Data Source: WDI and Global Development Finance, World Bank. 
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6. CO2 emissions grew particularly strongly since mid-1980s; again most of the 
growth in emissions was in the Asia and Pacific region, some in North America too and 
in the Middle East (Figure 32). Indeed the CO2 emission track closely with growth in 
energy consumption. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 31: Energy Use (kg of oil equivalent per capita) vs. GNI per capita by 
Developed and Developing Region (1971-2009) 
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Data Source: WDI and Global Development Finance, World Bank. 
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Developing countries 
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Despite Diversification in Energy Sources Oil, Coal and Natural Gas 
Dominate 
 
The share of oil, coal and natural gas was 87 percent of the world energy consumption in 
2011 (Figure 33). 
 
Persistent energy subsidies have encouraged the dominance of fossil fuel consumption: 
in 2010, fossil fuel subsidies amounted to $409 billon globally and without policy 
reforms fossil fuels are expected to remain the dominant energy source for the 
foreseeable future. The International Energy Agency’s World Energy Outlook (WEO 
2011) estimates that the share of fossil fuels in primary energy consumption globally will 
fall from 81 percent in 2010 to 75 percent in 2035, not a significant decline. 
 
Figure 32: Carbon Dioxide Emissions by Region (Million tonnes carbon dioxide) 
(1965-2011) 
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Alternative Energy Sources 
 
Data on alternative sources of energy present a conflicting picture. According to BP 
estimates, only 13 percent of the world energy consumption came from hydro, nuclear 
and only 2 percent from renewables (wind, geothermal, solar, biomass and waste, not 
accounting for cross border electricity supply. On the other hand, REN 21, an outgrowth 
of UNEP suggests that “Renewable energy sources have grown to supply an estimated 
16.7 percent of global final energy consumption in 2010. Of this total, modern renewable 
energy accounted for an estimated 8.2 percent, a share that has increased in recent 
years, while the share from traditional biomass has declined slightly to an estimated 8.5 
percent. During 2011, modern renewables continued to grow strongly in all end-use 
sectors: power, heating and cooling, and transport. In the power sector, renewables 
accounted for almost half of the estimated 208 gigawatts (GW) of electric capacity 
added globally during 2011. Wind and solar photovoltaics (PV) accounted for almost 40 
percent and 30 percent of new renewable capacity, respectively, followed by hydropower 
(nearly 25 percent). By the end of 2011, total renewable power capacity worldwide 
exceeded 1,360 GW, up 8 percent over 2010; renewables comprised more than 25 
Figure 33: World--Share of Total Primary Energy Consumption by 
Fuel (%) (2011) 
 
 
Source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy (2012). 
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percent of total global power-generating capacity (estimated at 5,360 GW in 2011) and 
supplied an estimated 20.3 percent of global electricity. Non-hydropower renewables 
exceeded 390 GW, a 24 percent capacity increase over 2010” (REN 21: 2012). The top 
seven countries for non-hydro renewable electric capacity—China, the United States, 
Germany, Spain, Italy, India, and Japan—accounted for about 70 percent of total 
capacity worldwide. The ranking was quite different on a per-person basis, with 
Germany in the lead followed by Spain, Italy, the United States, Japan, China, and India 
(REN21; 2012). At least 118 countries, more than half of which are developing countries, 
had renewable energy targets in place by early 2012, up from 109 as of early 2010. 
 
Alternative energy increase in the recent past has been result of a combination of 
incentives, investments, policies and subsidies that promote increased adoption of 
renewable energy as a way to reduce dependence on fossil fuels. As technology develops 
and prices for alternative energy sources fall, adoption of alternative energy sources 
should increase. But fiscal challenges in the US and Germany each of which have 
actively encouraged alternative energy sources in the last four years have led to decline 
or elimination of subsidies, slowing down the rates of technological innovation (REN21; 
2012). Although there is still a long way to go to provide energy access for all, some 
argue that more people than ever before derive energy from renewables as capacity 
continues to grow, prices continue to fall, and shares of global energy from renewables 
continue to increase. 
 
Yet China’s hydropower and natural gas production illustrates the point. It has 
increased substantially, but it still constituted only 2.3 percent and 3.4 percent of the 
total energy supply in China respectively with continued dependence on coal. 2 percent 
of all energy in the rest of Asia comes from nuclear and equal or less from hydropower 
whereas as much as 10 percent of all energy supply in Latin America comes from 
hydropower. The biggest growth in hydropower was in Europe, followed by Asia. 
 
The same is true in the case of the rest of Asia as regards nuclear energy, which has lost 
political support since the Fukushima tsunami and the earthquake and hydropower. 
Less than 2 percent of all energy in the rest of Asia comes from nuclear. 
 
There is considerable regional variation too in the sources of energy growth (Figure 34, 
35 and 36). The Asia Pacific Region experienced growth in all sub-sectors of energy, and 
although China was a leader in the growth in hydro, solar panels and wind energy, 
according to one estimate the share of coal had increased over time in energy 
consumption in Asia. 
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Figure 34, 35 and 36: Share of Total Primary Energy Consumption by Fuel (%) (Asia 
and Pacific Region, Europe and Eurasia Region and North America Region) (2011) 
 
 
  
 
Source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy (2012) 
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Wind Capacity has Grown Rapidly 
 
Despite the high growth in wind capacity the initial capital costs are high and therefore 
it is unlikely low income countries can afford it in the foreseeable future without 
substantial further reduction in costs although donors are supporting a number of 
projects in developing countries. 
 
The Global Grid Connected Biomass Capacity 
 
Again the biggest grid is largely a developed or a middle income country phenomenon. 
It is in Europe and North America, some in Oceania, China, Brazil and India. It seems to 
be insignificant in the rest of the world. 
 
Fuelwood 
 
Asia with close to 0.9 billion cubic meters of wood in 1996 dominated in the traditional 
forms of fuelwood to 2008, which is consumed largely by the poor. But levels of 
fuelwood consumption in Asia had declined to 0.73 billion m3. Africa’s level of fuelwood 
use on the other hand has increased from 0.5 billion m3 to slightly over 0.6 billion. Latin 
American consumption of fuelwood has remained about the same at 0.2 b m3 (Figure 
37). 
 
In terms of direct influence on deforestation and degradation, fuelwood use is of 
particular importance but at low levels of income and economic development seems 
directly related to access and opportunity cost of labour. Developing countries account 
for nearly 90 percent of fuel wood and charcoal consumption and wood is the primary 
source of energy for cooking and heating in developing countries. Given that 95 percent 
of all staple foods need to be cooked to be digested, securing an affordable supply of 
energy for cooking is crucial. In addition fuel wood use has adverse impacts on health. 
 
To make biomass use sustainable, a comprehensive supply and demand side approach is 
needed. Accurate and up to date country-level data on fuel wood use is often limited or 
no reliable because of the informality of extraction and use, the high cost of conducting 
surveys to assess the supply and demand and the highly location specific nature of fuel 
wood use. 
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In much the same way regional trends differ between Asia and Africa, Country level 
trends are also quite different. China and India have the highest fuel wood consumption 
levels globally but exhibit opposite trends. Chinese consumption has decreased since 
1998, to 196,043,000 m3 in 2008. Indian consumption on the other hand has increased, 
from 279,343,000 to 304,494,000 m3.  
 
Papua New Guinea had the highest levels of consumption in Oceania (after Australia) at 
7,748,000 m3 while Haiti, the largest consumer in the Caribbean, had a consumption 
level of only 2,024,000 m3. The differences among countries in terms of dependence on 
fuelwood may be explained by a combination of factors: substantially greater expansion 
of hydropower (e.g. in China relative to India), increased levels of living in rural China 
where the share of population living in poverty and hunger has diminished dramatically 
increased wage employment, and increased opportunity cost of women’s labour who 
collect fuelwood. 
 
Fuelwood and Household Energy Use 
 
 
Figure 37: Fuel Wood Consumption by Region (1996 to 2008) 
Source: Adapted from the FAO State of the World Reports, 1997-2011. 
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Households require up to 2 tons of biomass for cooking fuel annually, 730 tons of 
biomass are burned annually in developing countries, emitting more than 1 billion tons 
of carbon dioxide contributing to significant local deforestation (World Bank 2011). 
Nearly 3 billion people in the developing world use traditional cook stoves and open 
fires to cook, which results in two million deaths a year from exposure to cook stove 
smoke, more than the number of deaths from either malaria or tuberculosis (World 
Bank 2011). Women and children are disproportionately affected, both in terms of their 
health (from exposure to air pollution) and security (searching for biomass, occasionally 
in insecure areas).21 
 
Steps to Address the Fuelwood Crisis 
 
The clean cook stove and fuel industry is developing programs to promote cleaner, more 
efficient cook stoves but their use has not yet reached any significant scale in part due to  
the high cost of such technologies, particularly for poor households, lack of information, 
and  lack of finance. Even though financing instruments linked to climate change 
mitigation, such as carbon funds, climate investment funds, and traditional sources such 
as the Global Environmental Facility, are helping to lower, the impacts are minimal 
(World Bank 2011). Increased information is needed on the impacts of firewood 
collection on land degradation to help identify and target regions with the highest 
potential to achieve climate benefits from scaling up clean cook stove and fuel programs. 
 
Densely populated South Asia with relatively greater market access holds a greater 
potential to shift to alternative sources of energy, solar panels and solar cook stoves, 
than perhaps African rural populations. But it is clear that after 20 years of effort and 
government policy to promote alternative sources of energy the solar technology is not 
moving. A recent impact evaluation called it a failure (Duflow) as did our field visits22. 
 
An approach particularly suited to Africa is the promotion of community forests for 
energy. The Senegal Sustainable and Participatory Energy Management Project 
(PROGEDE), a World Bank–sponsored project established a permanent, community 
                                                          
21 Methane emissions are the 2nd largest contributor to climate change after carbon dioxide and black carbon is estimated to 
contribute 25-50 percent of global carbon dioxide emissions (GACCC Climate Factsheet). Residential uses of black carbon (generally 
associated with cooking) produce 26 percent of black carbon emissions—higher than the amount of black carbon produced by either 
the transport sector or industrial uses (GACCC Climate Factsheet). 
 
22 Solar cook stoves are being sold at $30 a unit in the state of Gujarat under the Aga Khan Program of development; Some Chinese 
cook stoves are available in India at $20 a unit. But the rural women Lele visited are not using it. The per capita income of those 
living below the poverty line in India is Rs. 37 a day, two thirds of a $ at the official exchange rate of Rs.55. By comparison, the price 
of the stove seems too high. Access to finance is not easy and the rural women interviewed seemed unconvinced of the benefits of 
cook stoves pointing instead to the amount of firewood, kindling and cow dung cakes they had stockpiled for the year. 
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based forest management system capable of producing more than 370,600 tons of 
woodfuel. By and large, barring fuel wood, most renewables do not yet seem to be 
practical in rural Africa. Even though some argue (Collier and Venables 2012) 
hydropower is perhaps the most significant option in SSA, improving supply of fuel 
wood and improving its efficiency may be by far the best option. 
 
Hydropower 
 
Hydropower is the most common form of renewable energy (IEA 2010), providing 80 
percent of the world’s renewable electricity (IRENA 2012). Estimates of the contribution 
of hydropower vary from 16 percent (IEA 2010; and IRENA 2012) to 20 percent of the 
global energy supply (World Bank 2009), but show an increasing trend between 2003 
and 2010 reaching 3,427 terawatt-hours (World Watch Trends). Hydropower helps 
climate change mitigation by avoiding carbon dioxide emissions from other energy 
sources and serving as an adaptation strategy for increased weather variability, for 
example from the storage capacity of the reservoirs which can be used in combination 
with rainfall and more variable renewable non-storable energy sources (IEA 2010). 
Hydropower also provides stability to the grid and electrical systems in general because 
of both its long-term storage capacity and its ability to quickly ramp up. 
 
The countries with the largest developed proportion of their hydro potential are: 
Switzerland with 88 percent, Mexico with 80 percent, Norway with 70 percent, Sweden 
with 69 percent, France at 68 percent, Japan at 61 percent, Austria at 54 percent, 
Paraguay at 52 percent, and Italy at 45 percent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 5: Hydropower Resource Potential by Country  
 
Source: IRENA 2012. 
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China, the US, Russia, Brazil, and Canada have the highest potential for hydropower, 
followed by the Democratic of Congo, India, Indonesia, Peru, and Tajikistan (IEA 2010). 
Africa has the lowest growth in comparison to its potential Hydropower potential could 
be up to five times higher than the amounts generated today (IEA 2010); Challenges, 
such as biodiversity impacts, land use and rights, water rights, upstream/downstream 
considerations, and impacts on local populations, have hindered hydropower 
development in Africa.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6: Top Ten Countries by Installed Hydropower Capacity and by 
Generation Share (2010) 
 
 
Source: IRENA 2012 
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Forest conservation is critical in ensuring hydropower supply. For instance, in Bhutan, 
which generates 99 percent of its electricity from hydropower, the continued 
conservation of forests and watersheds is necessary to ensure continued hydropower 
generation (SHP report). 
 
Although good hydropower practices, including safeguards and self-assessment 
measures, have been developed by the International Hydropower Association, the 
International Energy Agency, the World Commission on Dams, the World Bank, the 
Equator Banks, and the UN Environment Program, technical capacity to implement 
hydropower project is still lacking in many countries and regions. The IEA recommends 
policy-makers consider four key issues when deciding on using hydropower to meet 
energy generation needs: economic equity; protection from droughts and floods; land 
rights; and protection of air, land, biodiversity, and water (IEA 2010). 
 
 
Figure 38: Global Hydro Resource Potential  
 
Source: IRENA 2012 
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Hydroelectric power can help to meet increased energy demand, but it can also 
negatively impact forestry and river ecology, contributing to deforestation and changing 
hydrological characteristics of rivers. Dams change the flow of water, biota, energy, 
nutrients and sediments in a river, altering its ecological processes (Ligon et al 1995). 
Dam walls can trap sediments, hindering physical processes and downstream habitats, 
including coastal wetlands, deltas, floodplains or barrier islands. Dam walls also block 
fish migrations, in some instances separating spawning and rearing habitats. In the 
lower Snake River in the north-western US, the construction of four dams blocked and 
eliminated salmon spawning habitat, contributing to declines in the salmon populations 
(Kareiva et al 2000). 
 
Brazil plans to build more than thirty large dams in the Amazon region over the next 
decade to boost its hydroelectric potential, underscoring the trade-offs that countries 
face between meeting increased demand for electricity and conserving their forest areas 
(Lyons 2012, The New York Times: Sunday Review, June 30; and  Romero 2012, The 
New York Times, May 5). Critics of the dam projects state that over 120,000 acres of 
rainforest will be flooded as a result of the dam, resulting in releases of methane gas that 
outweigh the energy benefits of the dams. These dams are also predicted to destroy 
animal habitat, divert rivers, and displace communities (Lyons 2012, The New York 
Times: Sunday Review, June 30 2012). At the same time, the Brazilian government has 
stressed that Brazil will need 56 percent more electricity within the next decade and 
hydropower generation is the cheapest and cleanest option to meet this demand (Lyons 
2012, The New York Times: Sunday Review, June 30 2012).  These findings suggest that 
hydropower development in countries like Brazil is likely to continue to at a large-scale. 
Brazil plans to construct several dams and physical infrastructure which will impact 
forests (Fearnside and Graca 2006). In the Andean Amazon too, governments have 
promoted hydroelectric dams along the six major Andean tributaries of the Amazon 
River as a solution to long-term energy needs in Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, and 
Peru. 
 
Over the next 20 years, there are plans to construct 151 new dams (with capacity of 
2MW or higher), increasing the number of dams in the LAC region by over 300 percent 
(Finer and Jenkins 2012). Finer and Jenkins (2012) contend that 47 percent of the 
potential new dams (n=71) will have high ecological impacts with only 19 percent are 
likely to have low impacts, More than 80 percent of the planned dams would contribute 
to deforestation through forest clearing, inundation, new roads, and transmission lines, 
particularly in more remote areas where new road systems will be required. 79 percent 
of the planned dams would require new transmission line routes while occur in 36 
percent of the dam construction projects would require new road construction. The loss 
of river connectivity as potential ecological impacts of these dams, pointing out that “the 
placement of dams within a river network relative to one another is just as important to 
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consider as the total number and size of the dams.” Finer and Jenkins (2012: p. 2). 
Similar issues are extensive in Asia too. 
 
Such scenarios underscore the tensions and potentially huge trade-offs between meeting 
energy needs and protecting forests. These tensions are also visible between different 
government ministries and development practitioners and environmentalists, each of 
whom often has a different view on the benefits and limitations of dams. 
 
Critics of hydropower also point to the social impacts of hydropower projects. E.g. in 
Cambodia’s Cardamom forest range, a 14,354-square-kilometer area containing over 50 
species of endangered animals, including the Siamese crocodile and clouded leopard, 
and 450 species of birds, and endangered timber species such as rosewood. Although 
the Cambodian government has protected a 4,020-square-kilometer area of the forest 
range as the Central Cardamom Protected Forest sanctuary, deforestation, illegal 
logging, and allegations of timber-laundering operations persist in the area. The biggest 
impact on the forest will likely result from four Chinese-funded hydropower projects; 
expected to legally remove thousands of trees in creating reservoirs. Examples of 
violence associated with environmental protection and the huge sums of money made 
from thefts of valuable biodiversity abound23. 
 
Hydropower projects also entail social impacts on local populations, including the 
displacement of local populations for dam construction. The World Commission on 
Dams report highlights the negative effect dams can have on people and societies living 
both upstream and downstream from the dams.24  Governments of developing countries 
worked with the World Commission of Dams but do not necessarily go along with its 
conclusions and recommendations. 
 
Hydropower projects can both contribute to and mitigate climate change. For instance, 
hydroelectric dams produce carbon dioxide and methane emissions (Fearnside 1997 & 
2002). At the same time, hydropower projects have been promoted under the flexible 
mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol because they produce comparably less emissions 
than fossil fuels, though the percentage of emissions varies widely by climatic 
conditions, geographic location, land cover, and project and technology types, making it 
                                                          
23 In April 2012, Chute Wutty, a Cambodian environmentalist, was shot to death during a confrontation with military police and 
logging company security officers in an area of the forest where the government had licensed the timber company to remove logs for 
the construction of the Chinese hydropower reservoir (The Millbrook Independent (2012). 
 
24 The report states that poor and vulnerable groups and future generations bear a disproportionate cost from large dam projects 
without gaining similar economic benefits. Finer and Jenkins (2012) found that planned dam construction in the Andean Amazon 
region would impact upstream communities by causing displacement and flooding while downstream communities would face 
disrupted water flow. 
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difficult to generalize about lifecycle GHG emissions from hydropower projects (IPCC 
2011). Hydropower is the leading renewable energy source under the Clean 
Development Mechanism, representing 27 percent of total projects.  Approximately 75 
percent of these projects are in Brazil, China, India, and Mexico (IPCC 2011). 
 
Future Demand 
 
An estimate of future demand varies depending on the set of assumptions. BP estimates 
energy efficiency to continue to improve globally, at an accelerating rate of 2.0 percent 
p.a. vs. 1.2 percent p.a. over the past 20 years leading to restraining the overall growth of 
primary energy consumption25. FAO on the other hand projects demand in developing 
countries to increase by 3 percent annually compared to 0.9 percent growth in 
developed countries’ energy consumption. In both projections the proportion of global 
energy consumption consumed in developing countries also shifts, increasing from 46 to 
58 percent between 2004 and 2030 (EIA 2007; and FAO 2008). The number of people 
relying on biomass for cooking is expected to increase from 2.5 to 2.7 billion by 2030 
(EIA 2007; and FAO 2008). While traditional fuelwood production is expected to 
decline e.g. in Asia Pacific, the increased production of bio energy in the forest industry 
and in response to renewable energy targets will likely offset the potential for a net 
decrease (FAO 2008). 
 
Bioenergy 
 
Biomass is projected to increase four-fold from 227 to 983 by 2030 and biofuels are 
projected to increase from 15 to 147 Mtoe. FAO (2008) notes that “the contribution of 
forestry to future energy production will be influenced by: the competitiveness of wood-
based energy in achieving the objectives of recent energy-related policies; the costs and 
benefits of wood-energy-related systems vis-a-vis other options in social, economic and 
environmental terms; policies and institutions that provide the framework within which 
forestry and other sectors acts” (FAO 2008; p. 27). Climate and soil, infrastructure, land 
and labour availability, location relative to supply and demand, and governance and 
social structures also influence adoption of wood-based energy. Wood energy is most 
price competitive when generated as a wood industry by-product (FAO 2008). Examples 
of available, low cost wood residues include residue from timber operations, residue 
from mills, and rejected pieces of wood left in the forest after harvesting (e.g. tree 
                                                          
25 BP estimates assume global population growth of 1.4 billion over the next 20 years (or 0.9 percent p.a.) with GDP growth to 
accelerate, driven by low and medium income economies to 3.7 percent p.a. from 3.2 percent p.a. between 1990 and 2010 
accelerating growth of per capital income. Primary energy consumption growth to 2030 is expected to decelerate to 1.6 percent p.a. 
(compared to 2.0 percent p.a. the last 20 years); energy consumption per capita grows at 0.7 percent p.a., about the same rate as it 
has since 1970. 
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crowns). These wood residues make up about 50 percent of total biomass removed from 
forests. 
 
Traditional biomass use is currently the most widespread application of bioenergy 
though adoption of liquid biofuels is expected to increase (IPCC 2011). The FAO predicts 
that transitions to liquid and solid biofuels are likely for three reasons: high fossil fuel 
prices; perceived risks related to fossil fuel dependence; and increasing GHG emissions. 
 
Bioenergy Trade-offs 
 
As forest plantations for energy production have become more common, there have 
been increasing concerns about the trade-offs related to bioenergy use, particularly its 
effects on forest area and carbon dioxide emissions and indirect land use effects. 
Competition among land for food, fibre, and fuel is predicted to increase and research 
has increasingly shown that the production of bioenergy results in deforestation and 
increased food prices. Increased biomass production could also stress water supplies 
(IPCC 2011). Further, competition for wood products between markets, including bio 
refinery markets, is projected to increase as competition for forest land increases. The 
IPCC (2011) recommends land and water use management plans and increased 
understandings of the environmental, energy, and social interactions associated with 
bioenergy production and use to ensure that expanding bioenergy production is 
sustainable.  In addition, the IPCC (2011) recommends best fertilizer management 
practices, utilization of surplus heat, and process integration to lower GHG emissions 
from bioenergy production. 
 
Additional research has questioned the climate change benefits from transitions to 
bioenergy as discussed earlier Land conversion from forests to biofuel production 
contributes to climate change emissions, particularly in land high in carbon such as 
forests and drained peat areas. Oil palm plantations in Southeast Asia have also been 
located on drained peat lands, contributing to GHG emissions. Still, there are other 
promising technologies such as Jatropha production, which grows well on marginal 
lands and can be used to restore degraded land. 
 
Recent research has also begun to question the contribution of liquid biofuels in 
mitigating climate change, drawing attention to relative reductions in biofuels in 
comparison with fossil fuels (Douglas and Simula 2010; and Popp et al 2011)) predict 
that most carbon dioxide emissions from bioenergy will be in Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin 
America, and Pacific Asia over time, adding further pressure on land systems. 
Researchers increasingly agree that bioenergy contributes to GHG emissions and 
emphasize that these emissions will occur well into the future. The IPCC (2011) on the 
other hand concludes that most biofuel production systems significantly reduce GHG 
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emissions in comparison with the fossil fuels displaced, at levels up to 80 to 90 percent 
reductions, “if no iLUC effects are considered” (IPCC 2011: p. 50; emphasis added). 
iLUC can lessen, or even neutralize, net GHG mitigation impacts (IPCC 2011). The FAO 
(2008: p.19) suggests that 2nd generation liquid biofuels offer greater potential because 
they place less stress on soil and water and can have higher yields. The IPCC (2011) also 
suggests that advanced or next-generation biofuels may provide higher GHG mitigation 
than current bioenergy systems. 
 
Bioenergy also affects food availability and food prices. Like Hertel and Wright cited 
earlier, Douglas and Simula (2010) also point to trade-offs between biofuels and food, 
citing estimates that increased biofuel production contributes to a 10 to 30 percent 
increase in food prices. 
 
Cross-Sectoral Linkages between Forests and Transport 
 
Overview 
 
Transport itself is generally not identified as a stand-alone driver of deforestation, but 
rather a proximate cause of deforestation (Geist and Lambin 2001). Transportation 
infrastructures, particularly roads, contribute to deforestation in both direct and 
indirect ways. For instance, the creation of roads may result in forest clearance while the 
roads themselves may facilitate additional activities that contribute to deforestation by 
opening up forests to agriculture or logging or facilitating human settlement in new 
areas or increasing access to the forest for non-timber products, all of which can further 
contribute to deforestation. On the whole, road construction is recognized as 
contributing to deforestation and greater road density in nations is associated with 
higher deforestation both in that country and in neighboring countries (Pfaff 1999). 
Road reconstruction and improvements (such as paving an unpaved road or adding 
lanes to an existing road) are increasingly common, also contributing to deforestation 
(Nelson et al 2004). 
 
The number and type of road networks that are constructed and promoted shape the 
amount and spatial patterns of remaining forests. For instance, Mertens and Lambin 
(1997) identify several characteristic spatial deforestation patterns across the tropical 
belt that result from the clearing of forests for roads and transportation infrastructure, 
including: geometric (large-scale clearings for modern sector activities); corridor 
(commonly associated with roadside colonization by spontaneous migrants); fishbone 
(planned resettlement schemes); diffuse (smallholder, traditional subsistence 
agriculture); patchy (high density population areas with residual forest patches); and 
island patterns (peri-urban areas). Schneider (1995) recommends intensive road 
building in the developing world, creating dense road networks around market centers, 
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as opposed to extensive road development that extends roads into areas with low 
population densities. Roads are also modulated by local factors, such as land tenure 
status and soil characteristics. 
 
Forest clearance from road creation also results in associated negative impacts on 
biodiversity, from increased erosion to increased edge effects. When roads cut across 
previously forested landscapes, they fragment the landscape, resulting in smaller 
patches that produce edge effects, which results in changes in community structure, 
declines in biomass, and negative impacts on wildlife and other species (Wilkie et al 
2000). In England, for example, the construction of roads in forested landscapes 
resulted in the classification of the common dormouse as an endangered species because 
the dormouse does not cross open areas larger than 100 meters (Schoon 1996 cited in 
Wilkie et al 2000). In the Congo Basin, road construction and resulting deforestation 
results in increased bush meat hunting (Wilkie et al 2000). 
 
In the Amazon, road construction and the extension of roads are widely recognized as 
contributing to deforestation and some studies suggest highway construction has been 
the biggest driver of deforestation in the region (Gesit and Lambin 2001; and Viana et al 
2008). Nepstad et al (2001) found that over two-thirds of deforestation in the Amazon 
occurred within 50 km of major paved highways. The Brazilian government began to 
build roads linking the Amazon to other parts of Brazil in the early 1960s (Pfaff et al 
2007) and launched the Trans Amazon Highway project, which crosses the Amazon 
from east to west, in 1970 (Fearnside and Graca 2006). This initial road construction 
then contributed to additional forest clearance for secondary road construction, creating 
a fishbone effect (Pfaff et al 2007). Road reconstruction in the Amazon is also associated 
with deforestation, with deforestation typically spreading from roads upon their 
establishment but also accelerating upon their improvement (Fearnside and Graca 
2006). Road construction and repaving has been heavily debated in the Amazon 
(Fearnside and Graca 2006; Pfaff et al 2007). For instance, repaving of the BR-319 
highway that connects two Brazilian state capitals (Manaus and Porto Velho) and 
crosses 875 km of rainforest, has been repeatedly postponed despite its impassable 
condition at some parts. 
 
In Bolivia, the planned construction of a 182-mile highway would necessitate paving 32 
miles through the Isiboro Sécure National Park and Indigenous Territory (TIPNIS), 
which connects the Andes and Amazon basins. This highway was originally planned as 
part of the Brazilian-led Initiative for the Regional Integration of South America (IIRSA; 
now renamed the South American Council on Infrastructure and Planning, COSIPLAN), 
a network of 531 projects, including bridges, electrical power systems, highways, and 
hydroelectric dams, many of which will be carried out in the Amazon basin. Advocates of 
the TIPNIS highway point to Bolivia’s under-developed road system, which has only one 
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paved east-west highway, while critics counter the road would clear forests and disrupt 
wildlife habitat, open additional forest areas to logging and settlement, contaminate 
nearby rivers and threaten the livelihoods of indigenous communities in the area. One 
study by the Bolivian government predicts that up to six square miles will be deforested 
for every mile of paved highway. Other critics note that the road through TIPINIS would 
primarily cut transport time for goods, facilitating the transport of Brazilian soybeans to 
Pacific ports, providing more benefits for industry than for the local populations 
(Friedman-Rudovsky 2012). 
 
Transport and Agriculture 
 
New roads open up market access for agricultural products, timber, and non-timber 
forest products from previously remote areas (Chomitz and Gray 1996) and road 
extension is considered a direct driver of agricultural expansion. In an examination of 
the causes of deforestation in 152 cases across the world, Geist and Lambin (2001) 
found that 37 percent of cases can be explained by the “infrastructure-agriculture 
tandem.” They explain that, once road networks expand, land under permanent 
cultivation for food and commercial crops (or land under pasture) expands, resulting in 
additional deforestation. Geist and Lambin (2001: p. 47) state that this infrastructure-
agriculture-deforestation tandem is most common in South American countries, such as 
Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Honduras, Mexico, and Peru, 
though examples also exist in African and Asian countries. In the Brazilian Amazon, for 
example, paving the 900 km BR-163 highway would facilitate the export of soy products 
from the region (Pffaf et al 2007). 
 
In contrast to assumptions that subsistence farmers will colonize along any available 
roadway, Chomitz and Gray (1996) found that the impact of roads on subsistence 
farming is highly sensitive to soil quality in the low population-density context of Belize 
though only moderately sensitive to market access. Their results suggest that road 
building in areas with agriculturally poor soils and low population densities –which 
dominate in tropical areas– could be a “lose-lose” strategy, causing habitat 
fragmentation in biodiversity-rich forests and providing low economic returns. They 
further suggest that a plot of land may be undeveloped not because it is far from the 
road—it may be far from the road because it is not suitable for development (Chomitz 
and Gray 1996). 
 
Tradeoffs 
 
While roads contribute to and facilitate deforestation, road construction is promoted for 
agricultural development, rural development, and poverty alleviation and researchers 
have noted the strong correlation between road development, economic growth, and 
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national wealth (Chomitz and Gray 1996; and Wilkie et al 2000). For instance, 
placement of rural roads, including feeder roads, can have positive effects on rural 
incomes although such roads may increase deforestation pressures. Chomitz and Gray 
(1996) recommend that planners quantify the impact of road building (extension or 
improvement) on both deforestation and development to assess the severity of the 
trade-offs between environmental preservation and economic growth. For instance, 
planners who consider these tradeoffs can choose to locate roads in ways that minimize 
deforestation while promoting development. Coordination of road policies with land 
and forest tenure regularization can also minimize trade-offs between environmental 
protection and rural incomes (Chomitz et al 2007). Chomitz and Gray (1996) propose 
considering the following questions when evaluating the impacts of planned 
development on forests: “How far from the road do conversion effects extend? What 
kind of conversion is induced? Whom does it benefit?” (Chomitz and Gray 1996: p.487). 
 
Another consideration is whether different transport options could reduce the impacts 
of the transport sector on forests. Research shows that rail transportation can be up to 
30 percent cheaper than roads and that additional investment costs associated with 
building a railroad instead of a highway are less than the costs of controlling the 
deforestation that would result from road construction. The key environmental 
advantage of railroads over highways is that they allow greater control of access to the 
adjacent land by limiting the construction of new secondary roads. Viana et al (2008) 
promote the construction of railroads in the Amazon, rather than highways and roads, 
as an option that could limit further deforestation, mitigate climate mitigation, and 
generally promote sustainable development in the region.  
 
Cross Sectoral Linkages between Forests and Mining 
 
Overview 
 
Mining typically receives limited attention within broader forest policy discussions. 
Most discussions of forest challenges include mining references to the linkages between 
mining and forestry, though such references often just state that mining has the 
potential to contribute to deforestation. While reforestation efforts and ecological 
recovery in previously mined areas have received comparably more attention in the 
academic literature, the minimal attention to forests in the mining literature and to 
mining in the forest literature underscore the importance of a cross-sectoral approach to 
encourage explicit linkages between these two sectors. 
 
Mines are frequently described as having a relatively small environmental impact 
compared to sectors such as agriculture because mines occupy less than one percent of 
the Earth’s surface. Bridge (2004) notes that a central tenet on the environmental 
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impacts of mining was that the effects of mines were assumed to be localized and small. 
However, this assumption of mines having discrete, local impacts is increasingly 
challenged and researchers are drawing attention to how “mining modifies ecological 
processes over broad geographical scales” (Bridge 2004: p.214-5). Studies of the impacts 
of mines now emphasize that while the amount of land converted to mines is small, the 
resulting changes in the ecosystems are significant (e.g. Peterson and Heemskerk 2001; 
Simmons et al 2008; Douglas and Simula 2010; and Mishra and Reddy 2011). In 
addition, forest conversion from mining can create opportunities for further forest 
deforestation and degradation, underscoring the importance of attention to both direct 
and indirect deforestation and habitat destruction. 
 
Mining frequently occurs in areas with high conservation value or watershed stressed 
areas. The World Resources Institute’s (WRI) Mining and Critical Ecosystems 
Framework found that 75 percent of active mines and exploration areas occur in areas of 
high conservation value and high watershed stress (Miranda et al 2003). The study also 
found that 33 percent of active mines and exploration areas overlap with intact 
ecosystems considered of high conservation value and over 25 percent of active mines 
and exploration areas are located in or within a 10 kilometer radius of a strictly 
protected area (IUCN I-V) (Miranda et al 2003). In Papua New Guinea, over 25 percent 
of forests classified by the government as “fragile” overlap with oil, gas, and mining 
concessions and one-third of the countries forests have already been allocated to such 
concessions. Further, 42 percent of PNG’s mangrove forests have been allocated in oil, 
gas, and mining concessions. In the Philippines, 56 percent of all exploration areas and 
mining leases overlap with highly ecologically vulnerable areas (Miranda et al 2003). 
 
This overlap between high conservation areas and mines has the potential to increase as 
countries, such as Ghana and Indonesia, consider allowing mining in protected areas.In 
India, Mishra and Reddy (2011) note many forested areas also contain rich mineral 
resources and that the average forest cover in India’s major mineral-producing districts 
represents 18 percent of India’s total forest cover. Further, mining activities may occur 
in areas that are not yet formally protected but have high biodiversity levels. 
 
In the Congo Basin, such overlaps between forests and mining are already occurring. 
For instance, Schure et al (2012) found that 20 percent of diamond and gold artisanal 
miners in Cameroon mined inside the forest reserve, usually near forest streams, and 
collected NTFPs, including bushmeat, as a supplementary income. Schure et al (2012) 
caution that the overlaps between mining and timber concessions in the Congo Basin 
are likely to lead to increased pressure on the Sangha Tri-National landscape forest 
conservation area over time. 
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The sections below consider the impacts of mining on deforestation, forest degradation, 
and change in forest type as well as the indirect effects of mining on forests and the 
potential for forest regeneration following mining. This section on mining then 
concludes with a brief discussion of mining safeguards. 
 
Deforestation, Forest Degradation and Change in Forest Type 
 
Tropical forest areas and mineral rich areas often overlap, resulting in the need to clear 
forest areas for mining purposes. Mining results in forest and land conversion, habitat 
fragmentation, and associated biodiversity effects. The relative effect of mining varies by 
country and region. For instance, WRI (1997) identifies energy development, mining, 
and new infrastructure as the second largest threat (after commercial logging) to large, 
ecologically intact forests globally after commercial logging. In Russia, WRI (1997) 
found that mining, roads, and infrastructure threaten 51 percent of remaining frontier 
forests. 
 
In other locations, mining may result in only small levels of deforestation. In an analysis 
of forest conversion and loss between 1972 and 2002in Papua New Guinea, Shearman et 
al (2009), attributed only 0.6 percent of forest loss to mining, in part because of 
previous infrastructure development in the mining areas. They conclude that, while 
mining has intense local effects, particularly in Western Province, it has affected only a 
relatively small area. 
 
Artisanal and small-scale mining (ASM) can also contribute to significant deforestation. 
Hirons (2011) states that deforestation and forest degradation is one of the most 
significant environmental impacts associated with ASM. Peterson and Heemskerk 
(2001) estimate deforestation from gold mining at 48-96 km^2 annually in Suriname, 
suggesting that deforestation will reach 750-2280 km^2 by 2009. Peterson and 
Heemskerk (2001) stress that while the area of deforestation as a result of mining may 
seem small in comparison to deforestation from logging and ranching in the Amazon, 
the concentration of mining in particular areas and the slow rates of recovery mean that 
the local impacts of small-scale gold mining are significant, contributing to 
deforestation and loss of ecosystem services. 
 
In Ghana, ASM for gold is associated with significant deforestation, degradation, and 
erosion (Hilson 2002; Hilson and Nyame 2006; and Akpalu & Parks 2007). Akpalu and 
Parks (2007) state that surface gold mining is the main cause of deforestation in Ghana. 
They found that surface mining resulted in annual deforestation rates of 2 million acres. 
In Wassa West District, which they describe as a typical gold mining district in Ghana, 
gold mining activities contributed to the loss of 60 percent of the forested area. Hilson 
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(2002) notes that significant deforestation has occurred unnecessarily because miners 
search for ore without knowing precise gold deposit locations. 
 
Mining also significantly impacts forests by altering forest type. For instance, clearing 
edge forests for mining converts adjacent interior forest to edge forest, contributing to 
the loss of interior forest even if mining itself does not result in the loss of interior 
forest. In Southern Appalachia, Wickham et al (2007) found that forest loss in the 
interior forests was 1.75-5.0 times higher than forest loss directly attributable to 
mountaintop mining and that interior forest loss ranged from 7.4 percent to 20.5 
percent. Wickham et al (2007) also point out that such shifts in forest types alter the 
ecological composition, processes and structure of forests and the keystone services 
provided by these interior forests. They conclude that mountaintop mining has the 
potential to indirectly eliminate all interior forests in Southern Appalachia. 
 
Indirect Impacts on Forests 
 
Mining also has several indirect effects on forests, including opening up the forest to 
human activities through road construction and placing stress on associated forest 
benefits. Miranda et al (2003) emphasize that mining requires supporting infrastructure 
and processing facilities that means that the environmental effects of mining can extend 
beyond the actual concession area. They point out that once roads are built, these roads 
may facilitate colonization into the area and contribute to additional deforestation, 
resulting in a domino deforestation effect. Because mining results in cleared forests, 
mining can indirectly contribute to the loss of NTFP collection by local populations. 
Hilson and Nyame (2006) note that mining developments in Ghana pose threats to the 
rights of indigenous communities to gather forest products. In Wassa West District in 
Ghana, Akpalu and Parks (2007) found that gold mining activities affected the 
livelihoods of communities who depend on the forests for food, medicine, and craft and 
construction material. 
 
Conversely, miners who temporary reside in the forest can place additional impacts on 
forests. Miners can contribute directly to deforestation by clearing forest areas for their 
own temporary residences (Hilson 2002). Shearman et al (2009) and Douglas and 
Simula (2010) note that mining may result in small-scale deforestation as a result of 
small-scale agriculture to grow food for mine workers. Miners may also place pressure 
on forest resources by collecting NTFPs and using forest materials for construction and 
fuel wood. Ingram et al (2011) found that 42 percent of Cameroonian miners and 34 
percent of miners in the Central African Republic collect NTFPs and bush meat to 
supplement their livelihoods, but concluded that these impacts were minor because of 
the small number of miners and diamond and gold artisanal mining’s seasonal, 
temporary nature in the region. However, Ingram et al (2011) also found that 67 percent 
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of miners did not believe that mining contributed to negative environmental impacts. 
Consequently, given this low understanding of environmental effects and the likelihood 
of increased mining pressure in the future, they caution that mining impacts are likely to 
increase in the future and recommend measures to maintain mining’s low 
environmental footprint. In general, ASM typically corresponds to increased NTFP 
collection. Additional indirect environmental and social impacts of mining on forests 
can include increased conflict with indigenous or local communities, mercury 
contamination, and sedimentation (WRI 1997). 
 
Forest Regeneration 
 
Mining produces two effects on land use change: from pre-mining to a mining landscape 
and from a mining to a post-mining landscape (Larondelle and Haase 2012). In the 
conversion from forested land to surface mining sites, the site is cleared of all vegetation 
and the top soil horizons are removed. Next, additional soil and rock are removed, often 
with high water pressure, and the mineral is removed. Finally, during the reclamation 
process, soil is typically replaced and seeded. Several studies illustrate the regeneration 
potential of forests following mining. These studies generally agree that mining areas 
can be reforested and point to the role of nearby forests as seed sources and good soil 
composition in regeneration. Simmons et al (2008) stress, however, that land use 
change from forested to mining areas leads to significant, long-term changes in 
ecosystem functions. 
 
In Brazil, Rodrigues et al (2004) analyzed natural regeneration in a degraded area of 
MatoGrosso State that was originally covered by tropical rainforest and then deforested 
for gold mining. They found that the conservation of forest fragments in the 
surrounding areas was critical in the natural regeneration process because they serve as 
seed sources and can promote floristic composition and regeneration. Consequently, 
they recommend the conservation of critical forest fragments to ensure natural 
regeneration following mining activities. 
 
Similarly, in the Czech Republic, Mudrak et al (2010) found the spontaneous 
establishment of forests without any reclamation efforts in some previously forested 
mining sites. Consequently, Mudrak et al (2010) argue that mining sites can be 
successfully restored through spontaneous succession and that planting forest trees is 
not necessary for restoring vegetation cover. Within 22 years, the sites in the previous 
brown-coal mining district had 50 percent forest cover. They point to the role of 
undisturbed habitats to support recruitment of new colonizers and reasonable soil 
conditions as key contributions to regeneration. 
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Larondelle and Haase (2012) agree that forests can recover from the impacts of mining 
over time but illustrate that these reforested areas will often not contain the same 
diversity of ecosystem services as the pre-mined forest. They assessed the effects of open 
cut lignite mining near Leipzig, Germany, one of the largest opencast lignite mining 
areas in Europe, over a 100 year period. Mining activity began in 1921 and restoration 
efforts began in 1990. They found evidence that the restored landscapes can provide 
potential ecosystem services but cannot provide the same variety of ecosystem services 
contained in the pre-mining ecosystem. 
 
Other studies emphasize that mining results in long-term effects on soil and forest 
areas. Schimann et al (2012) compared tropical primary forest with five disturbed 
forests areas in gold mining sites to evaluate degradation levels in French Guiana. They 
found that that the process of washing forest soil with high pressure jets to extract gold 
deposits leads to deforestation, soil erosion, and heavy metal pollution. They conclude 
that gold mining had a significant impact on soil microbial processes, with Denitrifying 
Enzyme Activity (DEA) ten times lower in the mined forests than in the reference forests 
and significantly lower levels of Substrate Induced Respiration (SIR) in mined areas.  
 
Simmons et al (2008) evaluate the changes in ecosystem function and structure 
following forest conversion to coal mining to reclaimed forested areas in the 
Appalachian region of the US through a comparison of mined and non-mined 
watersheds over a 15 year period. The reclaimed mine site had significantly thinner soil 
and lower carbon, nitrogen, and phosphorous levels as a result of woody biomass 
removal. The mining area also exhibited multiple hydrological effects, including 
decreased soil infiltration rates, resulting in narrower, taller storm water runoff. 
Simmons et al (2008) conclude that land use change from forested to mining areas 
leads to significant, long-term changes in ecosystem functions and argue for mine 
reclamation goals to consider not just re-vegetation but also broader ecological 
processes. 
 
Forest regeneration following mining is slower than regeneration following any other 
land uses because mining causes higher levels of disturbance by turning over the soil 
and eliminating seeds, roots, and tree saplings. For instance, Peterson and Heemskerk 
(2001) found that after 4 years, 20 percent of mined areas in Surinam remained bare 
and no regeneration had occurred while other areas were also characterized as having 
bare ground, grass, and standing water. They found some tree regeneration in some 
areas but levels of regeneration and resprouting were significantly below the levels in 
old-growth forests. 
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In summary, forest regeneration following mining can and does occur throughout the 
world, though the forest composition and ecosystem services associated with the forest 
may not be as diverse as in the pre-mined ecosystem. 
 
Policies 
 
While some national mining legislation addresses the impact of mining on forests, 
additional collaboration among forest and mining officials could facilitate increased 
cross-sectoral attention to role of mining in deforestation and help to limit mining in 
areas of high forest diversity. For instance, the Government of India recently 
recommended eight parameters to evaluate forests before allowing mining to protect 
biodiversity, forests, and wildlife areas (Chauhan 2012; and Sethi 2012) and proposed 
land acquisition legislation is expected to address issue such as employment generation 
and compensation. However, India’s Land Acquisition Bill, now referred to as “The 
Right to Fair Compensation, Resettlement, Rehabilitation and Transparency in Land 
Acquisition” remains in discussion, after being referred to a Group of Ministers in 
August 2012, following reservations raised by some ministers raised reservations on 
certain provisions of the proposed legislation (Chauhan 2012; and Sethi 2012). 
 
Nearly 25 percent of active mines and exploration sites occur in countries with weak 
governance structures, suggesting that mining in such areas is unlikely to contribute to 
economic development and drawing attention to the need to ensure safeguards to 
ensure responsible mining (Miranda et al 2003). An additional concern is that the 
unregulated nature of ASM means that it represents a constant threat to forests, 
particularly when mining is not included in forest management policies. 
 
Mining safeguards and policies have been at the forefront of the World Bank’s works. Its 
Extractive Industries Review (EIR initiated in July 2001) considered whether extractive 
industries projects are compatible with the World Bank’s goals of sustainable 
development and poverty reduction, which has implications for overall considerations 
between sustainable development and the mining sector. The Review concluded that 
there is a role for the World Bank  in the oil, gas, and mining sectors if the right 
conditions are in place, namely: 1) pro-poor public and corporate governance; much 
more effective social and environmental policies; and respect for human rights (EIR 
2003: Executive Summary p. 1).  On mining, the Review recommended that the IBRD 
and IDA should help governments develop policies on artisanal and small-scale mining 
to address poverty while also recognizing the rights of communities over mining rights 
and the formation of a special unit on artisanal and small-scale mining. 
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In practice good practices in mining are challenged by governance issues in countries 
well endowed with natural resources. Figure 39 and 40 shows forest cover and ranking 
of countries on governance. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 39: Top 35 Countries with Collective> 90%+ of Global Forest Loss and 
Their Ranking in Governance Index  
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Cross-sectoral Linkages between Forests and Health 
 
Overview 
 
This section considers three key relationships between forests and health: forests as a 
Figure 40: Top 18 Countries with> 90% of Forest Gain and their Ranking in 
Governance Index 
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way of spreading disease; forests and forest products as providing a source of medicine; 
and forests and their pharmaceutical values. Finally, the section points to the 
complexities of the linkages between forests and health, noting the multidimensional, 
complex, and context specific nature of these linkages. Forests provide many benefits as 
described in this section.. At the same time, forest clearance has been associated in some 
cases with overall benefits for human health. Butler (2008), for example, suggests that 
human health in general has benefitted from forest clearing for agriculture and 
development of cities. Activities enabled by forest clearing have in turn allowed for the 
development of large populations in Europe, US, Japan, and China that have 
transformed themselves from being predominantly hunters, gatherers and forest 
dependent people. These populations have then stimulated and developed specialized 
fields and technologies that have brought health advances to large numbers of people. 
 
Further, as Colfer et al (2006) illustrate the importance of forests for people varies along 
a continuum from hunter-gatherers to swidden farmers, to recent in-migrants, to 
agriculturists, to urban dwellers. Recognizing and understanding this continuum is 
important in understanding and improving human health and forest sustainability. 
 
Forests and Human Disease 
 
There is clear evidence that forest clearance, deforestation, and forest fragmentation 
affect the emergence of infectious and other diseases. Researchers have illustrated 
relationships between forest area and disease, including the emergence of new 
infectious diseases such as HIV and the Ebola virus, which often originate in animals 
(e.g. MEA 2003; and Karjalainen et al 2010). As Wilcox and Ellis (2006) put it: “Forest 
land use changes and practices, particularly when unregulated and unplanned, 
frequently lead to increased prevalence of zoonotic and vector-borne diseases, and 
occasionally boost the prevalence of diseases capable of producing catastrophic 
pandemics.” (p. 17). Examples of diseases that have been linked to forests include 
increases in leishmaniasis in the regions of the Amazon and the Nile (Patz et al 2005) 
and increases in schistosomiasis in Cameroon (Chivian and Bernstein 2008: p. 297) and 
Ghana (Hunter 2003). In other cases, bush meat consumption has been implicated in 
the emergence of HIV/AIDS and such meat may be a vector for other disease 
transmission (Chivian and Bernstein 2008). The sale of bush meat has been facilitated 
by roads and other development, following forest clearance (Orubuloye et al 1993). 
 
In addition, destruction of forest habitat can lead to replacement of benign vector 
species with a more effective disease vector. One example is the Anophelese mosquito 
species that has replaced a more benign native species, resulting in more virulent strains 
of malaria following deforestation in parts of Southeast Asia and the Amazon (Chivian 
and Bernstein 2008). In addition, following forest clearing in locations such as the Terai 
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region of Nepal and parts of Panama, humans have moved into previously forested 
areas, where malaria was previously present, contributing to increased exposure to 
malaria (Colfer et al 2006). 
 
While the relationship between forests and infectious disease is most common in 
tropical forest regions, other diseases occur outside of tropical forests, such as Lyme 
disease and tick-borne encephalitis, both of which occur in more developed, non-
tropical nations. In the northeastern US, for example, deforestation and forest 
fragmentation have been attributed to increased risks of Lyme disease (Karjalainen 
2010). 
 
Still, while the relationship between forests and the spread of disease has become more 
clear, the causal pathways involved in the relationship between disease and forest 
condition are complex and likely context specific, making generalizations between forest 
modification and disease emergence difficult (Butler 2008; and Colfer et al 2006).  
Butler points out that the threshold for forest modification that leads to disease 
transmission is not known. 
 
Nevertheless, many studies conclude that improved forest resource management can 
help mitigate disease. Patz et al (in the MEA 2005) find evidence that undisturbed 
ecosystems can retard infectious disease transmission. An example of improved 
management to address disease spread is the use of afforestation to reclaim 
swamplands, which helped control malaria in early twentieth-century Italy (Wilcox and 
Ellis 2006). This relationship between forest modification and disease should be a 
consideration in forest land use and forest resource planning and management (e.g. 
Wilcox and Ellis 2006; and Patz et al 2005). In addition, greater collaboration among 
the agricultural, forest and public health sectors could facilitate cross-sectoral policies 
and practices to prevent and control such diseases. 
 
Forest Products as a Source of Medicine 
 
Forest products and ecosystem services provide health benefits to many populations 
who depend on non-timber forest products as sources of food and medicine, as also 
noted in BP1 (MEA 2003; and Karjalainen 2010). The WHO estimates that between 65 
to 80 percent of the world's population (about 3 billion people) do not use prescription 
drugs, but rely on naturopathic or homeopathic medicines, many of which are derived 
from forests, as their primary form of health care. One frequently cited advantage of 
forest products is that they are often freely accessible in the world’s forests, making 
them an affordable source of medicine for populations that might otherwise be unable to 
afford medicine or who lack access to formal health care services. The benefits of forests 
in traditional health care are particularly prominent in Africa, Asia, and Latin America 
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(Karjalainen 2010). But such forest extraction may also be associated with increased 
exposure to forest related disease vectors. There seems to be relatively little analysis of 
the costs and benefits of forest exploitation to human health taking into account these 
various impacts together. 
Forest food also offers a safety net for the most vulnerable population groups in 
developing countries and can play an important role in household nutrition, as 
discussed in BP1, therefore contributing to improved health. 
 
Forest products can also support human health and nutrition through the use of natural 
insecticides and fungicides in the agricultural sector, can increase survival of food crops. 
This relationship between forests, health, and agriculture is relatively less studied 
(Chivian and Berstein 2008), yet represents an important synergy in understanding the 
complex cross-sectoral relationships of forests. 
 
While the negative health impacts on humans from forest wildlife in terms of spread 
disease are listed above some have argued that forest ecosystems may also help in the 
regulation of infectious diseases by providing lessons for how different forest species 
survive and protect themselves against diseases (Chivan and Bernstein 2008). For 
instance, owls, squirrels, and Rhesus monkeys serve as important models for learning 
how animals protect themselves from diseases such as malaria. Researchers and health 
practitioners hope to draw upon these examples to develop vaccines to protect humans 
against P. Falciparum malaria.  
 
Forests and Their Pharmaceutical Values 
 
Forests represent natural pharmacies with rich stores of plant, animal, and microbial 
material with known or potential medicinal value (Chivian & Bernstein 2008; MEA 
2005; and Karjalainen et al 2010). For example, in the US, half or more of the most 
prescribed medicines come from natural sources (Chivian & Bernstein 2008) and 70 
percent of all new drugs introduced in the United States in the past 25 years have been 
derived from natural products (Newman and Cragg 2007). In Asia, mushrooms are now 
recognized as having significant pharmacological potential because of their 
antimicrobial effects (Karjalainen et al 2010). At the same time, the economic benefits 
from forest products with pharmaceutical value can result in overharvesting of some 
species, contributing to negative effects on forests (Karjalainen et al 2010). 
 
Using natural products from forests and traditional knowledge about those products to 
develop medicines to enhance human health can be a financially lucrative business. For 
example, of the 3,000 plants used for anti-cancer drugs, 70 percent come from 
rainforests (US National Cancer Institute 1991). 
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Benefit sharing from such bio prospecting remains an issue. Colfer et al (2006) describe 
this concern: “pharmaceutical companies have sometimes been charged with reaping 
unacceptably large benefits from forest peoples’ knowledge given the widespread 
poverty in forested areas. Issues relating to intellectual property rights, implications for 
cultural integrity, and amounts and recipients of benefits are complex” (p. 7). 
 
One of the three pillars of the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) is to ensure the 
fair and equitable benefits from genetic resources. CBD Article 15 addressees’ access to 
genetic resources, including facilitating access, prior informed consent (PIC), mutually 
agreed terms (MAT) and benefit-sharing. In addition, related CBD articles refer to 
traditional knowledge (Article 8(j)), access to and transfer of technology (Article 16.3), 
and handling and distribution of benefits of biotechnology (Article 19). The mechanisms 
for implementing Article 15 and realizing benefits for populations such as forest peoples’ 
have remain underdeveloped to date though recent efforts may significantly improve 
benefit sharing rights. At the Tenth Conference of the Parties to the CBD in 2010, 
delegates adopted the Nagoya Protocol on Access and Benefit Sharing. The Nagoya 
Protocol aims to share “the benefits from the utilization of genetic resources in a fair and 
equitable way, including by appropriate access to genetic resources and by appropriate 
transfer of relevant technologies, taking into account all rights over those resources and 
to technologies, and by appropriate funding, thereby contributing to the conservation of 
biodiversity and the sustainable use of its components” (Nagoya Protocol 2010). There 
are currently 92 signatories to the Protocol and five ratifications (Gabon, Jordan, 
Mexico, Rwanda, and the Seychelles). The Nagoya Protocol will enter into force 90 days 
after the 50th nation deposits its ratification with the CBD and has the potential to serve 
as a transformative mechanism to address benefit sharing from forest resources.  
 
Additional Linkages between Forests and Health 
 
Another health benefit of forests that is less frequently addressed or recognized is their 
contribution to both physical and mental health. Forest visits promote physical and 
mental health by providing physical exercise opportunities and reducing stress. For 
instance, studies have shown that individuals, who spend time in nature, including 
forests, can recover from attentional fatigue and focus better as well as showing 
improvements in mood and decreases in tensions (Karjalainen et al 2010). Some 
countries have explicitly encouraged the link between forests and physical and mental 
health through specific programs; for instance, the British Green Gym program 
encourages physical activity through environmental and gardening work while Japan 
has designated specific forests as “forest therapy bases” in recognition of their relaxing 
effects on populations (Karjalainen et al 2010). 
 
Forests can both contribute to health and present risks to help. In some cases, forests 
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help people avoid injury from natural hazards (e.g., mudslides due to lack of tree cover) 
and avoid harmful contamination (e.g. by regulating water supply). Forests can also 
present risks to human health by exposing people to physical hazards such as forest 
fires, floods, drought, soil slides, and haze as well as potentially dangerous wildlife and 
toxic fruits, foliage, and fungi. For example, flora and fauna in forests can provoke 
allergic or irritant reactions; pollen from trees or other plants or insect or snake bites 
can cause serious reactions or even death in people (Karjalainen et al 2010; and Nilsson 
2011). 
 
Finally, while the evidence above illustrates the importance of relationships between 
forests and health, the health field has paid comparatively little attention to people 
living in forests (Colfer et al 2006). Instead, health studies usually focus on larger urban 
populations with higher numbers of inhabitants. 
 
Payments for Environmental Services 
 
Paying actors to conduct environmentally friendly initiatives or to give up destructive 
practices is the purpose of payments for environmental services (PES). Interest in PES 
has been increasing rapidly over the past decade. There are today more than 300 
programs implemented worldwide predominantly used to address biodiversity, 
watershed services, carbon sequestration and landscape beauty. Nation-wide programs 
are running in China, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Mexico, Vietnam, the United Kingdom and 
the United States. Substantial empirical evidence tends to indicate that water-related 
PES have been more effective than others in terms of institutional design and funds 
collection26probably because the payers are the direct beneficiaries of the service – 
making easier for authorities to justify a levy on water consumption for funding the 
PES scheme, but evidence on their benefits in terms of effective protection of water 
resources is thin as discussed below, in part because monitoring and evaluation often 
tends to be weak and measuring biophysical benefits is difficult and highly location 
specific requiring the level of effort which is often not exerted and is typically not 
affordable, For biodiversity and carbon PES, the direct interest of the service’s buyer–
who act as an intermediary for the world’s inhabitants and the future generations, to 
ensure additionality and absence of leakage outside the perimeter of the project is not so 
strong. Therefore their protection is frequently more of a global public good than 
watershed protection tends to be, which is often a national or a regional public good. 
 
Definitions of Environmental Services 
                                                          
26 In terms of water quality or flows, the effectiveness is not straightforward since the relationships between land cover and water 
flows is more complex than generally thought (see FAO-CIFOR 2005; Bruijnzeel 2004; and Bruijnzeel et al 2007). In some cases, 
such as Vittel, the water quality has been maintained thanks to the change of agricultural practice of the riparian farmers, changes 
paid by the company through agreements which have been called, afterthought, PES. 
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One of the most commonly used definitions is that of Sven Wunder (2005): “a voluntary 
transaction in which a well-defined environmental service (ES) or a form of land use 
likely to secure that service is bought by at least one ES buyer from a minimum of one 
ES provider, if and only if the provider continues to supply that service (conditionality)”. 
This definition uses market terminology (buying), which is not free of ambiguities about 
the nature of the service that is the support of the transaction and can even create 
confusion about possible “ownership of the services” (in market relationships, one can 
only sell what one possesses). Environmental services are qualities associated with 
elements (for example the quality of water flowing through a drainage basin, or the 
carbon storage capacity of a forest) that are collective or public goods at different levels 
by nature. Furthermore, PES are not really about selling environmental services. In 
most cases, PES agreements provide for compensations for agreed restrictions on land 
use (e.g. stopping natural habitat destruction practices) and, in that sense, compare to 
conservation easements. Another useful definition has been proposed by Muradian et al 
(2010, p. 1205) “PES as a transfer of resources between social actors, which aims to 
create incentives to align individual and/or collective land use decisions with the social 
interest in the management of natural resources”. As pointed out by Farley and 
Costanza (2010) “most PES schemes actually pay for land uses associated with 
generating the service” (p. 2062). PES, therefore, can hardly be coined “market-based 
instruments”. While markets are defined by the transfer of property rights (Commons 
1931; Hodgson 1988; and Coase 1992), the nature of PES is based on a contractual 
relationship between actors for the compensation of avoided land use change, and such 
contractual nature is decoupled from the creation of a market that aims at exchanging 
and transferring property rights (such as the emission permits markets). In addition, 
many national PES programs (such as in Costa Rica, Mexico and Ecuador) are 
principally funded through taxes (on fuel distribution in Costa Rica, on water in 
Mexico). 
 
Therefore, the amount of the PES differs from the monetary value of the service. If there 
is no market, as for biodiversity, the scope of the monetary evaluation is limited, 
especially as it is difficult to establish an economic value for heterogeneous assets. If the 
service has a market, however, as for carbon, the price of the service will depend on the 
relationship between supply and demand, but will not correspond to the market price 
due to operating and transaction costs. 
 
The amount of a PES and the implementation of PES schemes therefore do not depend 
on the monetary evaluation of natural assets. They are determined by means of 
negotiations, which may or may not be balanced, and the amount should in principle 
cover at least the net cost of giving up an activity (the opportunity cost) linked to the 
usage restrictions or changes. Indexing payments on the opportunity cost nevertheless 
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has certain disadvantages and negative side effects. “Carbon” PES (especially through 
avoided deforestation, the basis of the REDD mechanism) may be sources of financial 
gains for operators. In a carbon market (voluntary or regulated) with a single price per 
ton of CO2 resulting from supply and demand, some agents providing an avoided 
deforestation service will have opportunity costs that are lower than the value of avoided 
emissions, calculated on the basis of the price per ton of CO2.  
 
This difference between the “production cost” of avoided deforestation and its 
“purchasing price” creates a surplus. This surplus may be conserved by the agents, but 
will more likely be captured by carbon market brokers or PES project promoters, who 
will there by pay themselves to varying extents. Moreover, conserving forests in 
agricultural frontiers in the Amazon instead of cultivating soybean, or in South East Asia 
instead of planting oil palms, generates opportunity costs that are often high since these 
crops are very lucrative. PES programs will therefore concentrate on forests that are 
under less threat at the risk of paying actors who have nothing to lose by avoiding 
deforestation (zero opportunity cost). 
 
PES, Ecosystem Services and Externalities 
 
In the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (MEA 2003), ecosystem services are defined 
as “the benefits people obtain from ecosystems”. Ecosystem services include all outputs 
from agricultural activities, including outputs as diverse as food production and climate 
regulation. As noted by FAO (2007), “Outputs such as food are generally produced 
intentionally for sale or direct consumption, and buyers or consumers can influence the 
production of these outputs through the prices they are willing to pay for them. Many 
other ecosystem services, however, are provided only as “externalities”, in that they are 
unintended consequences of the primary activity (e.g. food production), and the 
individuals who are affected by these consequences cannot influence their production. 
Externalities typically involve “off-site” impacts that affect others, in contrast to “on-
site” impacts felt directly by farmers”. Hence, “the term environmental services is used 
to refer specifically to the subset of ecosystem services characterized by externalities”, 
which justify to refer to PES as “payment for environmental services” rather than for 
ecosystems. 
 
A recurrent challenge addressed to PES is the uncertainty related to the environmental 
service, especially because the relationships between a given land use and the targeted 
service is not straightforward and uncertainties remains. Farley and Costanza (2010) 
suggest it is better to pay for a bundle of “poorly defined services” than to try to 
maximize one of them − and to measure precisely, which entail high transaction costs: 
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“Ecosystems and the services they generate are complex, and it may be appropriate to 
pay even for poorly defined services. For example, in real life there is considerable 
uncertainty concerning the water regulation services provided by forests and other land 
uses, yet dozens of schemes nonetheless pay for these services (…) One of the best 
defined services currently is carbon sequestration, but payments for this single service 
can have perverse outcomes (…) Transaction costs may also increase as services are 
more explicitly defined (…). In the face of ecosystem complexity, we believe that 
payments for a bundle of loosely defined services are more likely to maximize social 
benefits”. 
 
PES and Trade-offs between Efficiency and Equity 
 
PES are caught between two stumbling blocks: where the opportunity cost is high (and it 
can increase over time), the sums available are often not enough; but where the 
opportunity cost is low, the risk of paying for environmental services that are not 
endangered (lack of additionality) is high. Verifying additionality would require 
significant means in order to analyze local situations, which would imply higher costs. 
The Costa Rican PSA scheme is often considered a model, but has been criticized for not 
being sufficiently efficient (lack of additionality); Pfaff et al (2007) find very low impact 
of the PSA scheme on deforestation, since most of the payments went to land holders 
who would not have deforested even without payments. PES programs often make fixed 
uniform payments on a per hectare basis and have been criticized for that. The OECD 
pointed out that individual land holders are likely to have different opportunity costs of 
ecosystem service provision and suggests taking these differences into account. But such 
a choice encompasses other challenges. 
 
A major problem where PES and their social acceptability are concerned is that 
compensation based on the opportunity cost is inequitable for the poorest populations. 
Freezing user rights such as clearing, hunting or even the prospect of working in a 
forestry company deprives people of opportunities to lift themselves out of poverty. 
Moreover, within communities, it is often the poorest that depend on natural resources 
and have limited voice in designing the agreements. By giving up certain activities, they 
lose vital access rights that are often not offset by the payments, which are based on the 
average opportunity cost for the whole community and, therefore, often not coincide with 
the one of those who rely exclusively on the access to natural resources. Moreover, many 
organizations are reluctant to use cash money and favor in-kind transfers, with a mix of 
collective assets (school building or refurbishment, well digging, collective training) and 
individualized goods which do not automatically benefit the poorest. When cash transfers 
or salary opportunities (through surveying patrols or other remunerated tasks) are 
offered, it is not unusual for these payments to be monopolized by the “elites” and their 
118 
 
families. Simply compensating the opportunity cost for very poor farmers therefore 
raises ethical objections and is enough to justify envisaging another basis for payments. 
 
Finally, adopting the opportunity cost as a basis for compensation does not prepare for 
the long term. Compensating for the loss of income from giving up certain subsistence 
activities may free up working time but does not release any new resources to acquire 
the capital needed to implement new agricultural or agroforestry technologies. Although 
a sophisticated national PES program in Mexico is based on assessment of various 
opportunity costs at local level, one can think that, in poorest countries, the feasibility of 
large-scale PES strategy will depend upon the design of “assets-building” PES. This 
means going beyond the opportunity cost compensation logic that leaves the poorest in 
their condition and gives no other perspective than an infinite horizon for paying (even 
escalating payments if opportunity costs increase over time). However, although the 
ecological intensification of agriculture is a necessary condition for reducing pressure on 
ecosystems, it is insufficient. This is seen in the mitigated results yielded by the 
Alternative to slash-and-burn (ASB) programs of the past two decades: with the extra 
income generated thanks to intensification programs, farmers developed new cash crops 
elsewhere at the expense of the forests- “rebound effect” (Fearnside 1997). Hence the 
proposal to combine investment in more intensive agricultural technologies with direct 
incentives linked to ecosystem preservation provided by PES. Broader PES, in other 
words aimed at investment, may combine direct incentives with a conditionality on land 
use practices that was previously lacking. It means also that PES programs should be 
implemented on quite large territorial units, to avoid displacement of deforestation 
activities (“leakages”) associated with the new revenues allowed by the investments on-
site. 
 
Two Different Perspectives on Equity in PES Payments 
 
As acknowledged by economists, PES programs offer few gains if the compensated 
services are not additional (Pattanayak et al 2010). Therefore the “economic rationality” 
suggests that PES should reward effective provision of services, which means either a 
change in practices or continuation of conservation/sustainable forest management 
practices, while opportunities for conversion become more and more tangible (as 
suggested by a baseline scenario and analysis of opportunity costs of sustainable forestry 
in the area). Payments concentrated only on “objectively threatened forests” in the name 
of efficiency (again not clear what efficiency refers to here—do you mean efficiency in 
the payment services?) is recommended in such an approach. It makes sense for 
changing the behavior of migrant farmers. As Wunder (2007) put it: “PES payments 
need to be applied strategically so that additionality can be demonstrated clearly. Only 
in this manner can users’ willingness to pay overtime be enhanced. Yet this also means 
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people already living in approximate harmony with nature without any credible internal 
or external threat to service provision will generally not qualify as PES recipients.” 
 
But such a recommendation is challenged from an equity perspective. Many consider 
that those who conserve their forests, and therefore deliver an environmental service, 
should be paid regardless of their opportunity cost to conserve this forest. This is 
considered to be especially applicable to indigenous and forest-dependent peoples, the 
“forest guardians”. Indeed, there is a risk that PES based on opportunity cost simply 
rewards potential destroyers who threaten the ecosystems. Such a perspective is 
reflected in the emphasis put recently on “carbon rights” in the REDD+ debate by 
authors such as Cotula and Mayers (2009) and Schwarte and Mohammed (2011). 
 
Wunder (2007) argued that although this is an issue, it could prepare the ground for 
general environmental blackmailing:  
 
“To reward, in the name of fairness, anybody who delivers an environmental service 
seems a dangerous avenue.… Across-the-board entitlements to PES could endorse 
blackmail by anybody owning an unthreatened environmental asset, from Scandinavian 
forest owners menacing to cut down their trees for receiving carbon credits, to upland 
settlers threatening to deliberately pollute a river to receive watershed payments. It 
seems crucial not to take the PES-underlying victim pays principle to such absurd 
extremes.” 
 
This debate should also take into account the “imperfection” of the existing REDD+ 
schemes, where asymmetry of information about the true opportunity cost is borne by 
the PES candidate. When political interferences influence the design of PES schemes 
and the priority areas where programs are to be implemented, such as in Mexico, an 
“adverse selection” process can lead to the opening of profitable opportunities to large 
landowners (who can more easily hide information on their intentions, with some 
implicit blackmailing, and opportunity costs) while disempowered smallholders and 
communities would simply be excluded. The conditionality and the sanctions are not 
implemented in the way that the PES theory recommends. As noted by Bond (2009): 
 
“Although conditionality and sanctions are important design features, there is very little 
evidence in our case studies of them being fully applied outside of the Pimampiro 
Scheme [Ecuador], where some families were excluded from the program due to non-
compliance (Wunder and Alban 2008). Elsewhere, the use of conditionality has been 
deficient – either because the rules are too flexible and ad hoc, and the program is too 
new (BolsaFloresta), or because program monitoring is inadequate, making exclusion 
and non-payment difficult when contract breaches are discovered (Mexico PSA-H)”. 
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PES and Perverse Incentives 
 
There are difficulties to introduce PES in an already existing regulating framework 
where the legal constraint is prominent but hardly enforceable. For instance, in many 
places, when deforestation is forbidden or subject to legal authorization, using PES for 
encouraging law compliance raise an issue about the simultaneous use of incentives and 
prescriptions. The issue is exacerbated when wealthy famers are taking advantage of 
such financial incentives.  
 
Using PES to provide stakeholders and additional incentive to comply with the law 
would undermine civic motivations and make further use of constraining regulation 
unlikely without paying. In such a situation, one should decide whether public policies 
should rely on the legal prescription for land use or on financial incentives through PES. 
If PES are chosen, removing legal prescription for allowing PES implementation would 
be necessary to avoid the destruction of civic spirit, a declining value it is capital to 
preserve and restore. 
 
A generalisation of PES in the name of “incentives” could undermine disinterested 
motivations to conserve and manage ecosystems, as pointed out also by Corbera (2012). 
And emphasizing efficiency in PES design, as claimed by most of the economists 
(Wunder 2007; and Tacconi 2012), amplifies such a shift in motivations. Assessing the 
efficiency of PES by setting a “business-as-usual” scenario and evaluating the 
opportunity cost of the landholder to conserve the ecosystem might incite this latter to 
take advantage of the asymmetry of information for disguising its intention related to its 
preferences and future actions, i.e. formulating the worst-case scenario for maximizing 
claimed compensation levels. Exclusion of the benefit from a PES scheme (for lack of 
additionality, if PES are designed as such) might push some landholders or users to 
formulate environmental blackmail (and possibly to act as such).  
 
Promoters of PES programmes are often aware of such potential drawbacks. In a 
workshop on PES held in 2011 in DR Congo, responding to a question about researches 
having shown the lack of additionality of PES schemes in Costa Rica (more than 
90percent of the landholders having received payments would not have deforest 
anyway), the director of FONAFIFO (Costa Rica institutions handling the public PES 
program) explained it was a deliberate choice not to condition payment upon 
demonstrated additionality in order to avoid risks of environmental blackmailing 
(Personal Communication with O. Sanchez Chaves; March 7, 2012). 
 
Corbera (2012) is, therefore, right to raise the fact that PES logic contribute … “to the 
framing of conservation in utilitarian rather than ethical terms (…) and may result in the 
undermining of intrinsic motivations” (p. 5). 
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Containing PES’s Perverse Incentives 
 
By addressing, through setting positive incentives, a genuine difficulty for nature 
conservation, namely the frequent divergence between the private cost borne by 
individuals (opportunity cost compounded by high private discount rates that entail 
disregard for long-term benefits associated with conservation) and the social cost of 
ecosystems degradation, PES are instruments that cannot be easily dismissed. As for 
any economic instrument, they embody potential drawbacks effects and can also 
generate perverse incentives, such as environmental blackmailing. Containing these 
potential perverse incentives might be more likely when PES are going beyond land-use 
restrictions and incorporate significant investment for building economic alternatives 
with the active participation of the land users. 
 
The principle of a payment above the opportunity cost sketches what could be a dividing 
line between PES that are based solely on compensation for user rights and investment-
oriented PES to foster a development pathway that uses environmental resources 
sparingly and could become autonomous in the long term (i.e. ending the payments). By 
moving the core principle from compensation (still required) to investment into “forest 
friendly” rural practices (ecological intensification of the crops, planting cash crops in 
degraded areas, NTFPs valorisation, ecotourism, etc.), one could expect moving also the 
conversation with landholders from a rhetoric one can typified as “if you don’t pay we 
will destroy”, towards the cost and the condition of adopting new practices that will 
generate eventually higher revenues (a condition for dropping progressively the 
compensation payments). 
 
Recognition of Forest Land Rights in PES Schemes 
 
Clarifying effective management and exclusion rights is a precondition for contracting 
and foreseeing possible PES for forest keeping (Wunder 2007; and Kaimowitz 2008). 
Protecting a forest needs effective and, eventually, legal capacity to exclude outsiders 
(such as encroachers and illegal loggers) and to manage a given piece of forest land to 
ensure liability (fulfilment of contractual commitments).  
 
Contracting for PES on well identified territories with local dwellers will lead to de facto 
recognition of some property rights on the forest land and effective management and 
exclusion rights, the minimum basis for enforcing such contractual agreements. De facto 
recognition of key property rights will exacerbate the tension between customary rights 
and de jure public ownership and will call for land tenure reforms in those countries 
where the forests remain under state ownership. 
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As suggested by Karsenty and Assembé (2011) for Congo Basin countries, two key policy 
instruments can be used to allow for such an evolution: participatory mapping – an 
operation already undertaken by conservation programs, NGOs and even logging 
companies in many countries – and registration of forest tenure rights. The purpose 
would be to (i) identify and map out the various customary territories as they are 
recognized by community members and their neighbours, and (ii) to clarify and register 
the overlapping rights exercised over those spaces by the various stakeholder 
groups/actors using them. The purpose of the clarification and registering process is to 
understand who (families, lineages, village community, indigenous peoples) hold 
effective property and tenure rights over which area, where and over what conflicts 
might occur as well as where collective areas are, and finally to allow for land rights 
protection of minorities (for instance migrants). This work could be undertaken by up 
scaled administrations, delegated to local authorities, private companies or civil society 
organizations using a set of specifications detailing the methods to be employed and the 
categories to be used. 
 
This has already been tested (with more or less satisfactory outcomes between 
countries) in operations called “Rural land tenure plans”, supported by the World Bank, 
among others, in some African countries in the two last decades, but it still needs to be 
adopted in law. Such operations, however, were designed for agricultural land rather 
than for forest areas. The information found could be used in national zoning plans, to 
inform the land-use planning exercises that are essential for a designing and 
implementing effective national REDD+ strategies. 
 
Land Tenure and Deforestation 
 
We are adopting the definition of land tenure as “a set of property rights associated with 
the land, and the institutions that uphold those rights” (Bruce et al 2010), where 
property rights refer to a bundle of rights guiding the use, management and transfer of 
assets. 
 
The issue here addressed is the role of land tenure on deforestation, and the particular 
issue of community forestry. The issue of land tenure and natural resources 
management has been influenced by the well-known Garrett Hardin’s interpretation of 
the “tragedy of the commons” in a context of growing pressure on land driven by the 
demography. It has instilled the idea that there are intrinsic shortcomings with 
collective land tenure when land becomes scarce, leading to accelerating destruction of 
open-access resources entailed by self-interest and rational individual calculus 
(consuming the resource for my own profit before my neighbour does it for his own). 
Although Hardin’s prescriptions for land tenure individualization has been challenged 
by numerous scholars, and notably by E. Ostrom, for not distinguishing between open 
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access and collective tenure (which is often effectively managed by internal rules of 
access and use), the ideas distilled by Hardin have been operationalized by large 
programs of land titling, often designed and supported by the World Bank. Such 
programs have been designed first for the agricultural land, but could apply to forest 
too. The rational of such titling operations is to provide clarity in rights, which it is 
hoped will result in land tenure security and allow for long-term investment and credit 
access.  
 
Two Different Frameworks of Causal Relationships 
 
As for the relationships between land tenure security and forest conservation, it is 
interesting to see there are quite opposite views. One can stylize the most common 
perspective by saying that unclear land tenure tends to favour deforestation since it 
encourages land clearing which is generally associated with (or prepare) private holding. 
A couple of studies have underlined this for Brazil (Araujo-Bonjean et al 2009). They 
show how the legislation incentivizes squatters to occupy forested land and to clear it to 
claim land rights. Several studies on Sub-Saharan Africa have shown how the 
combination of customary rules (“the land is given to those who are able to make them 
productive”) and government rules (appropriation is conditioned upon land 
development for a continuous period of 10 years in many countries) have created 
incentives for deforestation (Karsenty and Assembé 2011). 
 
In addition, unclear land tenure prevents reforestation since it is not favourable to long 
term investment. 
 
An alternative interpretation has been provided by Angelsen (2007): if land clearing is 
considered as an investment, the absence of security in land tenure refrain the investor 
from maximizing its effort (i.e. clearing more forestland). Angelsen can therefore 
propose the following statement: “(from this simple model) tenure insecurity saves the 
forest!” 
 
An illustration of such a phenomenon is also implicit in Tollens’ analysis on Central 
Africa (2010) who thinks large-scale investors for perennial crops will not be successful 
in Africa, due to “investment climate and business conditions” (among which the 
multiple claim on forest lands). But the conclusion (“tenure insecurity saves forests”) 
should be taken cautiously, notably related to the policy recommendations that one 
could derive from it. Angelsen warns that the reality on the ground is more complex. For 
instance, “insecure land tenure will lead to less land investments and more soil 
exhaustion, thus increasing the need and/or incentives for cutting down more forest to 
replace degraded land” (p. 23). In fallow agriculture, and since insecurity is greater on 
land not occupied, farmers tend to shorten fallow (which is detrimental to fertility 
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management) (Goldstein and Udry 2005). The nature of the “investment” should also be 
considered: if the investment is essentially working time and if labour is not scarce (and 
has no or limited opportunity cost), the trade-off between fearing to lose the investment 
(insecurity favouring forest conservation) and the opportunity to claim property rights 
through land development, will frequently be resolved in favour of deforestation. 
Moreover, agricultural investment is not the only driver of deforestation. Firewood 
collection and charcoal making are often major factors in explaining deforestation, 
especially in countries where the revenues collected from agriculture sources are low or 
declining. An extreme example is given by Somalia today: an AFP report (November 11, 
2012) about Somalia reveals that 20 percent of the forests of Somaliland (North of 
Somalia) have disappeared these last ten years, due to charcoal making, one of the only 
sources of revenues for local people – and even one of the rare goods exported by the 
Shebarebels. The general insecurity and the crisis affecting herding (herds have declined 
due to diseases) have led the fast-growing local population to turn massively to charcoal. 
 
“Insecure tenure has contradictory effects on the rate of deforestation” (Angelsen 2007). 
Indeed, land tenure is often second in the decision processes, and economic conditions, 
demography, market opportunities and threats, seems to have much more influence on 
deforestation rates. Bromley (2008) insists on the idea that the degradation of the 
commons often arises from factors outside of the commons rather than arising from 
‘perverse’ property rights and selfish behaviour within the commons. Less-favoured 
areas are typically characterized by a combination of low agricultural potential or poor 
market access, and often exist in an institutional setting that is not conducive to 
alternative viable development pathways. Bromley (2008) classifies less favoured areas 
in Africa as suffering from institutional isolation and decay. With institutional isolation, 
purchase of inputs and sale of outputs must “run a gauntlet” of high information costs, 
high contracting costs, and high enforcement costs. This phenomenon is also present in 
South Asia. High transaction costs prevent remote farmers from using purchased inputs 
in the ideal quantities, and thus hinder adoption of soil and water conservation 
practices. Necessary investments are postponed, cropping intensity suffers, production 
declines, net economic returns are diminished, and a gradual degradation in the natural 
resource base is the inevitable result (Bromley 2008). 
 
A meta-analysis prepared by Robinson et al (2011), tends to show that “although greater 
implied tenure security seems to improve the probability of positive forest outcomes, 
tenure security by no means prevents change in forest cover” (p. 20). The author 
specifies that their results show that “all forms of tenure are susceptible to tenure 
insecurity” and warns against the idea that property rights over natural resources “are 
often naïvely viewed along a spectrum of “strength’ from unstable open access systems 
to strong private ownership”. Their statistical analysis reveals an “association between 
negative forest outcomes and communal land in Africa” (as opposite to Central and 
125 
 
South America). The authors think they could be explained by “the effects of regional 
conflicts” (p. 29). This does not seem a convincing explanation, since most of the case 
studies are related to Tanzania, Kenya and Zambia, countries not really affected by 
regional conflicts. Such negative results of communal land tenure with respect to 
forestry outcomes could be confirmed with the “community forests” in Cameroon, 
plagued by governance problem (Yufanyi Movuh & Schusser 2012; and Vermeulen et al 
2006). A parallel can be drawn with Bromley’s argument about institutional decay: local 
governance in community forestry is highly sensitive to the overall governance 
conditions prevailing at national and local scale (“decentralization of the corruption”, to 
paraphrase Prud’homme, 1995), since they are “embedded” into various institutional 
arrangements. 
 
Tenure security is not given by a paper (a title) but depends on the institutional context 
that prevails locally and the importance of land pressures, which itself depend on 
several factors, inter alia, demographic dynamics in rural areas (including migrations), 
potential and nature of the investment, etc. Where property rights creation are linked 
(by customs or by the national legislation) to forest clearing, and if there is growing land 
competition, there are institutionalized incentives for conversion. If collective land 
tenure is recognized and protected, the outcome in terms of forest protection might be 
better than on private holding, since the clearing decision will need a collective 
agreement which can be difficult to reach. 
 
Land Tenure Clarification: A Prerequisite For REDD+ and PES 
Implementation 
 
Instruments for incentivizing forest conservation and sustainable management, such as 
PES, requires nonetheless land tenure clarity and security. 
 
Schlager and Ostrom (1992) framework analysis about the “bundle of rights” (for land, 
but also for resources such as trees)is now widely adopted by scholars. This framework 
includes, respectively, right of access, withdrawal, management, exclusion and 
alienation, each of which incorporates the previous ones. The concept of bundle of rights 
acknowledges that individuals may hold some forms of rights, while not holding others. 
Only the “owner” holds all the rights mentioned here.  
 
 
 Owner Proprietor Claimant Authorized user 
Access and withdrawal X X X X 
Management X X X 1)  
Exclusion X X 2)  3)  
Alienation X 4)  5)  6)  
Table 7: Bundle of Rights Associated with Positions 
Source: Schlager and Ostrom 1992. 
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Changes in land tenure rules may be crucial for implementing user-oriented incentive 
systems at the local level. In many tropical countries, tropical forests are state property 
in one form or another. Access to the forest is through forest concessions, for timber 
exploitation, or different kinds of land concessions when the purpose is to clear the land 
for agricultural development. In many tropical countries, private ownership of land 
(with partial or full property rights) is still conditional upon developing the land, i.e. 
deforesting it to plant crops. In French speaking African countries, this is the clause of 
“mise en valeur” (development of the land) that can be found in almost all land tenure 
codes. Reforming such land tenure codes to allow individuals, families and communities 
to claim property or collective tenure rights on the land they use, without being pushed 
to deforest in support of such claims, will be an important policy shift to encourage 
within national REDD+ strategies (Karsenty and Assembé 2011). 
 
Clarifying effective management and exclusion rights is a precondition for contracting 
and foreseeing possible PES for keeping the forest (Wunder 2007; and Kaimowitz 
2008). Protecting a forest requires an effective and, possibly, legal capacity to exclude 
outsiders (such as encroachers and illegal loggers) and to manage a given piece of forest 
land to ensure liability (fulfilment of contractual commitments). The right to alienate is 
contingent in such contexts, and would not be appropriate in situations where 
individual (family) rights to lands are embedded in communitarian rights. Contracting 
for PES on well identified territories with local dwellers will lead to de facto recognition 
of some property rights to the forest land (effective management and exclusion rights), 
the minimum basis for enforcing such contractual agreements. De facto recognition of 
key property rights will exacerbate the tension with the de jure public ownership and 
will call for land tenure reforms in countries where forests remain under state 
ownership.  
 
REDD+ 
 
Will REDD+ be the “silver bullet” the international community was eagerly looking for 
to stop the deforestation process at global scale? REDD+ has been developed as a 
“positive incentive” to compensate countries for reducing emissions from deforestation 
and forest degradation, with an assumption that this will lead to development pathways 
towards sustainable land use. REDD+ is a positive incentive instrument by design, and 
not a cap-and-trade instrument27, due to the voluntary nature (meaning developing 
countries choose to participate) and the “no-liability” design, meaning that there are no 
sanctions for participating countries that do not reduce, or even increase, emissions. 
The question of REDD+ architecture is not bound to a cap-and-trade type system, but 
                                                          
27 A cap-and-trade scheme requires an authority to decide a maximum amount (rationing) of “rights” (emission rights, catching 
rights, production rights….) to be put at the disposal of economic agents for a given portion of time. The rights can be allocated 
through different ways (free allocation, administrative selling, auctioning) and are transferable among the agents.  
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remains open, and should be determined by the most cost-effective method of reaching 
the objectives of REDD+. REDD+ is praised for its “performance-based” dimension 
(payments are conditioned upon verified results in emissions reduction from 
deforestation and degradation and proportioned to them), and opposed to more 
traditional approaches where financial transfers were associated to the design of 
nationals plans (typically the National Forest Action Plans) without regard to the 
results. The second feature making REDD+ attractive is the non-intervention principle 
that respect sovereignty: REDD+ countries are free to decide which means they will use 
for achieving their targets. It represents a shift from approaches based on 
“conditionalities”, in which disbursements were released only if certain public policy 
actions and legal measures were taken. Such an approach, often associated with the 
“structural adjustment” periods under the auspices of the IMF and the World Bank, is 
seen as preventing the ownership of reforms – adopted under “external pressure” – and, 
therefore, with limited effectiveness. However, we will see that such attractive features 
are facing huge implementation challenges and the ambition exhibited at the inception 
of REDD+ in 2005 is shaded with mounting doubts about the workability of the 
mechanism. The design of the mechanism raises concerns about its capacity to deliver 
effective and permanent emission reductions, due notably to the potential arbitrary 
choice of the “reference”, i.e. the level of emissions against which the reduction will be 
calculated. REDD+ is questioned from the perspective of environmental integrity but 
also for it potential impact on local communities and indigenous people who might lose 
some critical access rights in the name of “reducing emissions” (Phelps et al 2011). 
 
The difficulty to move, in the international negotiation, from principles agreed upon by 
countries to an operational mechanism with precise rules, highlights the gap between 
simple ideas based on the economic theories of “rational choices” and “incentives” on 
which REDD+ has been based, and the complexity of dealing with national decision 
processes and the effects of globalization that increase land demand and foster 
displacements of land uses. The principle of basing payments on measurable 
“performance” in reducing emissions from deforestation (i.e. quantified reductions on a 
given period of time against an agreed reference level), is not really workable when 
countries face severe institutional dysfunctions which limit the effectiveness of the 
government and the reach of public interventions. A growing number of evidences show 
that before performance-based payments become practicable, there is a need to invest 
over a long period and work along with governments to create the necessary conditions 
for tackling the drivers of deforestation, and sometimes it is about rebuilding national 
institutions – not a swift and cheap action. The ambition, once exhibited, to shift from 
an “old” to a “new” principle of international cooperation is stumbling on the issue of 
local governance, “fragile states” and the limited reach of national public policies 
regarding external factors linked to liberalized and globalized markets. There is 
currently a growing awareness of such limitations, and, without abandoning the 
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principle of designing a “performance-based” payments mechanism, reflections are 
developing on the possibility to widen the scope of acknowledging  “performance”, 
linking them with a process (with milestones and “proxies”) and not only to a 
measurable output in term of emission reductions. In sum, the “REDD+ community” is 
following the same pathway the aid community has taken two decades ago about the 
concept of conditioning aid to performances, under the so-called “output-based aid”. In 
the ODA (Official Development Assistance) case, the concept of “performance-based 
aid” has remained more an ambition than a reality, even though it has been helpful for 
better understanding the obstacles on development and designing more effective aid 
policies. 
 
The “Three Phases” Approach 
 
The three-phase approach, which has wide support within the UNFCCC negotiations on 
REDD+, has been clearly detailed in the Meridian Institute Report (Zarin et al 2009) 
and is featured as “a flexible, phased approach to implementation”. This approach has 
been endorsed by the Cancun Agreements.  
 
The Meridian Institute Report details the three phases as: 
 
 Phase 1focusing on “National REDD+ strategy development, including national 
dialogue, institutional strengthening, and demonstration activities”. This phase is 
intended to be funded by multilateral institutions with immediately available voluntary 
contributions, such as the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF) and the United 
Nations collaborative initiative on Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and Forest 
Degradation (UN-REDD), and bilateral assistance.  
 
 Phase 2 is to allow “implementation of policies and measures (PAMs) proposed 
in those national REDD+ strategies”. The funding of this phase is supposed to be 
ensured by “internationally binding finance instrument with enforceable commitments, 
such as assigned amount units (AAU) auctioning revenue”. Zarin et al (2009) suggest 
that “eligibility for access to those funds should be based on a demonstrated national 
commitment to REDD+ strategy implementation, with continued access based on 
performance including proxy indicators of emission reductions and/or removal 
enhancements (e.g. reduction in area deforested)”. Clearly, phase 2 is intended to be a 
transition between general support to reinforcement of institutions and a performance-
based scheme. Here the “performance” notion is associated with demonstrated national 
commitment to implement a REDD+ strategy, albeit determined outcomes, via 
indicators in terms of reduced deforestation.  
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 Phase 3focuses on “Payment for performance on the basis of quantified forest 
emissions and removals against agreed reference levels”. The Meridian Report leaves 
the financing option open, outlining the sale of REDD+ units within global compliance 
markets or a non-market compliance mechanism as two broad options.  
 
Main Potential Architectures for REDD+ 
 
One can identify four main approaches, with possible combinations and variations in 
each option. 
 
1. REDD+ as a global market-based (cap-and-trade type) mechanism rewarding 
national governments with (fully or partially) marketable “carbon credits” for the 
reduction of deforestation (and degradation, if monitoring proves to be possible) in a 
given commitment period post-2012; 
 
 Dual market: To protect the carbon market against possible “flooding” (over-
supply) of carbon credits, REDD+ can be designed as a specific (forest-only or LULUCF-
only) market-based mechanism, not fungible with Kyoto emission allowances. REDD+ 
countries would be rewarded with specific carbon assets for achieving national targets of 
deforestation reduction, with industrialized governments having agreed to purchase a 
specified amount of such assets. 
 
2. REDD+ as a project-based scheme (extended CDM type), in which the reduction 
of emissions from projects will be certified and project-holders would have the 
possibility to sell their certified emission reductions on the global market. 
 
 In order to avoid loopholes and leakage risks associated with a full project-based 
approach, a “nested approach” has been proposed by Pedroni et al (2009). In the nested 
approach, accounting and crediting takes place at both the sub-national (project) and 
the national level. At the end of each accounting period, the country would have to 
deduct all credits issued and committed at the sub-national level from national credits 
for country-wide emission reductions (Angelsen 2008). A key question mark remains 
though: Should the national level fail to deliver carbon benefits, would independently 
validated and verified sub-national activities still be credited, and if so, by whom? 
 
3. REDD+ as a centralised funding scheme (backed by an international fund), 
rewarding the government for succeeding in curbing deforestation against an agreed 
target or baseline. This non-market approach is essentially the same as what was 
previously called the Brazilian proposal (Federal Republic of Brazil 2007), even though 
the Brazilian government has considered the possibility of selling carbon credits on its 
domestic market if the industrialised countries first reduce their emissions. Many 
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“innovative financing sources” have been proposed that could provide the income for 
such a fund without relying on government aid. 
 
4. REDD+ as an investment instrument (backed by an international fund) for 
financing (sectoral and extra-sectoral) policies and measures. In such an approach there 
is no baseline, but agreements with governments to implement cross-sectoral and 
integrative strategies focusing on agriculture changes, land tenure and land-use 
incentives mainly for farmers. Performances will be assessed through policy 
implementation indicators rather than through changes in deforestation rates against a 
baseline. 
 
Strengths and Weaknesses of the Various Architecture Proposals 
 
Leaving aside the difficulties associated with the “performance-based” approaches (the 
first three options) which entail baselines settings, or to the issue of additionality and 
the associated risk of “hot air” (or uncontrolled inflation of the costs of REDD+ in a 
fund-based approach), we will explore other features of the proposals, and further 
explore option 4 which bypasses the problem of quantifying emissions reductions and 
baseline setting by basing performance on the achievement of agreed policies and 
measures. 
 
Non-fungibility in a Market-based Approach? 
 
One variant or “specific market-based mechanism” of proposal 1 is based on the non-
fungibility of REDD+ credits in order to protect the carbon price on existing markets 
which are sensitive to the oversupply of credits. The assumed strength of proposals 
based on carbon markets would be potential to collect large amounts of money thanks to 
the private companies that will have to offset their emissions to fulfill their legal 
obligations (compliance market) on the national territories or regional jurisdiction they 
operate. Here, the expected demand would be created by voluntary commitments of 
Annex I governments28 in addition to their reductions targets in the non-forest sectors. 
There is a risk that Annex I governments could be reluctant to increase their reduction 
burden, or that they will implicitly balance (i.e. revise downward) their non-forest 
commitments with their anticipated REDD+ commitments. 
 
A possible alternative would be to create a dual market for land based credits 
(fungibility between REDD+ and LULUCF credits only) and to set new, additional 
                                                          
28 Annex I countries are those who adopted quantified greenhouse gases mitigation objectives when the Kyoto Protocol has been 
adopted. Most of the industrialized countries endorsed the Protocol (except the USA, which signed but not endorse it). In 2011, the 
Canada decided to withdraw from the Protocol. China, now the largest emitter, and other emerging countries such as India or Brazil, 
are not willing to adopt quantitative caps on their emissions in a future regime to be discussed by 2015. 
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targets for these sectors. However, the potential demand for carbon credits which 
cannot be used widely to offset fossil emissions in a compliance market is quite 
uncertain. Furthermore, choosing such a government-based approach may no longer 
require a “market” on which to trade credits, since the Annex I governments are not 
doing their reductions “at home”, but are relying on the capacity to use flexibility 
mechanisms29 if they cannot meet their targets at reasonable costs. In sum, this variant 
is not fundamentally different from the centralized funding approach, except that it 
makes it easier for bilateral cooperation between potential buyers (Annex I countries) 
and sellers (developing countries) of REDD+ carbon credits. 
 
The “Nested Approach”: Solution, Compromise or Back to Project-based? 
 
The nested approach attempts to reconcile carbon trading with crediting projects 
directly through project developers rather than via governments. Through this, it would 
meet the expectations of both the private sector looking for project-based carbon 
business opportunities and the “project developers” (notably conservation NGOs) who 
do not trust the governments to redistribute REDD+ monies or to financially support 
REDD+ projects in a national-based approach. The nested approach can be considered 
as the current “mainstream”, though it is hard to see how it actually differs from a mere 
project-based approach. 
 
In a box entitled “How a nested approach could work”, Angelsen et al (2008) indicate 
that: 
 
“A project generates 1000 tons of carbon dioxide emission reductions during the 
accounting period. The country’s overall reduction (carbon credits) is 5000 tons during 
the period. The 1000 tons already credited to the project have to be deducted from the 
national balance. To allow for project-level leakage, monitoring, reporting and 
verification (MRV) costs, and the risk of non-permanence (higher emissions in the 
future), the government may retain a certain share of the carbon credits assigned to the 
project. Thus the government and the project might make a deal that the project keeps 
70 percent of the credits while the government keeps 30 percent. In this scenario, the 
project would keep 700 credits and the government 4300 credits.” 
                                                          
29 Flexibility mechanisms differ from the cap-and-trade mechanism in the sense they are project-based activities, while the cap-and-
trade regime is based on national objectives of emission reductions (and passed on to the economic branches, ultimately to the 
enterprises).  Project-based emission reductions need the design of a business-as-usual scenario (“what would be the emissions 
without the incentives to reduce?”) and can generate potentially a very large number of certificates of emissions reduction (“carbon 
credits”) since the number of potential projects is almost unlimited(the main difference with a cap-and-trade regime). The two main 
flexibility mechanisms used for the Kyoto Protocol are the Joint Implementation scheme (projects in Annex I country) and the Clean 
Development Mechanism (projects in non-Annex I and developing countries), this last generating around 90% of the carbon credits 
of those flexibility mechanisms. A maximum of 10% of carbon credits issued through such mechanisms are allowed for Annex I 
countries to fulfill their national objectives. China, India and Brazil have benefited the much from the CDM, through the sale of CDM 
credits generated by their domestic projects (e.g. industrial GHG gases removal) to Northern companies.  
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In short, the projects are credited first (possibly with a discount to cope with the various 
risks) and the government takes the credits from reductions that are surplus to the 
aggregated reductions from projects (provided that there is one). But what happens if a 
country sees an increase in national deforestation (i.e. deforestation above the agreed 
reference level), while all the projects are certified as having reduced deforestation in 
their areas of intervention? The nested approach seems to have been conceived with 
small countries in mind, where aggregated project areas would cover a significant share 
of the country’s forest surface. But in large countries such as Brazil, the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (DRC) and Indonesia, it is most likely that “REDD+ projects” would 
cover only a fraction of the forested area nationwide. It is likely that a country would 
encourage, on the one hand, REDD+ projects in given areas, while on the other hand 
allocating large tracts of forest land to timber companies and agribusiness in other 
areas. Alternatively, leakage could take place from the areas under REDD+ projects, 
with a displacement of the pressure of deforestation in the other forested areas. As the 
nested approach is implicitly a market-based approach, it would create hot air, unless a 
safeguard would prevent crediting projects if there is no reduction of deforestation at 
national level. But Angelsen et al (2008) specify: “Should the national level fail to 
deliver carbon benefits, independently validated and verified sub-national activities 
would still be credited.” This position is logical: the former option (no crediting) would 
prevent private actors to invest in carbon projects where they do not manage the 
outcome in terms of crediting. But it would be at the expense of environmental integrity.  
Acknowledging such a difficulty, a working paper of the CDC Climate (Deheza and 
Bellassen 2012) suggests the government (or the jurisdictional entity, such as the sub-
national State) could guarantee the project promoters a purchase (and a subsequent 
destruction for avoiding selling “hot air”) of the carbon credits emitted by the project 
(and verified), in order to secure the investor for being rewarded for their own “carbon 
performance” whatever the national results would be. However, it would call for clear 
commitments and a strong credibility of national and sub-national governments, 
something which is precisely one significant part of the problem for fighting global 
deforestation. 
 
In a real commodity market, the buyer and seller usually have opposite interests as 
regards the measurement of volumes exchanged. In an open forest carbon market where 
buyers are constrained to buy offsets, where uncertainty on MRV data, liabilities and 
origin could be very high, both the seller and the buyer could have an interest in 
overestimating volumes (the project to sell more, the company to offset more and/or to 
pay low prices). 
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The Fund-based Approaches 
 
Fund-based30 approaches in REDD+ are often disregarded for their alleged incapacity to 
collect enough money, compared to market-based approaches (Edf & IPAM 2007; and 
                                                          
30 In this instance, “fund-based” refers to all options to raising finance which do not involve trading credits on a carbon market. This 
includes public monies, as well as potential taxes and levies (including on carbon markets) and private investment. The “fund” where 
monies are raised is not contractually bound to a project or emissions reduction, which allows different options to be explored for 
the distribution of financial incentives. 
Box 6: The Issue of Permanence 
 
As with the CDM, non-permanence is a critical issue for REDD+, especially in an 
approach in which carbon credits would be used as offsets to “compensate” for 
actual emissions: forest emissions removals can only be guaranteed for the duration 
of REDD+ (probably a few decades) whereas the emissions from fossil fuels that 
forest offsets would allow are irreversible. Although no decision has been made in 
the UNFCCC negotiations on this point, the debates are similar to those that took 
place in the development of the CDM. Some, like those who prepared the seminal 
proposal (Santilli et al 2005), consider that the same solution would apply, i.e. the 
issuance of temporary credits. Others (Zarin et al 2009) are looking for alternative 
accounting solutions such as setting aside a certain quantity of credits over 
commitments periods (“buffer accounts”) or insurance schemes (although an 
insurance scheme cannot prevent the non-permanent carbon credits from being 
used as an emission permit elsewhere). 
 
In a carbon trading approach, to cope with non-permanence, REDD+ credits would 
have to be discounted. Indeed, discounting is the traditional economic response in 
the face of risky assets. Discounting has also been proposed as a way of mitigating 
the risk of non-additionality or leakage (The Nature Conservancy, Conservation 
International & Wildlife Conservation Society 2010). Buffer accounts are also an 
indirect manner of discounting, since only a fraction of the credits are available by 
the host country for selling. 
 
However, it is frequently overlooked that discounting reduces incentives, especially 
when the opportunity costs of conserving forests are high. There is in fact a 
contradiction between the (fully rational) claims that there must be a high level of 
incentives for developing countries to reduce deforestation, and the (no less 
rational) statement that to cope with the risks of non-permanence, limited 
additionality and potential leakage, the carbon assets that constitute these 
incentives should be discounted. 
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Swickard & Carnahan 2010). There are also numerous issues associated with the 
governance of an international fund, regarding the balanced representation of donors 
and recipient countries, of civil society, and of international organizations such as the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank; eligibility criteria; and 
disbursement procedures. Large funds could also generate an internal bureaucracy and 
cumbersome procedures that often undermine their efficiency and legitimacy in REDD+ 
Countries. Yet, the Durban Agreements encourage the operating entities of the financial 
mechanism of the Convention (i.e. the GEF and the emerging Green Climate Fund) to 
provide results-based finance for REDD+. 
 
Funds Allow for Multiple Objectives beyond Carbon 
 
One advantage with a fund-based approach is that it allows for multiple objectives. 
Biodiversity will more readily be taken into account in the REDD+ activities under a 
fund-based approach than under a market-based one which, in spite of all the 
safeguards and the guidelines that will be produced, will inevitably tend to focus on the 
only "marketable asset", carbon (Phelps et al 2011) and on the safest, most profitable 
areas. For example dry forests – where many rural poor live, especially in Africa and 
South Asia, and where there are high levels of biodiversity – are currently neglected as 
targets for REDD+ demonstration activities (Wertz-Kanounnikoff and Kongphan-apirak 
2009). The market-based approach is criticized by NGOs and analysts who emphasize 
that REDD+ may disempower local people, through recentralization (Phelps et al 2010) 
and “land-grabbing” for carbon. 
 
Collecting enough money for an international fund is technically feasible, but it is 
essentially a question of political will. In a draft paper entitled “Mobilizing Climate 
Finance – A Paper Prepared at the Request of G20 Finance Ministers” (IMF 2011a), the 
international institutions in charge of its writing recall that “Its starting point is the 
commitment made in the Copenhagen Accord and Cancun Agreements on the part of 
developed countries to provide new and additional resources for climate change 
activities in developing countries. This commitment approaches US $30 billion for the 
period 2010–2012 and US $100 billion per year by 2020, drawing on a wide range of 
resources, public and private, bilateral and multilateral, including innovative sources.” 
Innovative sources include international taxation schemes. For Nordhaus (2009), such 
schemes are the only ones that could finance very large investments, which are 
predictable and sustainable. It could be a tax on international financial transactions and 
on financial exchanges, a national or European “carbon tax” with the proceeds of 
“border adjustment tax” (to protect against imports from countries without emissions 
constraints) to be poured in the Green Climate Fund, or it could be a levy on 
international aviation and maritime bunker fuels. It could be also a portion of the 
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auctioning of emissions permits, as contemplated by the EU for the next commitment 
period of the European Trading Scheme (ETS). 
 
Clearly many of these options are workable only if they are implemented by a critical 
mass of Countries, in order to avoid unfair competition and the displacement of 
industries and activities in tax-free countries, etc. It is difficult to predict how the global 
and European governance will evolve in the coming years.  
 
An Approach that Avoids the Thorny Issue of Baseline/Reference Setting 
 
A fundamental difference between the architecture of options 3 and 4 is that the last one 
bypasses the difficulty (which many consider insoluble) of setting a reference level 
(prediction of future deforestation, possibly compounded by political negotiation) 
against which the “performance” of the country would be measured. Option 3 is about 
rewarding “performance” (with financial incentives), while option 4 is about investing, 
along with committed governments, to address the drivers of deforestation and to 
engage the country under a different development pathway, referred to as a “green 
economy” (UNEP 2011) or "low emission rural development strategies". 
 
The Limits of the Theory of Rational Choices and of Financial Incentives 
 
“REDD+ countries have an incentive to reduce deforestation up to the point where the 
marginal cost of reductions (i.e. the national supply curve of REDD) is equal to the 
international compensation, for example, the market price for REDD+ credits” 
(Angelsen 2008). Such a statement is typical of the “theory of rational choices”, an 
approach we will discuss now in relation to the issue of “fragile states”. The very notion 
of "fragile states", albeit controversial, refers to the OECD (2007) definition which 
characterizes countries where there is a “lack of political will and/or capacity to provide 
the basic functions needed for poverty reduction, development and to safeguard the 
security and human rights of their populations”. Such a definition emphasizes the two 
issues we want to address: the will and the capacity to implement public policies that 
would tackle vested interests for changing the existing trends favoring deforestation. 
 
The “storyline” of REDD+ as an incentives-based system, inspired by the rational 
choices theory, can be stated as follows: “Deforestation in developing countries is a 
problem of opportunity cost: the governments (or actors in developing countries?) 
decide to deforest, or not, the countries chose to deforest as they earn more compared to 
conservation or SFM. The state can be assimilated to any other economic agent, making 
rational decisions by comparing the relative prices associated with the alternatives 
offered. Then, the government is acting by adopting the appropriate measures for 
reducing deforestation and modifying its development pathway.” This storyline is 
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consistent with the position of that describes REDD+ as “not encroaching on the 
sovereign discretion of nations to design acceptable and adequate policies and measures 
nationally” (Streck 2010; p. 389). 
 
Two assumptions underlying the REDD+ proposal are particularly arguable: (i) the idea 
that the governments of such states are in a position to make a decision for shifting its 
development pathway on the basis of a cost-benefits analysis anticipating financial 
rewards, and (ii) the idea that, once such a decision has been made, the financial 
rewards enable the “fragile” state to implement and enforce the appropriate policies and 
measures which could translate into reduced deforestation (Karsenty and Ongolo2012). 
 
Are States Rational and Autonomous Agents? 
 
Can a state be regarded as having an economic objective function with a single set of 
preferences, able to adjust its behavior on the basis of incentives? An economic agent is 
expected to have an ordered set of preferences (any option can be classified 
hierarchically according to its utility) and make decisions based on a calculation of 
value. It is easy to understand that any state is subject to conflicts of interest between 
government departments and public agencies, a situation that is exacerbated in 
countries where the state does not have sufficient autonomy to impose solutions of 
general interest on the different competing parties. 
 
Moreover, public policies are characterized by legacies to be managed, and a high level 
of path-dependence vis-à-vis previous choices that prohibit “autonomy” of public 
decision-making similar to that envisaged for the theoretical agents who are capable of 
comparing relative prices and making decisions accordingly. It is difficult to believe that 
even Brazil (which is not a fragile state) could suddenly break with its development 
model, which is based on the development of agro-exports which, in turn, are based on 
national capitalism; it is also unlikely that Indonesia (which could be considered as 
relatively more fragile than Brazil) would be able to enforce a forest law in provinces 
that have been empowered since the late 1990s; it is also unlikely that the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (one of the most fragile states) would give up state ownership of 
forests that allow governments to enjoy monetary and political benefits through the 
allocation of forest concessions and lands. 
 
Paradoxically, the “democratization” and “decentralization” that have marked changes 
in the last twenty years in countries of the South may have contributed to further 
complicating the decision-making process at the national level. National parliaments are 
more or less openly relaying the position of some economic pressure groups, and 
parliamentarians have become much more sensitive to the problem of maintaining jobs 
in their constituencies, especially when the need to increase revenue for central 
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government leads to the elimination of a number of activities that generate revenue and 
employment in forested areas. 
 
The assimilation of a government to an economic agent appears to be problematic in 
light of the theory of incentives. There is a second assumption underlying the “REDD+ 
proposal”, that a government can voluntarily (because encouraged to do so) reduce the 
levels of deforestation on its own territory. This assumption has become questionable 
since nation states have had to deal with liberalized global markets. Furthermore, the 
fact that many of the countries targeted under the REDD+ initiative are going through a 
period of crisis (as in the case of the DRC), the assumption becomes even more difficult 
to support. 
 
Forest-related Policies in Fragile States 
 
Since deforestation is a cross-sectoral issue, meeting REDD+ objectives will only be 
possible if significant changes occur outside the forest sector: agriculture, land tenure, 
transports, mines, energy and governance and, indeed, globally.  Yet the agendas of the 
other stakeholders often differ from that of the ministry in charge of the forests and the 
“REDD+ community”. There are specific difficulties, particularly in fragile states, to 
ensure that the public interest (as opposed to vested interests) is adequately represented 
in the political system, especially if potential losers from REDD+ implementation (such 
as farmers, logging or agribusiness companies) are not guaranteed proper 
compensation. 
 
To counter the influence of vested interests that will benefit from forest conversion, the 
“financial approach” based on the compensation of opportunity costs is unlikely to 
deliver. Other stakeholders’ interests will need to be heard to influence the decision 
process. But there is a significant risk that "improved" enforcement under REDD+ hits 
the most vulnerable citizens first, jeopardizing their livelihoods and silencing their 
claims.  REDD+ implementation and incentives should therefore target the biggest 
players first, and with proportionate means. 
 
For all these reasons – the consolidation of fragile states, the gradual promotion of the 
general interest over vested interests and the proportionate progress of the rule of law – 
are long but necessary detours for enabling REDD+ to work in these countries: and an 
appropriate REDD+ strategy can be a catalyst for these changes and contribute to their 
implementation. 
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Discussing and Broadening the Notion of Performance 
 
The notion of performance-based payments is critical in the three-phased approach as it 
is the basis for continuing disbursement of incentives in phase 2 and (especially so) in 
phase 3. The “performance” referred to by Zarin et al (2009) is primarily based on 
measurable results in curbing deforestation, and only secondarily on the commitment of 
governments to policy implementation. With respect to efficiency, the emphasis on this 
specific dimension of performance leads back to the issue of the baseline, whether it is a 
BAU baseline or “crediting baseline” giving room for national circumstances. An 
“inappropriate” baseline (providing there is a possibility to do accurate predictions on 
the evolution of deforestation for a given commitment period, a point of contestation in 
the literature) would allow countries to claim “performance” that to a greater or lesser 
degree would have been created by the baseline design. The Australian case (Macintosh, 
2010) provides a good illustration of this kind of situation (“[Australia’s] deforestation 
baseline under the Kyoto Protocol was deliberately manipulated”), and the author 
warns: “More than simply highlighting how difficult reducing REDD emissions in 
developing countries is likely to be, the Australian experience is a reminder of how the 
environmental credibility of an international REDD scheme could be undermined”.  
 
The notion of “performance” relies on the idea that all governments have an equal 
capacity to curb deforestation once they have taken the decision to enter the REDD+ 
scheme. The example of Brazil shows that a newly industrialized country, with a 
committed government and a high level of human and technical capacities, can succeed 
at reducing deforestation through better law enforcement and proactive measures 
(despite the overlooked leakage in terms of carbon emissions associated with the 
displacement of large-scale agriculture operations in the Cerrados (biodiversity and 
carbon-rich savannahs). However the situation in the majority of developing and 
forested countries is very different to that of Brazil. Indonesia, which is yet an emerging 
economy, whose government has not succeeded in imposing a genuine moratorium in 
the face of the agriculture and pulp industry lobbies (even for a temporary two-year 
period) on natural forest conversion31, despite an incentive of US $1 billion pledged by 
Norway, is an illustration of that difference. The majority of highly forested tropical 
countries are less advanced, and with a lower level of human and technical capacities. 
Many African countries lie in this category. It is very unlikely that these countries will be 
in a position to significantly curb deforestation and degradation whatever the incentives 
they are offered. Recalling how long it took for Australia to translate formally adopted 
measures into tangible results, Macintosh (2010) indicates: “The difficulty that Australia 
has experienced in controlling deforestation should serve as a warning about the 
potential obstacles that stand in the way of an environmentally effective international 
                                                          
31 Only the primary forests, already protected by law for the bulk of them, are covered by the promulgated moratorium (Murdiyarso 
et al 2011). 
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REDD scheme. If a country like Australia finds it hard to halt deforestation, what is the 
outlook for developing countries with less advanced institutional, governance, 
monitoring and economic systems?” 
 
It is not a mere issue of traditional “institutional building” programs which are required 
under phase 2 to curb deforestation in these countries; it is about rehabilitating the state 
in countries described as “fragile” states. In this respect, there are two options:  
 
i.       Disregard these countries participation in the REDD+ mechanism, which would 
limit REDD+ to a handful of countries that could in all likelihood reduce deforestation 
without external incentives; 
 
ii.             Reconsider the notion of “performance”, moving from physical and measurable 
results in deforestation/degradation reductions to concrete evidences of effective and 
sustained implementation of political decisions that are explicitly designed to reduce 
deforestation. 
 
This does not mean that donors should “dictate” the content of the policies and 
measures to be adopted; otherwise the appropriation of these policies is likely to be very 
formal with weak implementation. This issue has been already discussed in the 
literature focusing of the effectiveness of aid. For instance Collier et al (1997), who 
advocate a performance-based approach for the delivery of Official Development 
Assistance (ODA), acknowledge that “even where outcomes are fully observable, they 
are usually not fully under the control of the government”, and that “some of the 
outcomes in which donors are the most interested are slow changing, most notably 
poverty, and so conditioning aid upon these outcomes becomes problematic”. If one 
replaces the term “poverty” by “deforestation”, the parallel between the two 
conversations becomes striking. Collier et al (1997) further suggest “performance would 
need to be evaluated over a longer period than the current tranche-based system” and, 
in order to take into account “circumstances” and minimizing the risk of “punishing 
governments which are unfortunate and rewarding those which are fortunate”, they 
suggest to undertake ex-post “effective evaluation should therefore … attempt to correct 
for circumstances outside the control of the governments”.  
 
It seems extremely unlikely that “performance” could be translated entirely, even during 
phase3, into measurable results in terms of reduced emissions from deforestation and 
forest degradation. Without coming back to additionality (and its corollary, 
effectiveness) and the baseline-setting issue, the uneven capacities of governments to 
control the interacting factors that constitute the embedded causes of deforestation, call 
for a pragmatic and differentiated approach. In “fragile” states, the governance issue 
would have to be addressed well beyond the “capacity building” dimension of phase 2. 
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“Performance” should be understood in a broad sense, with a mix of indicators based on 
the effective and sustained implementation of policies and measures and some elements 
of performance that can be considered as correct “proxies” for reduced deforestation 
and the resultant emission reductions. Perhaps you should mention this earlier—more 
generally every term that is used in a way different than what most people understand, 
better to define it the first time it is mentioned. It is not technically difficult, for 
example, for even a weak government to cancel the forest concessions which are not 
properly implementing a compulsory management plan (for which quantitative 
indicators can be easily derived). Beyond such measures, what would matter will be the 
coherence of the public policies designed, their relevance for curbing deforestation and 
degradation, the sustained efforts for implementing the measures proposed and 
overcome the various obstacles (institutional or politic). Of course, the measured 
evolution of deforestation would be also part of the evaluation, but evidences that such 
evolution is connected with the policies and measures implemented would be needed to 
avoid misinterpretations of the monitored trends. For instance, there is a debate in 
Brazil about what has driven the dramatic fall in deforestation rate. As Mongabay.com 
put it:  
 
"Deforestation in Brazil remains a serious problem despite the fall in rates between 
2005 and 2010. Only part of this decrease was the result of government programs or 
stricter enforcement of environmental laws," eminent Amazon scientist Philip Fearnside 
wrote in an op-ed published (November 28, 2011) in The Financial Times. "The main 
reason was that the international price of beef and soya fell from 2003 to 2007, and this 
was followed by the global economic collapse that began in 2008. Over that period, the 
Brazilian real almost doubled relative to currencies such as the US dollar. This cut the 
profits of commodity exporters deeply, as all their expenses remained in reals while 
their revenues were in diminished foreign currencies." 
 
In a working paper published in early 2012, Brazilian researchers (Assunção et al 2012) 
presented the results of an econometric study attempting to disentangle between prices 
changes and public policies for explaining the slowdown of deforestation in the Brazilian 
Amazon. They have seen a positive correlation between rising agriculture crop prices 
and deforestation, but a negative correlation between cattle prices and deforestation32 
that can be explained by the contrasting effect of higher prices on ranchers’ strategies 
(high prices incite both to increase the number of cattle with pressure on the forestland, 
on one hand, and to sell more cattle to benefit from the high prices, which diminish the 
sizes of the herds and loosen the pressure). They attribute around 50 percent of the 
                                                          
32 Which differs for what Chomitz et al (2007) found for the 2001-03 period in the Brazilian Amazon where a clear correlation was 
shown between high farm gate prices of beef and deforestation rates. 
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deforestation decrease to change in prices; the rest is attributed to the public policies33. 
Although a very preliminary study which needs refinement for better understanding of 
the disaggregated cause-effects dynamics (for example the strengthening of the Real vis-
à-vis the USD which weakens the competitiveness of Brazilian exports seems not having 
being factored), this is a very valuable contribution to a better understanding of “what 
shapes performance?” that could inform the evaluation process (remaining aware that 
Brazil is probably, for the time being, the only country where both deforestation and 
economic data are accurate enough to undertake such econometric analysis). These 
analyses tend also to indicate that this reduction of deforestation is, at least partially, 
reversible, since new macro-economic conditions could foster a new surge of 
deforestation. 
 
Overall, it is crucial for donors to understand that most of these explanators of 
“performance” will require “sustained investments” in various sectoral activities, which 
in the less-developed countries, should be the priority for foreign donors anyway. 
 
Who Could Assess Broadened Performance?  
 
A market-based (carbon trading) approach can work only with a narrow definition of 
performance, expressed in ton of CO2 equivalent avoided or sequestered, is adopted as 
established by MRV (Monitoring, Reporting and Verification) procedures. Broadening 
the definition of performances leads logically to consider another financing scheme for 
REDD+, with a collective decision process about financing the countries, informed by 
several indicators, studies and empirical evidences. 
 
Unlike many previous initiatives, REDD+ is conceived as a multilateral initiative, a 
situation that might have impacts on the nature of the activities supported and the 
definition of “performance”. Within bilateral agreements, the donor country can decide 
in agreement with the recipient country exactly what to pay for, what kind of activities 
will be supported and which are the conditions and safeguards to be put on 
disbursements. In fund-based REDD+ architecture the multilateral perspective makes 
this approach more challenging, especially when the content of national policies is at 
stake. The notion of “performance” might be differently addressed; even though many 
observers acknowledge that reducing performance to “emissions reduction against a 
reference level” is full of risk, due to the unresolved issue of the setting of the reference 
level (and difficulties in monitoring), it could be that this narrow definition will 
constitute the lowest common denominator acceptable in a multilateral scheme for the 
so-called phase 3. 
 
                                                          
33 With some empirical evidences showing sharp falls in deforestation rates after two major policy turning points in 2004 and 2008. 
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A broader and more effective approach would require agreed governance principles. A 
global fund for tropical forests will need a set of commonly shared principles such as 
“adopting a positive ‘investment’ approach towards socially and environmentally 
sustainable businesses of rights-holders” as suggested by an IIED review (McQueen 
2010) and independent expert reviewing, as established in the Global Fund to fight 
AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria (GFATM). Under such a set of principles, it can be 
foreseen that recipient governments will have to make proposals on strategies they 
intend to implement to achieve the REDD+ objectives. Independent expert reviewing 
would provide the basis for the decision of funding or not the proposed strategies 
through national REDD+ funds or national REDD+ programs (for instance to establish 
large-scale investment-oriented PES programs or to secure land tenure rights). 
 
A New Conditionality? 
 
For the donors, one of the most appealing characteristic of REDD+ is the “performance-
based payments”, meaning the recipient country chooses freely the means it will use 
(providing it complies with the safeguards agreed upon within the UNFCCC process) 
and the magnitude of efforts it will consent. In that sense, it could be featured as moving 
away for the practice of imposing “conditionalities” to the recipient country for debt 
relief and continuing funding, a practice generally associated with the IMF and the 
World Bank, which has been criticized for preventing the national ownership of policies 
designed and decided in offices abroad (Seymour and Dubash 2000). However, it worth 
to notice such conditions were associated with “structural adjustment programs” (SAP), 
a kind of brutal medicine for cutting dramatically in public expenditures, reducing the 
number of civil servants and so forth. If REDD+ provided sustained investments to the 
partners’ countries, resulting in a more productive and sustainable agriculture, clarified 
land rights, land-use planning, reinforced institutions (justice, forests…),34 the issue of 
“ownership” can hardly compare with what took place during the SAP times. One could 
expect more cooperative relationships, allowing for more balanced discussions on how 
to estimate the “performance” and to create the conditions to reach them. Admittedly, as 
far as financial transfers are concerned, the design of the policies and measures and 
their implementation will raise potentially diverging views between the donors and the 
recipient governments. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
34 One should keep in mind that, in essence, REDD+ transfers are about financial compensations for the opportunity cost of 
conserving forests. Therefore, normally the “benefits” from REDD+ are those which derive from keeping and managing sustainably 
forests (employments of the forest industry, timber taxes, NTFPs, and many other ecosystem services. In an investment-oriented 
REDD+ scheme, one should add to the formers the benefits produced by the investments in institutional building, agriculture, etc. 
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Conclusion 
 
Whatever the architecture finally decided, it seems more and more clear that REDD+ 
will not be a “quick and cheap” mean for curbing global greenhouse gases emissions. 
The “performance-based” remuneration principle, the expected comparative advantage 
of this incentive instrument, will prove to be hardly workable in the majority of potential 
REDD+ countries, characterized by ill-functioning institutions, poor governance quality 
and limited reach of the public action. Perhaps the only country where payments for 
performance would prove workable, would be Brazil, where national policies has been 
effective for curbing deforestation (even though not all the “performance” is attributable 
to the intentional action of the government, making the decrease of deforestation at 
least partially reversible). But Brazil’s case has also shown that financial incentives35 
have not been decisive for adopting policies tackling deforestation: the balance of social 
forces has been moved in favor of forests’ protectors (especially for the indigenous 
populations)  with the election of the Worker’s Party (PT) candidate in 2002, and 
national ambition of Brazil to be recognized as a global power and become a permanent 
member of the UN, called for building up an environmental credibility vis-à-vis the rest 
of the world. 
 
If political will to tackle deforestation is related to the need to build up credibility (at 
both national and international levels), incentives can be useful for helping committed 
politicians to justify their decisions in favor of forest protection and to circumvent 
vested interests; but conceived as such, it seems clear such incentives should not be 
necessarily in financial terms (joint and sustained investments for “greening” the 
economy and tackling the drivers of deforestation would certainly be more useful) for 
“performance” in emission reductions which does not depend entirely of the 
governments’ action. 
 
 
                                                          
35 Norway pledged up to one billion US$ to pour in the Amazon Fund if the trend of reduced deforestation is confirmed over time. It 
is unlikely such a pledge has been the trigger of the new policy trend vis-à-vis the Amazon, even if it could have comforted the 
government in the national debate with the agribusiness lobbies.   
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